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Abstract
In recent years, the need for lightweight encryption systems has been increasing as many
applications use RFID and sensor networks which have a very low computational power
and thus incapable of performing standard cryptographic operations. In response to this
problem, the cryptographic community designed a number of lightweight cryptographic
primitives that varies from stream ciphers, block ciphers and recently to hash functions.
Out of these many lightweight primitives, the block cipher PRESENT gets a lot of
attention from the cryptographic community and it has been recently adopted by ISO
as one of the international standards in lightweight cryptography.
This thesis aims at analyzing and evaluating the security of some the recently proposed
lightweight symmetric ciphers with a focus on PRESENT-like ciphers, namely, the block
cipher PRESENT and the block cipher PRINTcipher.
We provide an approach to estimate the probability of differential and linear approximations
with low-weight differential and linear characteristics on PRESENT-like ciphers as well as
ciphers allowing low hamming weight differential and linear characteristics. We study the effect
of key scheduling in the distribution of linear approximations on a variant of PRESENT with
identical round keys. We propose a new attack named the Invariant Subspace Attack that
was specifically mounted against the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. Furthermore,
we mount several attacks on a recently proposed stream cipher called A2U2.
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Abstrakt (in Danish)
I de seneste a˚r er efterspørgslen efter systemer til letvægtskryptering steget, da mange anven-
delser involverer RFID og sensornetværk, som af natur har meget lav ydeevne, og derfor er
ude af stand til at udføre sædvanlige kryptografiske operationer. For at imødekomme dette
problem, har det kryptografiske fællesskab udviklet adskillige byggeblokke til brug i letvægt-
skryptering, som indebærer strømcifre, blokcifre og, som det seneste, hashfunktioner. Ud af
disse letvægtsalgoritmer, f˚ar især blokcifret PRESENT megen opmærksomhed fra det kryp-
tografiske fællesskab, og er for nylig blevet vedtaget af ISO som en international standard i
letvægtskryptografi.
Denne afhandling har til form˚al at analysere og evaluere sikkerheden af nogle af de senest
foresl˚aede symmetriske metoder til letvægtskryptering, med fokus p˚a cifre som designmæssigt
ligner PRESENT, navnlig PRESENT selv, samt blokcifret PRINTcipher.
Vi giver en metode til at estimere sandsynligheden af differential- og lineære approksimationer,
for karakteristikker af lav vægt, p˚a kryptosystemer som designmæssigt ligner PRESENT,
s˚avel som systemer der tillader differential- og lineære karakteristikker af lav Hamming vægt.
Vi undersøger virkningen af nøgleskema-planlægningen p˚a fordelingen af lineære approksima-
tioner for en variant af PRESENT med identiske rundenøgler. Vi foresl˚ar et nyt angreb med
navnet Invariant underrum-angreb, som specifikt blev anvendt p˚a letvægtscifret PRINTcipher.
Desuden giver vi adskillige angreb p˚a et nyt strømciffer kaldet A2U2.
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Preface
Lightweight cryptography deals with the design of cryptographic primitives that are suitable
to fit and run on small hardware devices such as RFID tags, sensor networks and contactless
smart cards. As the standard symmetric algorithms such as AES cannot fit in these low cost
small devices. The cryptographic community has recently responded by designing a number of
lightweight symmetric primitives suitable for constrained environments. This thesis evaluates
the security of some of the recently proposed symmetric-key ciphers. This thesis is organized
as follows.
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction about cryptography and cryptanalysis. We highlight
the goals and services of cryptography and the goals of a cryptanalyst and define some of the
attack models used by cryptanalysts. We also describe some generic attacks on symmetric-key
ciphers.
Chapter 2 describes the common cryptanalytic techniques used in symmetric-key ciphers.
We describe the most versatile attacks on symmetric-key ciphers, namely, differential and
linear cryptanalysis and some improvements of these attacks. We also give a short description
about other attack variants such as the slide attack and algebraic attacks.
Chapter 3 provides a brief introduction about symmetric-key lightweight cryptography.
We describe the lightweight ciphers that are analyzed in this thesis, namely, the block cipher
PRESENT, the block cipher PRINTcipher and the stream cipher A2U2.
Chapter 4 addresses two subjects on differential and linear cryptanalysis in PRESENT-
like ciphers. The first subject concerns the estimation of the probabilities of low-weight dif-
ferential and linear approximations. The main result of this subject is in the extension a
previously known method to find better estimations for the correlation on linear approxima-
tions on the block cipher PRESENT and the core permutation of SPONGENT. This result
was published in ICISC 2012 [1]. The second subject concerns the effect of key scheduling
on the distribution of differential and linear approximation on PRESENT-like ciphers. The
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main result of this subject is in showing that variance of the distribution of some linear ap-
proximations in PRESENT with identical keys is significantly larger than that of PRESENT
with independent round keys. This result was part of a work about the distribution of linear
biases published in CRYPTO 2012 [2]. Note that [2] was a joint work with Martin A˚gren,
Peter Beelen and Gregor Leander.
Chapter 5 is concerned about the differential cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher. The key-
dependent linear layer of PRINTcipher seems to complicate differential cryptanalysis. We
show that is the not the case by providing two differential attacks on reduced rounds of
PRINTcipher. One of these attacks recovers the key-dependent linear layer by computing
the rth root of a permutation in the symmetric group S48. This work was published at FSE
2011 [4]. Note that this was a joint work with Gregor Leander and Erik Zenner. The chapter
also shows how to design an authentication protocol whose security is based on a multi-valued
function, namely, the r-th roots of a permutation in the symmetric group Sn.
Chapter 6 provides a new attack on block ciphers called the Invariant Subspace Attack.
The attack was successfully applied to PRINTcipher and it managed to break the whole
PRINTcipher for a certain number of keys. We show that this attack can be seen as a
weak key variant of the statistical saturation attack previously applied on the block cipher
PRESENT. This work was published at CRYPTO 2011 [83]. Note that this was a joint work
with Hoda AlKhzaimi, Gregor Leander and Erik Zenner.
Chapter 7 provides several attacks on the stream cipher A2U2. The first attack uses only
two chosen plaintexts to break the cipher in a second. The second attack uses a guess-and-
determine approach to mount an attack with time complexity 249. The third attack is a chosen
IV attack that recovers 5-bit of the secret key used to initialize the LFSR counter. The fourth
attack is a known plaintext attack that targets the low number of initialization rounds to
recover the secret key with time complexity 238. Finally, an attack that exploits the noisy key
stream is proposed. This work was published at IMACC 2011 [3]. Note that this was joint
work with Julia Borghoff, Erik Zenner and Mathieu David.
Chapter 8 wraps up the results of this thesis and suggests some topics for future work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptography is the art and science of designing security algorithms to provide certain
security services. Cryptanalysis is the art and science of analyzing and defeating the
security claims of these algorithms. The branch of science that embodies both cryp-
tography and cryptanalysis is called Cryptology. The main goal of cryptography is to
secure communications between two parties (sender and receiver) by transforming a
message (plaintext) to a scrambled message (ciphertext) using a secret key. The process
of transforming a plaintext into a ciphertext is called encryption and the process of
unscrambling the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext is called decryption.
Before the digital era, cryptography was used mainly by governments to secure their
communication channels and thus it was all about providing the service of confidentiality
using encryption-decryption methods. Nowadays, cryptography is widely used to solve
real-world information security problems that arise in many digital applications such as
ATM cards, computer passwords and online shopping. Thus in addition to confiden-
tiality, modern cryptography provides the following services to solve various aspects of
information security problems:
 Authentication allows the receiver to verify the sender’s identity.
 Data Integrity enables the receiver to verify that the sender’s message has not
been modified.
 Non-repudiation prevents the sender from denying any message he previously sent.
1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
The mathematical functions or algorithms that provides the above mentioned services
are called cryptographic primitives. These primitives include the following three schemes,
1
but are not limited to them: symmetric-key ciphers, public-key ciphers and cryptographic
hash functions.
1.1.1 Symmetric-Key Ciphers
Symmetric-key ciphers use one key for encryption and decryption between two parties.
Thus, they require that the two communicated parties agreed beforehand on a key. The
whole security of symmetric-key primitives depend on the secrecy of the key; revealing
the key means that encryption and decryption are possible by anyone. Symmetric-key
ciphers are used to provide the services of confidentiality and authentication and they
can be divided into two schemes. One scheme operates on a block of bits and these kind
of ciphers are called block ciphers and the other scheme generates a pseudo-random
stream of bits and mixes it with the plaintext bits and these kind of ciphers are called
stream ciphers. In the following, we give a brief overview about block ciphers and stream
ciphers.
Block Ciphers
A block cipher divides the input (plaintext) into block of bits of the same length and
then encrypts each block by a secret key. The output of the encryption operation must
be invertible using the same secret key used in the encryption operation. A block cipher
with a block size n takes a block of plaintext represented in bits (m0, · · · ,mn−1) and
outputs a binary vector (c0, · · · , cn−1) depending on the secret key. More formally, a
block cipher is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A block cipher with a block size of n bits and key size of k bits is an
invertible mapping F :M×K → C, where M∈ F n2 is the message space, K ∈ F k2 and
C ∈ F n2 .
A block cipher is a family of n-bit permutations of size 2k where each secret key yields
one permutation out of the 2n! n-bit permutations. In order to pick a totally random
permutation or an ideal permutation from the set of all n-bit permutations, we would
need a key of size log2(2n!) ≈ (n − 1)2n bits. This is a huge number and would be
impractical to have such key size, so the design goal would be to approximate ideal
ciphers in practice by drawing 2k permutations uniformly at random from the set of all
n-bit permutations.
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Modern block ciphers are iterated ciphers. They iterate a round function a number of
times. The round function consists of a linear and nonlinear layers which transform the
given state (the plaintext in the first iteration) using a round subkey. There are two
construction types of block ciphers:
 Feistel Cipher operates on half of the state, i.e., the state at round i is divided into
two equal halves (Li, Ri). The round function F is applied to one half, sayRi, using
a round subkey ki and then its output is xored with the other half. Then the two
halves are exchanged with each other. Thus Li+1 = Ri and Ri+1 = Li⊕F (Ri, Ki).
 Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) operates on the whole state. They trans-
form the state using a substitution layer followed by a permutation layer. The sub-
stitution layer is a nonlinear layer consisting of small Sboxes which are vectorial
boolean functions that substitutes a small vector (usually ≤ 8 bits) of input bits
with another small vector of output bits (usually ≤ 8 bits). The permutation layer
applies a linear transformation to the output of substitution layer. The simplest
linear layer is the bit-wise permutation which permutes the state of the bits but
there are complex linear layers that performs matrix multiplication.
Examples for notable block ciphers are the DES, a Feistel cipher and was the previous
encryption standard and the AES which is an SPN design and the current encryption
standard.
Stream Ciphers
The only provably secure cipher, called one time pad, is a classical stream cipher whose
secret key is used only once and has the same length as the plaintext under encryption.
The cipher simply xors the plaintext bits with the secret key bits. Obviously this
encryption scheme has practical problems. Modern stream ciphers tries to emulate the
action of this provably secure scheme by using a short secret key and mixing it with a
random initial value in order to generate a very long pseudo-random key stream sequence
(this is called the initialization phase) which is then xored with the given plaintext to
produce the ciphertext.
Modern stream ciphers are usually constructed using Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ters (LFSR) and Non-Linear Feedback Shift Registers (NFSR). Linear Feedback Shift
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Registers devices are used to produce long period sequences from short ones. An
LFSR of length n consists of n stages and is associated to a connection polynomial,
cnX
n + cn−1Xn−1 + · · ·+ c1X + c0, where ci ∈ F2 that is used to update its state. Each
stage stores one bit (or word) and has one input and one output. The flow of bits is
controlled by a clock. At each clock tick, the contents of stage 0 is the output and forms
part of the output sequence. Stage i is moved to stage i − 1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
Stage n−1 is filled by the feedback bit(or word), sj, which is formed by xoring together
a fixed subset of the previous stages (0, 1, . . . , n− 1) depending on ci’s, the coefficients
of the connection polynomial,
sj =
n⊕
i=1
cisj−i.
An LFSR of length produces a maximal sequence of length 2n − 1 iff its connection
polynomial is primitive. LFSRs are vulnerable to the powerful O(n2) linear complex-
ity Berlekamp-Massey attack [88] which requires only 2n consecutive sequence bits (or
words) to deduce the ci’s. Therefore, the LFSR is used together with a nonlinear Boolean
function to avoid the Berlekamp-Massey attack. Another component that is also used in
modern stream ciphers is the NFSR which works similar to LFSR except that its feed-
back function is a nonlinear Boolean function of the state. Examples for NFSR-based
stream ciphers are the lightweight ciphers Grain [60] and Trivium [32].
1.1.2 Public-Key Ciphers
Also known as Asymmetric-key ciphers. They use one key for encryption called “public
key” and another key for decryption called “private key”. The public key is known by
everyone whereas the private key is kept secret by its user and it is never possible to
deduce the private key from the public key. A public-key cipher can be defined as a
function that maps a plaintext message to a ciphertext message and can be computed by
anyone having the public key but its inverse is infeasible to compute unless we have the
private key. This one way encryption function is often called a trapdoor function. The
hardness of inverting these functions relies on the fact that there are some mathematical
problems that there are no known algorithms to solve them in a reasonable amount of
time such as the Integer Factorization Problem and the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
The most prominent public-key ciphers are RSA and ElGamal. Public-key ciphers are
used to provide the services of confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and secret
key establishment.
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1.1.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function maps a binary message of any arbitrary length to a small
binary message of a fixed length often called the hash value or the message digest. The
message digest serves as a small unique representation and a digital fingerprint of the
actual lengthy message. Since the input size of the hash function is larger than its output
size, many messages will have the same message digest but finding such messages should
be infeasible. A good cryptographic hash function must be easy to compute and must
possess the following properties:
 Collision resistance: It is infeasible to find two messages that have the same hash
value.
 Preimage resistance: Given a hash value, it is infeasible to generate its actual
message.
 Second preimage resistance: Given a specific message, it is infeasible to find an-
other different message that has the same hash value.
Cryptographic hash functions are used in many security applications to provide the
services of data integrity and non-repudiation when used with a public-key cipher. An-
other different primitive but usually constructed from either a keyed hash function or
a block cipher is called Message Authentication Code (MAC). It has different security
properties and it is used to provide authentication.
The focus of this thesis is in the cryptanalysis of symmetric-key ciphers, so the next sec-
tion specifically discusses cryptanalysis of symmetric-key ciphers and more specifically
block ciphers.
1.2 Cryptanalysis
In this section, we describe the cryptanalyst’s (aka attacker or adversary) goals and the
attack models based on the data available to him. We also discuss the measurements
of the complexity of a cryptanalytic attack. We close the section by describing some
generic attacks on block ciphers.
5
1.2.1 Attacker’s Goals
The attacker’s goal is to find the secret key but he can also tries to achieve other useful
information. In [75, 79], Knudsen classified various types of attacks on block ciphers
based on the attacker’s gained information:
 Total break : An attacker finds the secret key of the cipher.
 Global deduction: An attacker finds equivalent algorithms for performing encryp-
tion and decryption without knowing the secret key.
 Local deduction: An attacker finds the plaintext of a new given ciphertext.
 Distinguishing algorithm: An attacker is able to distinguish the block cipher from
a randomly chosen permutation.
1.2.2 Attack Models and Complexity
Cryptanalytic attacks can be divided based on the amount of data available. First, the
attacker is assumed to know the cryptographic algorithm under attack. This is known
in the literature as Kerckhoff’s principle. The following represents some of the attack
models used in symmetric key cryptanalysis based on the data available to the attacker:
 Ciphertext only : the attacker only knows the ciphertexts
 Known plaintext : the attacker knows some plaintexts with their corresponding
ciphertexts
 Chosen plaintext (ciphertext): the attacker can choose his own set of plaintexts
(ciphertexts) and obtain their corresponding ciphertexts (plaintexts), i.e. the at-
tacker has access to the encryption (decryption) device.
 Adaptive chosen plaintext (ciphertext): similar to the chosen plaintext (ciphertext)
attack except that here the attacker base his next choice of plaintext (ciphertext)
on his observations from the previous encryptions.
 Related key attacks : here the attacker knows some plaintexts-ciphertext obtained
under the encryption of at least two unknown keys (k1, k2) but they have a known
or chosen relationship (i.e. k2 = f(k1) where f is known or chosen).
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The complexity of an attack is determined by the dominant complexity among the
following three different complexity measures together with the success probability of
the attack:
 Time complexity : the processing time taken to mount the attack.
 Data complexity : the expected amount of data (plaintext-ciphertext) for the attack
to succeed.
 Memory complexity : the memory size required to process the attack.
1.2.3 Generic Attacks
Generic attacks are the kind of attacks that are possible regardless of the internal struc-
ture of the target cipher. The most obvious generic attack is the brute force attack
or exhaustive key search which is simply trying all the possible keys. Another generic
attack is called table lookup and this attack builds up a huge table that is used later to
find the key instantly. Another generic attack that combines both the exhaustive key
search and the table look-up attack is called the time-memory tradeoff. We conclude
our discussion on generic attacks by describing meet-in-the-middle attacks especially
the attack on 2DES. While the meet-in-the-middle attack on 2DES is a generic attack,
advanced meet-in-the-middle attacks do exploit the internal structure of the cipher and
more specifically they exploit some weaknesses in its key schedule. In the following we
discuss these four generic attacks.
Brute Force:
Suppose we have an n-bit block cipher Ek with a k-bit key size. Then a brute force can be
performed either by using a ciphertext only where the attacker searches throughout the
key space until a meaningful plaintext is found or by using a known plaintext/ciphertext
pair where the attacker looks for the key that yields the plaintext/ciphertext pair. We
might possibly get more than one key candidate for the target secret key when known
the key size k is larger than the block size n. This is due to the fact that the probability
of encrypting an n-bit plaintext (m) to an n-bit ciphertext (c) under one key is 2−n.
Thus the expected number of keys that encrypts m to c is 2k−n. Thus in order to get a
unique key we need to test d k
n
e plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
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If we only need one plaintext/ciphertext, then the worst case time complexity will be
2k encryptions of the cipher under consideration. If the secret key lies in the first or last
half of the key space, then the time complexity will be 2k−1 encryptions. Now the target
secret key is chosen at random and with probability 12k and each ki takes i encryptions.
Therefore, the average time complexity can be computed as follows
2k∑
i=1
i · Pr(secret key = ki) =
2k∑
i=1
i
2k ≈ 2
k−1
Thus on average we need 2k−1 encryptions. Parallel computing is usually used to speedup
the exhaustive search. For example, if the amount of computing power available to the
attacker is P , then the time taken for a brute force attack will be in the order of ≈ 2k
P
.
Therefore, it is recommended that when designing a cipher, that the secret key length k
is chosen such that 2
k
P
is larger than the life time of the data protected by the cipher [66].
Table Look-Up
Rather than carrying out the exhaustive search attack everytime. The table look-up
attack builds a huge table once using exhaustive search in order to be used later to find
the key instantly. The table look-up attack consists of two phases: one phase called
the oﬄine phase where exhaustive key search is used to build a table that maintains
2k entries where each entry consists of a specified plaintext m that is likely to be sent
(plaintext is a common word) and an encryption key together with the corresponding
ciphertext. The other phase called the online phase where we attack the cipher under
consideration by getting a ciphertext c obtained from encrypting the likely specified
plaintext at the oﬄine phase and then finding the target key by looking up for c in the
table built in the oﬄine phase.
Time-Memory Tradeoff:
Clearly the exhaustive key search attack consumes time and negligible memory whereas
the table lookup consumes memory and negligible time. This triggered and led up to the
time-memory tradeoff attack developed by Hellman in [61]. The time-memory tradeoff
attack is a probabilistic method and its success probability depends on time and memory
that are allocated by the attacker. Likewise the table look-up attack, the time-memory
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tradeoff attack consists of two phases: an oﬄine phase where the attacker builds a table
and stores it in memory in order to be used in the online phase to reduce the amount
of time to recover a secret key.
In order to perform a time-memory tradeoff attack, we first choose a likely plaintext P
and obtain its ciphertext C = EK(P ), where E is an n-bit block cipher with key size
k-bit and for simplicity let us assume first that n = k. Let K0 be a possible key. Then
we create a chain of t encryptions where our starting point denoted as SP equals K0
and our ending point denoted as EP equals Kt−1. Now the chain is created as follows:
SP = K0, K1 = ESP (P ), K2 = EK1(P ), · · · , Kt−1 = EKt−2(P ) = EP
Now to cover more keys we createm chains where each key starts with a different starting
point. Moreover we also assume that there is no overlap among the m chains. The m
chains forms the following m × t matrix, where each row is created after performing
(t− 1) encryptions.
SP1 = K1,1 K1,2 = ESP1(P ) K1,3 = EK1,2(P ) · · · K1,t = EK1,t−1(P ) = EP1
SP2 = K2,1 K2,2 = ESP2(P ) K2,3 = EK2,2(P ) · · · K2,t = EK2,t−1(P ) = EP2
...
...
...
...
...
SPm = Km,1 Km,2 = ESPm(P ) Km,3 = EKm,2(P ) · · · Km,t = EKm,t−1(P ) = EPm
As we are assuming that none of the chains overlap, then our matrix covers mt distinct
key values. To reduce memory requirements we only store the starting and ending points
of each chain, i.e. (SPi, EPi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus we reduce our memory storage
from mt key values to 2m values at the cost of spending (t− 1) encryptions to recover
each chain when we are looking for the secret key and thus we have a time-memory
trade-off. Now let us explain the process of recovering the secret key. The attacker
knows the ciphertext C of the chosen plaintext P used in the creation of the chains.
The attacker performs the following encryption operations:
EC(P ) = K˜1, EK˜1(P ) = K˜2, · · · , EK˜t−1(P ) = K˜t−2
After each encryption step the attacker checks whether K˜i equals one of the m end
points (EP1, · · · , EPm). Now assuming our chains cover all the key space, then we
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must have
K˜i = EPj for some i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}
Now the attacker rebuilds the jth chain starting with SPj and consequently one of the
keys on this chain, say Ks must be equal to C. Thus C = Ks = EKs−1(P ) and therefore
the secret key will be Ks−1 = EKs−2(P ). Note that we have to avoid using C as a
starting point when building the chains in the oﬄine phase. In order for the chains to
cover the whole key space we need to have mt = 2k and this is the time complexity of the
oﬄine phase. The online phase requires only (t− 1) encryptions. Since the assumption
of having no overlaps among the chains is unrealistic and cannot be avoided, we will
usually have a probabilistic attack anyway.
However, the overlaps in the above case where n = k are fewer compared to the case
n > k which was in the original Hellman’s time-memory attack [61] proposed on the
DES cipher which has a block size, n = 64 bits and a key size, k = 56 bits. In order
to create the chains represented in the above matrix, Hellman used what he called a
reduction function, f(K) = R(EK(P )), which simply truncates in some specific way the
64-bit of EK(P ) to 56-bit so that it can be used as a key in order to produce the next
value in the chain. The attack in this case is similar to the previous attack except here
we have false positives or false alarms. For instance suppose that we found
f(C) = Ks = f(EKs−1(P )),
then unlike the n = k case, the key Ks−1 might not be the right key as the equality
here holds for the truncated values and not for the actual values of C and EKs−1(P ).
False alarms can be discarded by using them to decrypt C as the right key will always
yield the plaintext P . The false alarms are a result of the overlap that is caused by the
reduction function. Overlaps can happen in one chain or two chains can merge into one
chain.
Therefore, the number of the distinct key values might be less than mt. The values of m
and t decide the time-memory trade-off and the secret key is recovered with probability
mt
2k under the assumption that all the mt key values are distinct. In other words, if
the secret key exists in the chains, then it will be found by the time-memory tradeoff
otherwise it will not be found. This makes the attacker aims at finding the suitable m
and t values that increase the success probability of the time-memory trade-off attack.
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Hellman showed that when choosing m = t = 2 k3 . The success probability will be
2− k3 and to overcome this small probability Hellman proposed the use of around l = 2 k3
different tables where each table has its own reduction function to avoid overlaps among
the tables. If the first table doesn’t yield the key, then the second table is tried, and so
on until we find the key. Therefore, the total memory cost is 2ml = 2 2k3 +1 ≈ 2 2k3 and
the total time complexity is at most (t−1)l ≈ 2 2k3 since in each table we perform (t−1)
encryptions and reductions. However, time-memory tradeoff attacks can be thwarted
by adding some random value to any plaintext before encrypting it.
One notable improvement to Hellman’s time-memory tradeoff is the work of Oech-
slin [92] which uses what he calls “rainbow table”. This table uses (t − 1) successive
reduction functions and thus different reduction functions within each point in a chain.
For instance, all chains start with reduction function 1 and end with reduction function
(t− 1). This reduces possible overlaps among the chains as any two chains that overlap
will not merge unless they overlap at the same position or column in the table since
different positions or columns in the table use different reduction functions. For more
details about “rainbow tables”, we refer the reader to [92].
Meet-In-The-Middle Attacks:
Meet-in-the-middle attacks were first developed by Diffie and Hellman to attack a version
of DES called Double DES or 2DES which simply tries to solve the short length of the
56-bit DES key by increasing it to 112-bit through performing DES twice with two
different keys, i.e. 2DES(K1||K2, P ) = DES(K2, DES(K1, P )) = C.
Given (P,C) the attack exploits the fact that DES−1(K2, C) = DES(K1, P ). The meet
in the middle attack on 2DES can described as follows:
1. To get a unique key we need to collect d11264 e = 2 (See the brute force attack)
plaintext blocks and their corresponding ciphertexts (P1, C1) and (P2, C2).
2. For all the 256 possible key values k1 of K1, compute L = DES(k1, P ) and save L
and k1 in a hash table indexed by L.
3. After constructing the hash table, compute R = DES−1(k2, C) for all the 256
possible values k2 of K2 and check if there is as index in the hash table that equals
to R. If there is no index that equals R in the hash table then k2 6= K2 and we
11
continue another k2. If there is an index L corresponding to the entry (L, k1) in
the hash table that equals R. Then k1||k2 is a possible candidate for K1||K2
4. If k1||k2 encrypts P1 to C1 and P2 to C2, then k1||k2 is probably the right key
value.
The time complexity taken by the above algorithm is 256 encryption operations taken
at step 1 and at most 256 decryption operations taken at step 3. Thus the total time
complexity is 257 DES encryption or decryption operations. The amount of memory
taken by the hash table is 7 × 8 × 256 bytes and this is approximately equivalent to
222 TB which is a huge amount of memory (a time-memory tradeoff is possible here,
for more information we refer the reader to [88]). However, this attack suggests that
the security of 2DES is reduced from 112-bit key length to a 57-bit key length. This
attack in 2DES led up to the suggestion of two triple DES or 3DES ciphers which use
3 iterations of DES. One is called 3DES3 and it uses three different keys and is defined
as follows
3DES3(K1||K2||K3, P ) = DES(K3, DES−1(K2, DES(K1, P )))
The other one is called 3DES2 and it uses 2 different keys and is defined as follows
3DES2(K1||K2, P ) = DES(K2, DES−1(K1, DES(K2, P )))
Here we note that DES−1 is used above so that 3DES and 3DES2 become easily com-
patible with DES since
DES(K,P ) = 3DES3(K||K||K,P ) = 3DES2(K||K,P )
3DES3 is obviously susceptible to a meet in the middle attack similar to the one on
2DES and its effective key length is clearly consists of the lengths of only two keys out
of the three keys. Thus its effective key length is reduced from 168-bit (bits length of
the three keys) to 112-bit (bits length of two keys). 3DES2 is suspectable to a meet-in-
the-middle attack that takes time 2120−log2 t and memory complexity in the order of t if
t known plaintexts are available [88].
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Chapter 2
Cryptanalysis Techniques
In his seminal paper [106], Claude Shannon mentioned two statistical properties that any
cryptosystem should acquire in order to be secure against statistical analysis, namely
confusion and diffusion. The confusion property could be described as having a compli-
cated relation between the secret key and all the ciphertext bits in a way such that each
ciphertext bit dependent on the entire secret key. A good confusion is accomplished
if flipping one bit of a secret key, results in flipping several bits in the ciphertext. In
cryptographic primitives this is often accomplished by the use of nonlinear vectorial
Boolean functions aka substitution boxes (Sboxes). The diffusion property could be de-
scribed as having the plaintext being distributed over the ciphertext in a way such that
each plaintext bit affects as many bits as possible in the ciphertext. A good diffusion
is accomplished if flipping one bit of a plaintext, results in flipping several bits in the
ciphertext. In cryptographic primitives this is often accomplished by the use of linear
mappings such as matrix multiplication. Most of the attacks on cryptographic primi-
tives exploit weaknesses of these two important properties in the cryptosystem under
consideration.
In this chapter, we discuss the two most powerful attacks agianst symmetric-key ciphers,
namely, differential and linear cryptanalysis. We also discuss some of their extensions
and close the chapter by giving a brief overview about the slide and algebraic attacks.
2.1 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential Cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack invented by Biham and
Shamir [14]. The idea is to look into differences of plaintext pairs and their corre-
sponding ciphertext pairs rather than looking into the values of a plaintext and its
corresponding ciphertext. It exploits the existence of input differences whose corre-
sponding output differences occur with high probability to deduce some information
13
about the secret key.
On the Type of Difference: The difference operation is chosen in order to remove
the effect of the key used in the system under attack. Usually it is the xor difference
which is the case in most cryptographic primitives but there are some primitives where
the difference is addition or multiplication modulo n such as in IDEA and SAFER.
For the sake of simplicity, suppose we have the following ciphertexts, c1 = m1 ⊕ k and
c1 = m2 ⊕ k. Then the suitable difference operation that cancels the key effect is the
following: c1 ⊕ c2 = m1 ⊕m2 which allows the attacker to gain some information (their
difference) about the plaintexts. Another example, if c1 = m1k and c2 = m2k where
 is the addition modulo an integer, usually in most cryptographic primitives this is an
8-bit, 16-bit or 32-bit integer. Then the suitable difference that cancels the key effect is
the following: c1  c−12 = (m1  k)  (m2  k)−1 = m1  k  k−1 m−12 = m1 m−12 ,
where the inverse operation is taken under the group defined by the set of the possible
plaintexts and under the  operation. In fact nowadays the ⊕ is the most used operation
in mixing the key with data as the the other operations such as addition makes the cipher
difficult to analyze especially against differential cryptanalysis and thus designers tend
to use ⊕ operations to ease the analysis and also because its cost is cheaper in hardware
compared to the .
Differential Characteristic and Differential: As most modern symmetric ciphers
are iterated, i.e. they iterate for some rounds, where all rounds basically perform the
same operations with the exception of using a specific round key or a round constant,
linear and differential properties of such ciphers are analyzed for one round and then
extended to multiple rounds. Differential attacks are based on the so-called differen-
tial characteristic which is a sequence of intermediate difference relations for all rounds
where the probability of each element in this sequence determines the probability of the
corresponding differential characteristic. The collection of all the r-round differential
characteristics (aka trails or paths) with input α = α0 and output β = αr is called
the differential of the difference approximation (α0, αr). Each r-round differential char-
acteristic could be seen as a sequence (α0, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr) where i defines the ith
differential trail between α0 to αr.
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On the Probability of a Differential Characteristic: As pointed in Chapter 1,
iterated cryptographic primitives have both linear and nonlinear components. Clearly
the linear operation preserves the difference and thus the output difference occurs with
probability 1. However, the nonlinear components (usually the Sboxes or  modulo
an integer) do not preserve differences but some input differences can have some out-
put differences with some probability. For instance if we have a nonlinear component
S : Fn2 → Fm2 , where n and m are small integers then we can build its difference approx-
imation table. This table simply contains the probabilities of all the possible input and
output differences. Suppose we have input difference ∆X and output difference ∆Y ,
then
S∆X,∆Y = |{X ∈ Domain(S) : S(X)⊗ (S(X ⊗ (∆X)−1))−1 = ∆Y }|
where ⊗ is the difference operation. The probability of having an input difference
∆X and getting an output difference ∆Y is S∆X,∆Y2n . This together with the concept
of a Markov cipher which we define below enable us to compute the probability of a
differential characteristic.
One class of iterated ciphers defined in [81], is called Markov ciphers. For such ciphers,
under well established independence assumptions, the probability of a differential char-
acteristic can be calculated. In these ciphers, the sequence (α0, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr) is
called a Markov chain if the intermediate transitions αi → αi+1 are independent of each
other, in other words, given the present state, the future and past states are independent.
In other words,
Pr((vi+1 = αi+1)|vi = αi, · · · , v0 = α0) = Pr((vi+1 = αi+1)|vi = αi) for 0 ≤ i ≤ r
Moreover, if Pr(vi+1 = β|vi = α) is independent of i for all α and β then a Markov chain
is called homogeneous or stationary, in other words Pr(vi+1 = β|vi = α) = Pr(vi =
β|vi−1 = α).
Definition 2. An iterated cipher with round function Y = f(X,Ki) is a Markov cipher
if there is a difference operation where Pr(∆Y = β|∆X = α,X = m) is independent of
m for all α and β when the round key Ki is chosen uniformly at random.
The probability of a differential relation can be computed using a difference transition
matrix. In the following, we briefly describe how to construct and use these matrices.
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Difference Transition Matrix [81]: Assume that we have an r-round Markov cipher
with independent and uniformly random round keys. To estimate the probability of
an r-round differential (α0, αr), we first consider the probability of each differential
characteristic between α0 and αr, so the probability of the i-th differential characteristic
(α0, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr) is
pi =
r∏
i=1
Pr(FK(X)⊕ FK(X ′) = αi|X ⊕X ′ = αi−1)
Consequently the probability of an r-round differential (α0, αr) is the sum of all the
probabilities of all the possible differential characteristics between (α0, αr), that is∑Nd
i=1 pi, where Nd is the number of all the possible differential characteristics between
(α0, αr). Let D denote the transition difference-probability matrix of an n-bit Markov
cipher. D has size (2n − 1) × (2n − 1), the (i, j) entry in D is the probability of
obtaining an output difference say βj when we have an input difference say βi, i.e.
Pr(∆(FK(X)) = βj|∆(X) = βi) where FK is the round function of the Markov cipher.
Now, for any r, the (i, j) entry of the matrix Dr, p(r)ij is equivalent to the probability of
the r-round differential (βi, βj).
Key Recovery and Data Complexity of a Differential Attack: Suppose we have
an r-round iterated n-bit block cipher with k-bit secret key. To mount a differential
attack we first look at a good (r − 1)-round characteristic, i.e. (α0, · · · , αr−1). In other
words a characteristic occurring with a probability p significantly larger than 2−n.1
Suppose we want to recover some key bits of the last round key kr. We guess part
of kr that would enable us to partially decrypt a number of ciphertext pairs c
1
r and c
2
r
obtained by encrypting a number of plaintext pairs m1 and m2 with difference ∆m = α0.
The guess and the partial decryption process should have a time complexity below the
brute force complexity 2k. Then for each key guess and each partial decryption of a
given ciphertext pair, we check if the difference of the partially decrypted pair matches
the characteristic value or part of it at round r − 1, αr−1. Then the key guess that
yields the highest number of matches would probably be the right key. As noted in [81],
when mounting a key recovery differential attack, we assume that all the round subkeys
1It was shown in [59] that the maximum differential probability in an n-bit random permutation
is expected to be ≤ n2n−1 with a higher probability that is almost equal to 1. Therefore the maximum
differential approximation for a 64-bit and 128-bit block ciphers is expected to be less than 2−57 and
2−120 respectively but as pointed in [11] they are hard to find.
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are independent and uniformly random to compute the differential probability but we
are also assuming that all the secret keys behave similarly, i.e. for an (r − 1)-round
differential, (α0, · · · , αr−1):
Pr(∆cr−1 = αr−1|∆m = α0) ≈ Pr(∆cr−1 = αr−1|∆m = α0, k1 = s1, · · · , kr−1 = sr−1)
for almost all subkey values (s1, · · · , sr−1). This is known in the literature as the hy-
pothesis of stochastic equivalence [81] (See Chapter 4). A successful differential attack
requires data complexity equivalent to c
p
, where c is a small integer since this will give
us on average c right pairs which are pairs that follow the differential characteristic.
However, for the attack to succeed, the right value of kr have to be suggested at a rate
that distinguishes it from the other candidate values. Usually this is determined by the
signal-to-noise concept which is often denoted as S/N and is defined as the number
of times the right key guess is counted over the number of times a wrong key guess is
counted. For more details we refer the reader to [14,79].
The work of Selc¸uk in [104] reveals that the targeted key length is one of the factors
that affects the success probability of a differential attack besides the S/N rate and
the available amount of plaintext. Approximating the binomial distribution of the key
counters to a normal distribution, Selc¸uk provided a formula depending on the key length
and the amount of plaintext pairs to estimate the success probability of a differential
attack.
However, the recent work of Blondeau and Ge´rard [18] provides a better statistical
framework to compute the success probability and data complexity in differential crypt-
analysis as their statistical analysis deals with the binomial distribution of the counters
which is believed to be better than approximating the binomial distribution to a normal
distribution [18].
Several extensions to the normal differential attack have been developed in the 90’s.
However, unlike the normal differential their applicability depends on the cryptographic
primitive under attack. Below we discuss some of them.
Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis: In their original differential attack [13],
Biham and Shamir considered the idea of using many differentials with different input
difference but the same output difference. Later Knudsen in [76] used the reverse of this
idea. So rather than looking into multi inputs and one output difference, he looked at
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one input but multi output differences or part of the output difference. This technique
is called truncated differential as in the multi output differences we only consider part of
the bits which are the ones having the same value and position. This will definitely give
us a higher probability than considering only one output difference. However unlike dif-
ferential cryptanalysis, truncated differentials are limited and it might not be applicable
on some cryptographic primitives designs but when applicable they are more effective
than the usual differential attacks as they would result in either attacking more rounds
or reducing the data complexity required to have a successful attack. More recently
in [19], Blondeau and Ge´rard combined the two above ideas, i.e. multi input differ-
entials and multi output differences, and proposed multiple differential cryptanalysis
along with a statistical framework to estimate its data complexity, time complexity and
success probability.
Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis: This technique was introduced by Lai
in [80] and used by Knudsen in [76] to develop an attack against ciphers presumably
secure against ordinary differential attacks. Instead of considering a difference between
two values as in differential attacks, higher order differential attacks consider difference
between differences. For instance, let f : F2n → F2 be a Boolean function. Consider a
normal α1 difference f(x)⊕f(x⊕α1), this is called a 1st order difference (or derivative),
an α2 difference of ∆α2 = f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ α1) is:
∆α2(∆α1f(x)) = f(x)⊕ f(x⊕ α1)⊕ f(x⊕ α2)⊕ f(x⊕ α1 ⊕ α2)
More generally a dth-order differential is defined as ∆αd(∆α1,··· ,αd−1f(x)). Since any
ciphertext bit can be expressed as a polynomial in the secret key bits and plaintext
bits, ciphers with low algebraic degree are weak against this technique as they could be
attacked using the fact that the value of the (d+1)-order derivative is zero if f(x) has
degree d. For instance, if we know that the algebraic degree of a cryptographic primitive
is 16, then the key guess that makes the value of the 17th order differential zero will be
the right key.
One application of higher order differentials is called cube attacks. They were introduced
by Dinur and Shamir in [47]. Cube attacks use higher order differentials in order to
obtain linear equations in the secret key bits of the target cipher even if the attacker
has no idea about the design of the target cipher, i.e. the multivariate polynomials
that represent each bit at the output. Like higher order differentials attacks, if there
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is a single bit represented by a polynomial whose Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) has
a low degree then cube attacks can be applied successfully. Thus, as block ciphers
have high algebraic degree even for a small number of rounds, cube attacks can only
be effective for stream ciphers as they use nonlinear feedback registers which provide a
slow diffusion and consequently some output bits might have low algebraic degree even
after a high number of rounds. The attack was successfully applied to reduced-rounds
of Trivium [32].
More recently, an improvement to cube attacks called dynamic cube attacks has been
proposed [48]. The attack tries to benefit from high algebraic degree polynomials P
that can be decomposed into three polynomials P1, P2 and P3 such that P = P1P2 + P3
where P1 is called the source polynomial, P2 is called the target polynomial and it is
very dense and has a high algebraic degree and P3 is called the remainder polynomial
and it has a low algebraic degree. The idea of the attack is to choose some inputs called
dynamic variables that nullify the polynomial P1 and therefore simplify the polynomial
P to P = P3. The choice of P1 and P2 requires a careful analysis of the cipher under
consideration. The attack was successfully applied to the full Grain-128 but only for
some keys belonging to a subset of 2−10 of all the possible 2128 keys.
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis: Rather than exploiting a differential with
a high probability, impossible differential attacks exploit differentials with a very low or
zero probability. The use of a zero differential probability was firstly used by Knudsen
in his analysis of his block cipher DEAL [74]. Later the use of a zero or low differential
probabilities was exploited by Biham et al in their analysis of SKIPJACK [12] where
they named it impossible differential.
2.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear Cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack that exploits ciphers which are
close to linear functions. The attack was invented by Matsui to break the DES cipher
in [86]. The idea is to find a linear relation between some plaintext bits and ciphertext
bits (and also some secret key bits in the case of block ciphers) and then exploit the
bias or the correlation of this linear relation which should be unbiased (uncorrelated) in
an ideal cipher.
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Suppose we have an n-bit plaintext and ciphertext denoted by m and c respectively and
obtained under a secret key k of length l. Then linear cryptanalysis finds an α and
β ∈ Fn2 such that probability of linear approximation
〈α,m〉 ⊕ 〈β, c〉 = 〈γ, k〉, where k ∈ Fl2
deviates significantly from 12 .
We start by introducing the Walsh transform of a single and vectorial Boolean functions
respectively. We then define a linear approximation in terms of the Walsh transform
and this is useful especially when we discuss the multidimensional linear attacks.
The Walsh transform of a Boolean function f(x) where f : Fn2 → F2 at the point a ∈ Fn2
is defined to be the real valued function
fˆ(a) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)⊕〈a,x〉.
Similarly the Walsh transform (or the Fourier coefficient) of a vectorial Boolean function
F : Fn2 → Fm2 at the point (a, b) ∈ Fn2 × Fm2 is defined by
Fˆ (a, b) =
∑
x
(−1)〈b,F (x)〉⊕〈a,x〉
In linear cryptanalysis we approximate the function f(x) to 〈a, x〉. Therefore, we are
interested in computing Pr(f(x) = 〈a, x〉). Let N0 denote the number of x = u such
that f(u) = 〈a, u〉 and let N1 denote the number of x = u such that f(u) = 〈a, u〉 ⊕ 1.
Obviously, N0 +N1 = 2n and the Walsh transform can be written as follows
fˆ(a) = N0 −N1
Let pa = Pr(f(x) = 〈a, x〉). So pa = N02n and we see that fˆ(a) = 2N0−2n = 2n+1(pa− 12).
Consequently
pa =
1
2 +
1
2n+1 fˆ(a)
Similarly for a vectorial function F (x), the probability that 〈b, F (x)〉 equals 〈a, x〉 can
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be calculated as follows
pa,b =
1
2 +
1
2n+1 Fˆ (a, b)
The bias of approximating 〈b, F (x)〉 by 〈a, x〉 is defined as  = pa,b − 12 = Fˆ (a,b)2n+1 and the
correlation of of approximating 〈b, F (x)〉 by 〈a, x〉 is defined as
C(a, b) = 2 = Fˆ (a, b)2n (2.1)
Linear Characteristic and Linear Hull Linear attacks are based on the so-called
linear characteristic which is a sequence of intermediate linear relations for all rounds
where the correlation of each element in this sequence determines the correlation of
the corresponding linear characteristic. The collection of all the linear characteristics
with input mask α = α0 and output mask β = αr is often called the linear hull of the
linear approximation (α0, αr), also each r-round linear characteristic could be seen as a
sequence (α0, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr) where i defines the i-th linear trail between α0 to αr.
On the Correlation of a Linear Characteristic: As pointed in Chapter 1, it-
erated cryptographic primitives have both linear and nonlinear components. Clearly
the linear operation preserves a linear approximation with probability 1. However, the
nonlinear components (usually the Sboxes or  modulo an integer) need to be linearly
approximated with some probability. For instance if we have a nonlinear component
S : Fn2 → Fm2 where n and m are small integers then we can build its linear approxi-
mation table. This table simply contains the correlations of all the possible input and
output approximations (aka input and output masks).
Suppose we have input mask α and output mask β, then
Sα,β = |{X ∈ Domain(S) : 〈β, S(X)〉 = 〈X,α〉}|
The probability of an input mask α being equal to an output mask β is
Pr(〈β, S(x)〉 = 〈α, x〉) = Sα,β2n
and their correlation is equivalent to 2 Pr(〈β, S(x)〉 = 〈α, x〉)− 1.
The Piling-Up Lemma [86] was used by Matsui to estimate the probability of a linear
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characteristic but the estimation of the correlation of a linear hull results from the theory
of correlation matrices [41,44] or the Walsh tansform of composite mappings [35].
Correlation Matrix [41, 44]: Assume that we have a composite function F : Fn2 →
Fn2 such that F = Fr ◦ · · · ◦ F2 ◦ F1. To estimate the correlation of an r-round linear
approximation (α0, αr) of F , we first consider the correlation of each linear characteristic
between α0 and αr. Using the Piling-Up Lemma and assuming that all the intermediate
linear approximations, i.e. 〈α(j−1)i, cj−1〉 ⊕ 〈αji, cj〉 = 〈γj, kj〉, are independent and
〈γj, kj〉 = 0 with probability pj for all j’s, one can see that the probability of the ith
linear characteristic (α0 = α0i, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr = αri) is
1
2 + 2
r−1
r∏
j=1
(
pj − 12
)
Consequently, the correlation of ith linear characteristic (α0 = α0i, α1i, · · · , α(r−1)i, αr =
αri) is
Ci =
r∏
j=1
CFj(α(j−1)i, αji).
It is well known, see e.g., [44], that the correlation of a linear approximation is the sum
of all correlations of linear trails starting with the same mask α and ending with the
same mask β, i.e., CF (α0, αr) =
∑Nl
i=1Ci, where Nl is the number of all the possible
linear characteristics between (α0, αr).
The correlation of a linear trail is key dependent but only the sign of the correlation
depends on the key. More precisely, in [44] the following formulas were proven under
the assumption that we have a key-alternating cipher2:
Ci = (−1)si
r∏
j=1
CFj(α(j−1)i, αji),
where si ∈ F2 depends on the i-th linear characteristic and the round keys.
Therefore, the correlation of the linear hull (α, β) is
CF (α, β) =
Nl∑
i=1|αi=(α=α0i,··· ,α(r−1)i,β=αri)
(−1)si⊕di |Ci| (2.2)
2Key-alternating ciphers are a subclass of Markov ciphers that alternate key additions with key-
independent rounds.
22
where the sign di ∈ F2 denotes the sign of the correlation, Ci.
Let C denote the correlation matrix of an n-bit key-alternating cipher. C has size 2n×2n
(or (2n−1)×(2n−1) when we exclude the zero input or output masks), the (i, j) entry in
C corresponds to the correlation of an input mask, say βi, and output mask, say βj, i.e.
CF (βi, βj) = 2 Pr(〈βi, x〉 = 〈βj, F (x)〉)− 1, where F is the un-keyed composite function
of the key-alternating cipher and ‘x’ is its input. Now the correlation matrix for the
keyed round function is obtained by changing the signs of each row in C according to
the round subkey bits or the round constant bits involved.
Key Recovery and Data Complexity of a Linear Attack: A basic linear attack
recovers one bit of information about the secret key. This is often called in the literature
as Matsui’s algorithm 1 which is a distinguishing attack of the cipher under consideration
since it doesn’t recover the whole key but distinguishes the cipher from a randomly
chosen permutation. The following algorithm describes the basic linear attack.
Algorithm 1 Matusi’s distinguishing attack
Require: N known plaintexts (m, c)
Require: Tb ≡ the number of times 〈m,α〉 ⊕ 〈c, β〉 = b where b ∈ F2
1: for all the N known plaintexts (m, c) do
2: Compute b = 〈m,α〉 ⊕ 〈c, β〉
3: Increment Tb
4: end for
5: if T0 >
N
2 then
6: Guess 〈γ, k〉 = 0.
7: else
8: Guess 〈γ, k〉 = 1.
9: end if
In the following we estimate the data complexity needed to perform the basic linear
attack successfully. Without loss of generality, assume that T0 >
N
2 and that m·α⊕c·β =
0 holds with probability p = 12 +  where  > 0. Then
Pr(Success) = Pr
(
T0 >
N
2
)
= 1− Pr
(
T0 ≤ N2
)
T0 is random variable and it is the sum of N identically distributed and mutually
independent binary random variables Xi ∈ F2 which have the following probability
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distribution.
Pr(X = Xi) =

1
2 + , Xi = 1
1
2 − , Xi = 0
Clearly T0 follows a binomial distribution with an expected value E(T0) = Np = N(12+)
and variance V (T0) = Np(1− p) = N(14 − 2). So T0 ∼ B(N(12 + ), N(14 − 2)). When
N is large, then using the Central Limit Theorem the probability distribution of
x = T0 −Np√
Np(1− p)
=
T0 −N(12 + )√
N(14 − 2)
can be approximated by the standard normal distribution Φ(x), i.e. x ∼ N (0, 1).
Therefore,
Pr(Success) = 1−Pr
(
T0 − N2 − N ≤ −N
)
= 1−Pr
T0 − N2 − N√
N(14 − 2)
≤ −N√
N(14 − 2)

Assume that  is small, then 2 can be ignored, Thus
Pr(Success) = 1− Pr
x ≤ −N√
N(14 − 2)
 ≈ 1− Φ(−2√N)
When N = 2,
Pr(Success) = 1− Φ(−2) = 1− 0.02 = 0.98
Therefore having data complexity N = c
2 where c is a small integer, the success rate will
be almost 1. More key information can be recovered using a simple algorithm similar to
the key recovery procedure in the differential attack. Suppose we have an r round cipher
with a round function f , we use an (r − 1) linear approximation to recover log2(l) bits
from the last round key kr by the following algorithm which is known in the literature
as Matsui’s algorithm 2.
Unlike the distinguishing attack whose success rate is easily evaluated as discussed
above, the success rate of the key recovery attack is more complicated. One assump-
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Algorithm 2 Matusi’s algorithm 2
Require: N known plaintexts (m, c)
Require: (r − 1) linear approximation (α0, αr−1)
Require: 2l key counters, namely T0,0 · · · , T0,l−1 and T1,0 · · · , T1,l−1
1: for all the N known plaintexts (m, c) do
2: for all the l guessed key values for kr do
3: Compute b = m · α0 ⊕ f−1(c, l) · αr−1
4: Increment Tb,l
5: end for
6: end for
7: Find the counter Ti,t that have the maximum value
8: Guess that kr = t
tion that is used in determining the success rate is that wrong key guesses to the key
information results in having random values for cˆr−1 = f−1(c, l). In other words cˆr−1 is
treated as being equivalent to the ciphertext obtained after (r + 1) rounds, cr+1. This
is known in the literature as the hypothesis of wrong key randomization [58]. For more
details about the success rate, we refer the reader to the work of [104] as it provides
a formula depending on the key length and the amount of plaintext to estimate the
success probability of a linear attack. As noted in [104], approximating the binomial
distribution of the counters to a normal distribution gives accurate results in linear
attacks compared to differential attacks.
Several papers tried to extend linear cryptanalysis by using multiple linear approxima-
tions [10, 15, 62, 63, 70] to either reduce the data complexity or gain more information
about the key. Below we discuss the multidimensional linear attack [62,63] which is an
improvement over all the previously proposed attacks that use multiple linear approxi-
mations.
Multidimensional Linear Attack: We start by defining the mutual capacity be-
tween two probability distributions and the squared Euclidean distance and show its
relation to the capacity since they are both used in estimating the data complexity of
the multidimensional linear attacks.
The term capacity was firstly defined and used by Biryukov et al. in [15] where they
estimated the data complexity to be inversely proportional to the capacity of the multiple
linear approximations. Later the term was generalized by Hermelin et al. in [62] in order
to estimate the data complexity of their multidimensional linear attack.
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Definition 3. Let p = (p0, · · · , pM) and q = (q0, · · · , qM) be two probability distribu-
tions. Their mutual capacity is then
Cap(p, q) =
M∑
i=0
(pi − qi)2
qi
Thus given a vectorial Boolean function F : Fn2 → Fm2 , the mutual capacity of the
probability distribution p of the output of F and the uniform distribution is called the
capacity of p and is given by
Cap(p) =
∑
y∈Fm2
(2−n · |{x ∈ Fn2 | F (x) = y}| − 2−m)2
2−m (2.3)
The Squared Euclidean distance is defined as follows
D(p) =
∑
y∈Fm2
(
2−n · |{x ∈ Fn2 | F (x) = y}| − 2−m
)2
(2.4)
and it differs from the capacity by a factor of 2m, i.e. D(p) = 2−m Cap(p).
Suppose that we have a vectorial Boolean function F : Fn2 → Fn2 . Let αi ∈ Fn2 and
βi ∈ Fn2 be input and output masks respectively. Define the following gi functions where
1 ≤ i ≤ m:
gi(x) = 〈βi, F (x)〉 ⊕ 〈αi, x〉
Denote by Ci the correlation of gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and let them be defined as the base
correlations. Let C(0, a) refers to the correlation of the linear approximation 〈a, gi(x)〉.
For instance if a = ei = (0, 0, · · · , 1, · · · ) is a unit vector with 1 at position i, then
C(0, a) = C(0, ei) = C(αi, βi) and this holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. When a 6= ei, then
C(0, a) corresponds to a correlation of one of the combined approximations, i.e. if
a = ei ⊕ ej then C(0, a) is the correlation of the linear approximation gi(x) ⊕ gj(x) =
〈βi + βj, F (x)〉 ⊕ 〈αi + αj, x〉. In other words C(0, a) = C(αi ⊕ αj, βi ⊕ βj).
Let p = (p0, p1, · · · , p2m−1) be the probability distribution of the above m-dimensional
linear approximations. In order to estimate the capacity of the distribution in terms of
the correlations of the corresponding linear approximations we use the following Lemma
which was proved in [62].
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Lemma 2.2.1. Let g : Fn2 → Fm2 be a vectorial Boolean function with probability distri-
bution p and single linear correlations C(0, a) of 〈a, g〉. Then
pi = 2−m
∑
a∈Fm2
(−1)〈a,i〉C(0, a).
It is noted in [62] that the capacity can be expressed in terms of correlations or Fourier
coefficients of the linear approximations involved in the multidimensional distribution
by using the above Lemma in addition to the following relation which is known as
Parseval’s relation [34] ∑
u∈Fn2
ϕˆ(u)2 = 2n
∑
x∈Fn2
ϕ(x)2,
where ϕˆ(u) = ∑x∈Fn2 ϕ(x)(−1)u·x and ϕ(x) ∈ {1,−1} for any x ∈ Fn2 . In the following
proposition, we show these relations between the capacity and the correlations or Fourier
coefficients.
Proposition 2.2.2. [62] Let g = (g1, · · · , gm) be a an m-dimensional vectorial Boolean
function, where gi is the boolean function defined above. Suppose that g has a probability
distribution p = (p0, · · · , p2m−1). Then
Cap(p) =
∑
a6=0
(C(0, a))2 = 2−2n
∑
a6=0
(Fˆ (0, a))2.
Proof. From the above lemma, we know that
pi = 2−m
∑
a∈Fm2
(−1)〈a,i〉C(0, a)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. Now using Parseval’s relation, we see that
2m
∑
i
p2i =
∑
a
C(0, a)2.
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Therefore,
Cap(p) = 2m
∑
i
(pi − 2−m)2 = 2m
∑
i
p2i − 2−m+1pi + 2−2m
= 2m
∑
i
p2i − 2m
∑
i
2−m+1pi + 2m
∑
i
2−2m
=
∑
a
C(0, a)2 − 2∑
i
pi + 1 =
∑
a
C(0, a)2 − 1
=
∑
a6=0
(C(0, a))2 = 2−2n
∑
a6=0
(Fˆ (0, a))2
In [63], two different statistical methods were proposed to recover the secret key using
m-dimensional linear approximations. Namely, the goodness of fit method and this is
usually based on χ2-statistic and the method of distinguishing an unknown probability
distribution from a given set of probability distributions and this is usually based on
Log Likelihood Ratio (LLR-statistic). Below we only describe the χ2 method which
is the one that was applied to the block cipher PRESENT. For more details about
the LLR method, we refer the reader to [63]. It has been noted in [38] that the LLR
method cannot be applied in PRESENT as the probability distribution of the linear
approximations in PRESENT depends heavily on the key (See Chapter 3 and Chapter
4).
Suppose we would like to recover l bits of the target key. Then for each key value k ∈ F2l ,
we obtain the empirical probability distribution for each key qk = {qk,0, qk,1, · · · , qk,2m−1}
by computing the probability of the m-dimensional vectors which are Boolean values of
m linear independent approximations. Now given the empirical probability distribution
qk, a key recovery attack is mounted by computing the χ
2 statistic
S(k) = 2m
2m−1∑
i=0
(
qk,i − 2−m
)2
which also represents the squared Euclidean distance from the uniform distribution.
Now according to the wrong key hypothesis mentioned above, the right key value is the
one that yields the maximum squared Euclidean distance from the uniform distribution.
Therefore, the right key is the one for which the statistic S(k) is the largest. For more
details about the success rate and data complexity of the multidimensional attack using
the χ2 method, we refer the reader to [63].
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Recently a new attack called the statistical saturation attack [39] was shown in [82] to be
similar to multidimensional linear attacks. Below we describe the statistical saturation
attack and show its link to the multidimensional linear attack.
Statistical Saturation Attack: The statistical saturation attack was developed in
[39] by Collard and Standaert to attack reduced-round PRESENT. The attack fixes
some plaintext bits and exploits the bias at some output bits. The attack computes the
Squared Euclidean distance between the distribution of the targeted output bits and the
uniform distribution. The attack breaks 24 rounds of PRESENT. The data complexity
of their attack was estimated to be proportional to the inverse of the squared Euclidean
distance. To estimate the Squared Euclidean distance the authors propose an algorithm
to calculate the theoretical distribution of 8 output bits of PRESENT. The algorithm
guesses some subkey bits at each round and therefore cannot be applied for several
number of rounds. Later, Leander [82] provided a useful method to estimate the average
capacity of statistical saturation attacks. His method shows that statistical saturation
attacks are closely related to multi-dimensional linear attacks. In the following we
discuss Leander’s method.
Let e : Fn2 → Fn2 be an encryption function. Now write e as follows e : Fr2×Fs2 → Ft2×Fu2
where
e(x, y) =
(
e(1)(x, y), e(2)(x, y)
)
(2.5)
where r + s = t+ u = n, e(1)(x, y) ∈ Ft2 and e(2)(x, y) ∈ Fu2 .
The statistical saturation attack fixes ‘s’ bits and considers ‘t’ bits at the output. For
simplicity we fix the last ‘s’ bits and consider the distribution of the first ‘t’ bits. Denote
this restriction of e by hy : Fr2 → Ft2 where
hy(x) = e(1)(x, y) (2.6)
where y ∈ F2s denotes the fixed ‘s’ input bits, and let py be the probability distribution of
the output ‘t’ bits of hy. Leander provided a formula to estimate the average capacity of
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py. The formula was proven using the following proposition which establishes a relation
between the Fourier of a Boolean function and the Fourier of its restrictions.
Proposition 2.2.3. [33] Let E and E ′ be subspaces of F2n such that E ∩E ′ = {0} and
whose direct sum equals F2n. For every a ∈ E ′, let ha be the restriction of a Boolean
function f : F2n → F2 to the coset a + E (ha can be identified with a function on F2k
where k is the dimension of E). Then
∑
u∈E⊥
(fˆ(u))2 = |E⊥| ∑
a∈E′
(hˆa(0))2
The following theorem gives the formula.
Theorem 2.2.4. [82] With the above described notation, the average capacity of sta-
tistical saturation attacks where the average is taken over all possible fixations y ∈ F2s
is given by
Cap(py) = 2−2n
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
(eˆ(a, b))2 =
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
(C(a, b))2 (2.7)
where C(a, b) refers to the correlation of approximating 〈b, e(x1, x2)〉 by 〈a, (x1, x2)〉
where x1 ∈ Fr2 and x2 ∈ Fs2.
Proof. [82]
The average capacity of py over all the possible y fixations is given by
Cap(py) = 2−s
∑
y∈F2s
Cap(py)
Now since hy is defined as follows hy : Fr2 → Ft2, then using proposition 2.2.2, we see
that
Cap(py) = 2−s
∑
y∈Fs2
Cap(py) = 2−s
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
2−2r(hˆa(0, b))2
Now applying Proposition (2.2.3) on the function 〈b, e〉 and its restriction 〈b, hy〉 where
we choose E = Fr2 × {0} and E ′ = E⊥ = {0} × Fs2 gives us
∑
u∈{0}×Fs2
(eˆ(u, b))2 = 2s
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2
(hˆa(0, b))2
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Now using the above equations, we see that
Cap(py) = 2−s
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
2−2r(hˆa(0, b))2 = 2−2s−2r
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
(eˆ(a, b))2
Now applying Identity (2.1) to the above equation, we see that
Cap(py) = 2−2n
∑
a∈{0}×Fs2,b∈Ft2×{0}
(eˆ(a, b))2 = (C(a, b))2
Clearly the last equality shows that statistical saturation attacks and multidimensional
attacks are very similar attacks since the average capacity of the statistical saturation
attack and the capacity of multidimensional linear approximations (shown in proposition
2.2.2) are equivalent.
Statistical saturation attacks perform well when we identify any input subspace U ⊂ F2n
and any output subspace V ⊂ F2n that make the sum ∑u∈U,v∈V (CF (u, v))2 big (U
corresponds to the input masks and V corresponds to the output masks).
The average squared correlation (aka potential linear approximation [90] or expected
linear probability [45], see 4.2.2) of the linear approximation (a, b) is used to estimate
the average data complexity of multidimensional attacks or statistical saturation attacks
over all the key space. Specifically, the data complexity of statistical saturation attacks
is estimated to be proportional to the inverse of D(py) = 2−tCap(py) according to the
original attack paper [39] and to also some experiments in [82].
While Theorem 2.2.4 considers an input subspace consisting of fixing the last s input
bits and an output subspace consisting of the first t output bits, the Theorem also holds
in general as noted in [82]. For instance, we can restrict the above defined encryption
function e to the case where one fixes the first r bits in the input to y and considers only
the first t bits of the output. Thus e can be written as follows e : Fr2 × Fs2 → Ft2 × Fu2
where
e(y, x) =
(
e(1)(y, x), e(2)(y, x)
)
(2.8)
and its restriction hy can be redefined as follows hy : Fs2 → Ft2 where
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hy(x) = e(1)(y, x) (2.9)
Now following the proof of Theorem 2.2.4 and choosing E = {0} × Fs2 and E ′ = E⊥ =
Fr2 × {0}, one can see that
Cap(py) = 2−2n
∑
a∈Fr2×{0},b∈Ft2×{0}
(eˆ(a, b))2 =
∑
a∈Fr2×{0},b∈Ft2×{0}
(C(a, b))2 (2.10)
In Chapter 6, we use equation 2.10 to show the existence of linear approximations with
large correlations in PRINTcipher for some weak keys in the sense of the invariant subspace
attack described in Chapter 6.
Zero Correlation Cryptanalysis: More recently, Bogdanov and Rijmen in [25] proposed
a new attack called Zero-correlation cryptanalysis and as the name suggests the attack exploits
linear approximations having a zero correlation for any key value. Thus, zero correlation
attacks are the linear equivalent of impossible differential attacks. The authors propose an
algorithm that computes the exact correlation of a linear approximation using 2n−1 chosen
plaintexts, where n is the block size of the cipher. The algorithm is used to distinguish a block
cipher with a key length larger than its block size from truly random ciphers which deviate
from zero with a high probability. The authors showed examples of zero correlations linear
approximations of reduced rounds of AES and other ciphers and they used them to mount a
key recovery attack on reduced rounds of AES-192 and AES-256 as well as other ciphers.
Moreover, in [26], the authors propose a statistical technique to significantly reduce the data
complexity using many zero correlation linear approximations and they applied their technique
in reduced rounds of TEA and XTEA. For instance, when using l zero correlation approxima-
tions the data complexity will be in the order of 2
n√
l
which is a significant reduction compared
to the 2n−1 data complexity when only one zero correlation approximation is used. More
recently, in [24], the authors propose a multidimensional zero correlation attack that uses
multiple zero correlation approximations regardless of their statistical independence.
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2.3 Estimating the Probabilities of Differential and
Linear Approximations
There are two known automated methods for estimating the differential probability of a dif-
ferential approximation and the correlation value of a linear approximation.
The first method uses a submatrix of the difference transition matrix or a submatrix of the
correlation matrix as the difference transition and correlation matrices of an n-bit block cipher
have size (2n−1)×(2n−1) which is huge for a practical block cipher. The difference transition
submatrix was firstly proposed and used by Lai and Massey in their differential estimations
of the block cipher PES which was improved to the famous block cipher IDEA [81]. In their
differential analysis of PES, an 8× 8 submatrix was used. This submatrix approach has also
been used recently to estimate the differential probabilities of the 64-bit block cipher Maya [52]
where a 64×64 submatrix was used [27]. The correlation submatrix approach has been recently
used in estimating the correlation of the linear approximations in SPONGENT [21].
The second method uses a branch and bound algorithm. This method was firstly proposed and
used by Matsui to find the best differential characteristic of the DES cipher [87]. As noted by
Matsui, the algorithm can also be used to find the best linear characteristic. Matsui’s branch
and bound algorithm can be seen as a depth first search algorithm that first finds the best
(r − 1)-round differential or linear characteristic and then finds the best r-round differential
or linear characteristic. The algorithm builds trees whose roots are input differences or masks
and whose nodes at level i correspond to the i-round output differences or output masks. As
the number of rounds increases, it becomes infeasible to keep track of all the possible output
differences or masks. Therefore, the algorithm cuts the branches that lead to a probability
that is lower than an initial specified r-round lower bound probability value. The following
recursive procedures describe Matsui’s branch and bound algorithm.
Several techniques could be used to reduce the search space of the possible ∆X1 and ∆Yi in
the above algorithm. For instance, we can restrict the input differences to activate as few
Sboxes as possible since this usually results in obtaining higher probabilities. As Matusi’s
branch and bound finds only the best differential, in order to estimate the probability of a
difference approximation we need to adjust the branch and bound algorithm to find the best
‘m’ differential characteristics (with the same input and output difference) probabilities and
add all these ‘m’ probabilities to get an estimate of the total probability of the differential.
Similarly, in order to estimate the correlation or the average squared correlation of a linear
hull, we need to find the best ‘m’ linear characteristics (with the same input and output mask)
and add them to get the correlation in the case that the key is known or the average squared
correlation in the general case where the key is not known of a linear hull.
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Algorithm 3 Matusi’s branch and bound algorithm
Require: Initial probability values {B1, B2, · · · , Br}, where each Bi is the initial esti-
mate of the best i-round differential characteristic probability.
Require: Define (∆Xi,∆Yi) as the probability of having an input difference ∆Xi at
round i with an output difference ∆Yi at round i.
Ensure: Br ≡ Best r-round differential characteristic probability
1: BEGIN main procedure
2: for each possible candidate ∆X1 do
3: p1 = max∆Y1(∆X1,∆Y1)
4: if p1 ×Br−1 ≥ Br then
5: Call procedure Round-2
6: end if
7: end for
8: EXIT main procedure
9: procedure Round-i (2 ≤ i ≤ r − 1)
10: for each possible candidate ∆Yi do
11: Let ∆Xi = ∆Yi−1 and pi = (∆Xi,∆Yi).
12: if p1 × p2 × · · · × pi ×Br−i ≥ Br then
13: Call procedure Round-(i+ 1)
14: end if
15: end for
16: Return to the upper procedure.
17: procedure Round-r
18: Let ∆Xr = ∆Yr−1 and pr = max∆Yr(∆Xr,∆Yr).
19: if p1 × p2 × · · · × pr ≥ Br then
20: Br = p1 × p2 × · · · × pr
21: end if
22: Return to the upper procedure.
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2.4 Security Against Differential and Linear Crypt-
analysis
Differential and linear cryptanalysis are the most powerful attacks against block ciphers. Since
their invention and application on the DES cipher, two approaches have been followed to resist
against these two attacks [79]. One approach concerns with the improvement of the overall
structure of a block cipher in order to resist differential and linear attacks. The other approach
improves the resistance provided by the cipher components. Here we discuss the component
approach, for more details about the structure approach we refer the reader to [79].
As the round function of most modern block ciphers consist of a linear component (linear
transformation) and a non linear component (Sboxes), designers tend to make the probabil-
ities of differential and linear characteristics as small as possible by selecting an appropriate
Sbox as well as an appropriate linear transformation. An appropriate Sbox is a one whose
linear and differential approximations have the smallest probabilities among all the possible
Sboxes of the same size. An appropriate linear transformation is a one that has a good dif-
fusion in the sense that every output bit depends on all the input bits after a few number of
rounds. Designers also give bound to the probability of a differential or linear characteristic by
counting the minimum number of the so-called active sboxes which are the set of Sboxes that
a non-zero input difference of the differential characteristic or a non-zero input mask of the
linear characteristic passes through them. Clearly, the linear transformation together with the
differential and linear properties of the chosen Sbox determines the number of active Sboxes.
The most notable design approach that bounds the probability of a differential and linear
characteristic in a few number of rounds is the wide trail strategy [43] which was used in the
design of the AES. The wide trail strategy simply consists of choosing the best possible Sbox
together with designing a linear transformation layer that prevents the existence of differential
and linear characteristics with low hamming weight. This results in increasing the number of
active Sboxes in a few number of rounds and thus lowering the probabilities of differential and
linear characteristics.
2.5 Other Attack Variants
Many other attacks exist on both block and stream ciphers. In the following we briefly describe
the slide attacks and the algebraic attacks.
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Slide Attacks: The slide attacks [16] were proposed to attack iterated block ciphers re-
gardless of the number of rounds that they use. Slide attacks target ciphers that use identical
round functions accompanied with a simple key schedule that uses identical round keys or
alternates between two keys every round. Let F be the round function of the target block
cipher. Then slide attacks look for two known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (P1, C1) and (P2, C2)
such that P2 = F (P1). If we find a P2 such that P2 = F (P1), then consequently, C2 = F (C1).
Such pairs are called slid pairs. Now if F is weak then the key could be derived from the two
relations P2 = F (P1) and C2 = F (C1).
Algebraic Attacks: These kind of attacks exploit ciphers that can be expressed by a
sparse multivariate non-linear equation system over the binary field F2 with the secret key
bits as unknown variables and the plaintext/ciphertext pairs as the known variables. In
general, solving random multivariate nonlinear system of equations is an NP-hard problem
[51]. However, some techniques depending on the structure of the nonlinear system under
consideration such as Gro¨bner basis and linearization are used to solve the nonlinear system
in a reasonable time. While the Gro¨bner basis approach can sometimes take a reasonable
amount of time, the Gro¨bner basis algorithms are hard to predict and in the worst case they
have exponential complexity. The linearization approach replaces all the nonlinear terms in
the equations with new independent variables in order to get a system of linear equations that
have enough linearly independent equations which could be solved using Guassian elimination
algorithm. If the new system is solvable, the attacker would then substitutes results back
into the original system of equations to yield the secret key bits. Such simple linearization
techniques were applied successfully against some stream ciphers [40].
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Chapter 3
Lightweight Cryptography
Lightweight cryptography deals with the design of cryptographic primitives that are suitable
to fit and run on small hardware devices such as RFID tags, sensor networks and contactless
smart cards. Before the era of lightweight primitives, the landmark paper [50] proposes a low-
cost implementation of the AES that costs around 3595 GE which is expensive for low-cost
small devices 1. This might indicate that implementing standard cryptographic algorithms on
highly constrained devices is not an easy task.
The cryptographic community has pursued two directions to solve this problem: the first direc-
tion designs new solutions based on new cryptographic algorithms and protocols for lightweight
devices. One solution in this direction belongs to the HB family which is a set of symmetric
key challenge-response authentication protocols whose security is based on the hardness of the
Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem [65,71]. Another solution is the one-way function
SQUASH which is a lightweight MAC proposed by Shamir [105]. The second direction de-
signs lightweight cryptographic algorithms by reducing the state size and the hardware cost
of the linear and nonlinear components of the cryptographic algorithm without making any
compromise in security.
Thus, the challenge is in coping with the tradeoffs among security, hardware cost and per-
formance. Saving area and power consumed by the cryptographic algorithm but at the same
time avoiding any compromise concerning the security of the cryptographic algorithm. In this
thesis, we are concerned with analyzing lightweight solutions that go inline with the second
direction.
In this chapter, we give a short description about the lightweight ciphers that we studied in
this thesis, namely, PRESENT, PRINTcipher and A2U2. We also give an overview about
some of the attacks reported on them.
1A very compact implementation has been recently proposed in [89] requires 2400 GE
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3.1 Lightweight Ciphers
Few years later after the publication of [50], many ciphers were developed for minimal hardware
requirements. These lightweight ciphers have a small state or block size that are usually less
than or equal 64. They also use a smaller key size compared to the standard encryption
algorithms. Most of them use an 80 bit master key. In the following, we give a short description
of the three ciphers that we investigated in this thesis. Namely, the block ciphers PRESENT,
PRINTcipher and the stream cipher A2U2. We also investigated the core permutation of
SPONGENT-88 which can be seen as a block cipher with a zero key xored with a round
constant.
3.1.1 A Short Description of PRESENT and SPONGENT
One of the most prominent lightweight ciphers is the block cipher PRESENT proposed in
2007 [23]. It is an SPN consisting of 31 rounds. It has a 64-bit block size and uses an 80-bit
master key (recommended for lightweight applications) or 128-bit master key. PRESENT-80
requires 1570 GE. The PRESENT round function consists of three layers (See Algorithm 4
and Figure 3.1), namely, the key addition layer, the Sbox layer (the nonlinear layer) and the
permutation layer (the linear layer). The key addition layer simply xors the current state
with the round key generated by the PRESENT key schedule (for more details about the key
scheduling we refer to [23]).
The Sbox layer applies 16 times in parallel a single 4-bit Sbox. The PRESENT Sbox is
described in the following table.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S[x] C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Beside being chosen to be well-suited for efficient hardware implementation, the PRESENT
Sbox has been chosen to fulfill several conditions to strengthen PRESENT against differential
and linear cryptanalysis. More precisely, the PRESENT Sbox was chosen from a set of
Sboxes, S : F42 → F42, whose difference approximation table (as defined in Chapter 2) fulfills
the following two conditions:
1. The probability that a nonzero input difference ∆X ∈ F42 has a nonzero output difference
∆Y ∈ F42, Pr(∆X,∆Y ) ≤ 14 for all ∆X and ∆Y .
2. For any nonzero input difference ∆X ∈ F42 and any nonzero output difference ∆Y ∈ F42
with Hamming weight 1, Pr(∆X,∆Y ) = 0.
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and whose linear approximation table (as defined in Chapter 2) fulfills the following two
conditions:
1. The correlation of approximating 〈b, S(x)〉 by 〈a, x〉, C(a, b) ≤ 12 .
2. For all the nonzero input masks a ∈ F42 and all the nonzero output masks b with Ham-
ming weight 1, C(a, b) = ±14 .
The Permutation layer uses a bitwise permutation (See Figure 3.1) which costs only wires and
0 GE. The bitwise permutation is chosen so that full dependency (each output bit is dependent
on all the input bits) is gained after a minimal number of rounds.
As noted in [77], for an SPN with block size b and s bit Sboxes, where s divides b, the following
bit permutation
P (i) =
 bs × i mod b− 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 2,b− 1 for i = b− 1,
and also its inverse
P−1(i) =
 s× i mod b− 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ b− 2,b− 1 for i = b− 1,
provide optimal diffusion as full dependency is gained after dlogs be rounds.
In particular, PRESENT uses the above P (i) with b = 64 and s = 4 and thus it gains full
dependency after 3 rounds whereas PRINTcipher uses the inverse of P (i) as its bitwise per-
mutation as we will see later in its description. The significance of these optimal permutations
is in thwarting statistical attacks with a smaller number of rounds compared to the case where
non-optimal permutations are used. Constructing or finding these optimal permutations is not
a trivial task as they are very rare. For more information about constructing optimal bitwise
permutations we refer the reader to [82].
The simple and neat structure of PRESENT allowed its designers to give upper bounds on
the probability of a differential characteristic and the bias of a linear characteristic. More
specifically, the probability of a 4-round differential characteristic is upper bounded by 2−20
and thus the probability of a 25-round is upper bounded by 2−100(≤ 2−64) and the absolute
correlation value of a 4-round linear characteristic is upper bounded by 2−6 and thus the
absolute value for a 28-round linear characteristic is upper bounded by 2−42(≤ 2−32).
SPONGENT is a new lightweight hash function [22], its core permutation is inspired by
PRESENT as it inherits its three layers. There are many variants of SPONGENT depending
on its hash size and the block size of its permutation.
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Algorithm 4 Pseudo-code of the PRESENT cipher
Require: Plaintext = P , K = (K0, K1, · · · , Kr)
Ensure: C = EK(P )
1: STATE ← P
2: for i=0:r-1 do
3: STATE ← STATE ⊕Ki
4: STATE ← SboxLayer(STATE)
5: STATE ← PLayer(STATE)
6: end for
7: STATE ← STATE ⊕Kr
Fig. 3.1: One round of the block cipher PRESENT.
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The permutation layer of SPONGENT is the same as PRESENT except that it is wider.
The SPONGENT Sbox has been chosen according to the same criteria of the PRESENT
Sbox. It has been chosen carefully to avoid the existence of many linear trails with only one
active Sbox per round found on PRESENT. The SPONGENT Sbox is described in the
following table.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S[x] E D B 0 2 1 4 F 7 A 8 5 9 C 3 6
The core permutation of SPONGENT can be seen as a cipher using identical round keys (the
key is almost the zero key with few bits at the leftmost and the rightmost generated from a
counter that is meant to prevent sliding properties and invariant subspaces).
In other words, the core permutation of SPONGENT can be seen as a PRESENT-like cipher
which is a definition we borrowed from [27]. Thus the core permutation of SPONGENT can
then be represented by the above pseudo-code of PRESENT using zero round keys xored
with the corresponding round constant. For more details about the description of PRESENT
and SPONGENT, we refer to [22,23].
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3.1.2 A Short Description of PRINTcipher
PRINTcipher is a PRESENT-like block cipher proposed in 2010 [77]. It has two variants
PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96 mainly designed to exploit the properties of IC-
printing technology which targets the fabrication of cheap RFID tags. PRINTcipher-48 and
PRINTcipher-96 require only 402 GE and 726 GE respectively.
To reduce the size of the implementation, PRINTcipher uses a 3-bit Sbox that costs less than
12 GE but at the cost of having more rounds to thwart differential and linear cryptanalysis.
It also uses a small block size, only 48 bits, in its smallest variant, Moreover, it uses a fixed
key since it is very unlikely that the secret key of an RFID tag will be changed.
Regular IC technology allows all versions of the cipher to be identical and as a post-fabrication
step it personalizes each RFID tag with a unique key. However, with IC-printing technology
there is a little cost in changing the circuit that is printed at each run. Thus, part or all of
the secret key can be embedded into the algorithm description.
PRINTcipher-48 (resp -96) is a PRESENT-like cipher with a block size of b = 48 (resp
b = 96) bits and 48 (resp 96) rounds. The key size is 80 bits for PRINTcipher-48 and 160
bits for PRINTcipher-96. PRINTcipher uses a single 3 bit Sbox shown in the following
table.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
S[x] 0 1 3 6 7 4 5 2
In the non-linear layer the current state is split into 16 words of 3 bits for PRINTcipher-48
and into 32 words of 3 bits for PRINTcipher-96 and each word is processed by the Sbox in
parallel. The linear layer consists of the inverse of the PRESENT permutation with b = 48
or b = 96 and s = 3.
The peculiar part of PRINTcipher is to have all rounds identical up to adding a round
constant on a small number of bits. Here identical has to be understood as including the
round key, in other words, all round keys are identical. As a simple round key xored to
the state in each round limits the key size to 48 resp 96 bits, an additional key-dependent
permutation layer was introduced. This permutation layer permutes the input bits of each
Sbox individually. Out of 6 possible permutations on 3 bits, only four are valid permutations
for PRINTcipher.
For PRINTcipher-48 the 80-bit user-supplied key k is split into two subkeys k = sk1||sk2
where sk1 is 48 bits long and sk2 is 32 bits long. The first subkey sk1 is xored to the state at
the beginning of each round. The second subkey sk2 is used to generate the key-dependent
41
permutations in the following way. The 32-bits are divided into 16 sets of two bits and each
two-bit quantity a1||a0 is used to pick one of four of the six available permutations of the
three input bits. Specifically, the three input bits c2||c1||c0 are permuted to give the following
output bits according to two key bits a0||a1.
a1||a0
00 c2||c1||c0
01 c1||c2||c0
10 c2||c0||c1
11 c0||c1||c2
One round of PRINTcipher-48 is shown in Figure 3.2.
Fig. 3.2: One round of PRINTcipher-48 illustrating the bit-mapping between the 16 3-bit
Sboxes from one round to the next. sk1 denotes the xor key, p the permutation key, and RCi
the round counter.
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3.1.3 A Short Description of A2U2
The stream cipher A2U2 was presented at IEEE RFID 2011 [46]. It has a key length of 56
bit. The cipher’s inner state consists of a counter LFSR C (7 bits), two non-linear feedback
shift registers A and B (NFSRs, 17 and 9 bits), and a key register K (56 bits). Note that we
use a different notation than in the original paper, ours being more suitable for cryptanalysis.
Even though this is not apparent from the original paper [46], the authors confirmed upon
request that the cipher first outputs and then updates its inner state. In the following, the
opposite order is used, though purely for didactical reasons.
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Updating the Counter: In the following, we denote the state of the counter LFSR at
time t by Ct = (Ct, Ct−1, . . . , Ct−6), for t = 0, 1, . . .. The starting state after initialization
is C0 = (1, 1, . . . , 1), see below under “Initialization”. The LFSR then uses the feedback
recurrence
Ct = Ct−7 + Ct−4
for updating the state for t ≥ 1. It is an m-LFSR, i.e. it has maximal period (i.e., 27 − 1).
Updating the NFSRs: We denote the state of the NFSRs by At = (At, . . . , At−16) and by
Bt = (Bt, . . . , Bt−8). The update uses an auxiliary variable ht (defined below under “Updating
the key register”) and the following non-linear feedback recurrences:
Bt = At−17 +At−15At−14 +At−12 +At−10Ct−7 +At−7At−6At−5 +At−4At−2
At = Bt−9 +Bt−8Bt−7 +Bt−6 +Bt−3 + ht + 1,
again for t ≥ 1.
Updating the Key Register The key register is a rotation register, i.e. the state in
time t is a rotated version of the initial state. If we denote the key bits by (k0, . . . , k55), then
each state of the key register is defined as
Kt = (k5t, k5t+1, . . . , k5t+55),
where all indices are computed modulo 56.
For each round, the first five bits of the register are stored in a buffer St = (St0, . . . , St4) =
(k5t, . . . , k5t+4), and they are used to compute the auxiliary variable ht as follows:
ht = MUXCt−5(St0, St1) ·MUXCt−1(St4, At−2) + MUXCt−3(St2, St3) + 1,
where MUXz(x, y) is the multiplexer function that selects x if z = 0 and y otherwise.
Initialization: The A2U2 cipher has a 61-bit key split into two parts: A 5-bit “counter
key” and a 56-bit “register key”. In addition, the cipher receives a 32-bit random number
(which are only 31 bits used of). Key and random number are written into the registers as
follows:
 Counter Register: The 5 least significant key of the 61-bit key are used as the“counter
key” and are bitwise xored with the 5 least significant random bits. The resulting 5-bit
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vector is written into the 5 least significant bits of the counter LFSR (using the above
notation). The second MSB is set to 1, the MSB is set to 0.
 NFSRs: The next 26 key and random bits are bitwise xored and written into the NFSR
cells.
 Key Register: The 56 register key bits (to some extent the same that were used for
NFSR initialization) are stored in the key register.
Now the cipher is clocked until the counter register reaches the all-one state. This happens
after 9-126 clockings. The resulting state is called the initial state.
Output Generation: The cipher deploys a form for irregular output mechanism; it out-
puts either encrypted plaintext bits or pseudo-random bits depending on the content of NFSR
cell At. Plaintext bits have to “wait” until At = 1 before being encrypted. If we denote the
plaintext string by P = (P0, P1, . . .) and if we define σ(t) =
∑t−1
i=0 Ai with σ(0) = 0, then the
output of the cipher in round t is:
Yt = MUXAt(Bt + Ct, Bt + Pσ(t)).
3.2 Other Lightweight Primitives
There are many lightweight primitives proposed in the literature. In the following, we give a
brief description about some of them.
There are two stream ciphers suitable for lightweight applications emerged from the eStream
project. Namely, Grain [60] and Trivium [32]. Grain has a compact hardware implementation.
It consists of two variants. One uses an 80-bit key with a 80-bit initialization vector (where 16
bits are fixed to 1) which is the recommended variant. The other uses 128-bit key with an 128-
bit initialization vector (where 16 bits are fixed to 1). Both of its variants consists of a LFSR
initialized by the IV, a NFSR initialized by the secret key bits and a nonlinear output Boolean
function that takes some inputs from the LFSR and the NFSR. Grain-80 has 160 initialization
rounds and Grain-128 has 256 initialization rounds. During the initialization rounds no output
is produced but is fed back into the LFSR and the NFSR. The structure of the two variants
of Grain looks very similar but each of their components use a different Boolean function.
For instance, the NFSR of Grain-80 uses a nonlinear update function with algebraic degree 6
whereas the NFSR Grain-128 uses a nonlinear update function with algebraic degree 2 which
makes its full version suspectable to the recent dynamic cube attacks for some weak keys and
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this has led to modifying Grain-128 to Grain-128a. The hardware implementation of Grain-80
suggests a cost of 1294 GE [54] which makes it well-suited for lightweight applications.
Trivium has a very simple design. It uses an 80-bit secret key together with an 80-bit initial-
ization vector. Its internal state uses 288-bit and it consists of three interconnected NFSRs
of different lengths where each use a quadratic Boolean function. It uses 1152 initialization
rounds before producing any keystream bits. The hardware implementation of Trivium sug-
gests a cost of 2580 GE [54].
In 2009, a block cipher family called KATAN/KTANTAN was proposed [31]. It is a family
of block ciphers inspired by the stream cipher Trivium. It uses two NFSRs that update each
other. It has three variants with small block sizes, namely 32-bit, 48-bit and 64-bit. All
these variants use an 80-bit key and 255 rounds. The only difference between KATAN and
KTANTAN is in the key scheduling as in KTANTAN the key is fixed and cannot be changed.
In 2010, QUARK the first lightweight sponge-based hash function was proposed [9]. Its design
is similar to that of KATAN and Grain and its number of rounds exceed 255. It has three
variants depending on its output size together with the input size of its core permutation. Its
smallest variant fits in 1379 GE.
In 2011, lightweight AES-like primitives has been proposed. Namely, the PHOTON hash
function [56] and the LED block cipher [57] were proposed. Their diffusion layers use an MDS
matrix which can be efficiently computed in a serial way. The smallest variants of PHOTON
and LED require 865 and 966 GE respectively. Also in 2011, the block cipher Piccolo, a
generalized Feistel block cipher, was proposed [107]. Similar to PHOTON and LED, Piccolo
diffusion layer also uses an MDS matrix. Its smallest version requires less than 700 GE.
3.3 Overview of Some Attacks in PRESENT, PRINT-
cipher and A2U2
In this section, we briefly describe some of the attacks on the ciphers we analyzed in this
thesis, namely, PRESENT, PRINTcipher and A2U2.
3.3.1 Attacks on PRESENT
The PRESENT block cipher has been analyzed in several publications. In [109], a 16-round
differential attack was mounted. Later a statistical saturation attack was mounted and claimed
to break 24 rounds [39]. In [93], the author showed the existence of 32% weak keys which have
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a higher bias that makes the cipher using those weak keys distinguishable for up to 24 rounds.
In [38], a multidimensional attack was used to break 25 rounds and 26 rounds where the latter
attack used the whole code book. Recently, a multiple differential attack was mounted on
18-round of PRESENT [18]. Linear attacks were more successful in breaking more rounds
in PRESENT than differential attacks. This is due to bitwise permutation of PRESENT
together2 with the following two facts about the PRESENT Sbox:
 The fact that the design criteria of the PRESENT Sbox allows the existence of linear
characteristics with one active Sbox per round and prevents the existence of differential
characteristics with one active Sbox per round.
 The existence of eight linear approximations in the PRESENT Sbox with input and
output masks of Hamming weight one (See the linear approximations of the PRESENT
Sbox in the Figure below and Table 3.1).
Fig. 3.3: Biased 1-1 bit approximations in the PRESENT Sbox
Ohkuma exploited the second fact to find linear approximations with input and output masks
of Hamming weight one that consists of many linear characteristics activating only one Sbox
with the same absolute bias. Considering these many linear characteristics and assuming
independent round keys, Ohkuma showed that the bias distribution over the entire key space
of some r-round linear approximations of input and output masks of Hamming weight one
follows a normal distribution with average 0 and variance 2(−2r)2N , where N is the number of
linear trails activating one Sbox per round. Therefore, 32% of the keys in the key space have an
absolute correlation≥ 2−2r√N . Such keys were defined as weak keys. Ohkuma showed that for
28-round PRESENT there are linear approximations with absolute correlation 2−38.3 < 2−42
for some weak keys. This is higher than the 2−42 upper bound for the absolute correlation
value of a linear characteristic set by the designers for 28-round PRESENT. However, as the
2It was observed in [82] that given the PRESENT bit permutation, the PRESENT Sbox is
among the 8% worst of all optimal Sboxes. Also given the PRESENT Sbox, the PRESENT bit
permutation was the worst among 221 chosen optimal permutations.
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Table 3.1: Linear Approximation Table of the PRESENT Sbox. The first column holds
the integer represenation of the binary input masks while the first row holds the integer
representation of the binary output masks. The entry (i, j) divided by 16 represents the
correlation of a linear approximation with input mask equal to the binary representation
of i and output mask equal to the binary representation of j. 1-bit to 1-bit masks are
marked with boxes.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0 -8 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0 8
2 0 0 4 4 -4 -4 0 0 4 -4 0 8 0 8 -4 4
3 0 0 4 4 4 -4 -8 0 -4 4 -8 0 0 0 -4 -4
4 0 0 -4 4 -4 -4 0 8 -4 -4 0 -8 0 0 -4 4
5 0 0 -4 4 -4 4 0 0 4 4 -8 0 8 0 4 4
6 0 0 0 -8 0 0 -8 0 0 -8 0 0 8 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0 0 8 0
8 0 0 4 -4 0 0 -4 4 -4 4 0 0 -4 4 8 8
9 0 8 -4 -4 0 0 4 -4 -4 -4 -8 0 -4 4 0 0
10 0 0 8 0 4 4 4 -4 0 0 0 -8 4 4 -4 4
11 0 -8 0 0 -4 -4 4 -4 -8 0 0 0 4 4 4 -4
12 0 0 0 0 -4 -4 -4 -4 8 0 0 -8 -4 4 4 -4
13 0 8 8 0 -4 -4 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 -4 4 -4
14 0 0 4 4 -8 8 -4 -4 -4 -4 0 0 -4 -4 0 0
15 0 8 -4 4 0 0 -4 -4 -4 4 8 0 4 4 0 0
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designers’ upper bound is for a linear characteristic and not for the linear approximation or
linear hull, Ohkuma’s result does not contradict the designers’ 2−42 upper bound. Ohkuma
used a 20-round linear approximation to break 24-round of PRESENT.
Table 3.2 shows the number of linear characteristics activating one Sbox that exist within a
linear approximation with input and output masks of Hamming weight one. The table clearly
shows that the correlations of the linear approximations exceed the designers’ characteristic
bound for large number of rounds which might be the reason why the experiments performed
by the designers which were probably for small number of rounds have not shown the effect
of the linear hull which seems to appear for large number of rounds. As shown in Table 3.2,
when the number of rounds exceeds 11, the maximum squared average correlation of a linear
approximation with input and output masks of Hamming weight one in PRESENT is larger
than the maximum squared correlation of a linear characteristic.
Table 3.2: r ≡ Number of rounds, N ≡ number of linear trails, C21 ≡ maximum average
squared correlation of the linear approximation with input and output masks of Ham-
ming weight one in PRESENT and C22 ≡ maximum squared correlation possible for a
linear characteristic in PRESENT.
r log2(N) log2(C21) log2(C22)
4 1.58 -14.41 -12.00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
8 7.58 -24.42 -24.00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
11 7.58 -24.42 -24.00
12 18.73 -34.82 -36.00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
20 24.29 −55.71 -60.00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
23 28.45 -63.55 -68.00
24 29.84 -66.16 -72.00
. . . . . . . . . . . .
28 35.39 -76.61 -84.00
The multidimensional linear attack on PRESENT mounts a 25-round attack using a 23-
round distinguisher with multiple linear approximations activating one Sbox per round but
having input and output masks with Hamming weight more than or equal to one. A 26-round
attack was mounted using the whole code book using a 24-round distinguisher with multiple
linear approximations activating one Sbox per round but having input and output masks with
Hamming weight more than or equal to one.
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These linear attacks have influenced the design of SPONGENT since it uses the same but
extended bitwise permutation of PRESENT as its linear layer and the same criteria of the
PRESENT Sbox. Thus to avoid the threats of such attacks, the SPONGENT Sbox was
carefully chosen to avoid the existence of many linear characteristics with one active Sbox per
round as the case in PRESENT. Table 3.3 shows the existence of only 4 linear approximations
with input and output masks with nonzero correlation in SPONGENT compared to 8 in
PRESENT. This makes SPONGENT secure against linear attacks in fewer rounds compared
to PRESENT. For instance in SPONGENT-88, there is always only one trail that have one
active Sbox at each round when the number of rounds is larger than 5.
Table 3.3: Linear Approximation Table of the SPONGENT Sbox. The first column
holds the integer representation of the binary input masks while the first row holds
the integer representation of the binary output masks. The entry (i, j) divided by 16
represents the correlation of a linear approximation with input mask equal to the binary
representation of i and output mask equal to the binary representation of j. 1-bit to
1-bit masks are marked with boxes.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 -4 4 4 -4 0 0 0 0 -4 4 -4 4 -8 -8
2 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0 -8 -4 -4 -4 4 4 4 4 -4
3 0 0 -4 -4 -4 4 8 0 4 4 0 0 0 8 -4 4
4 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 8 -4 -4 4 4 -4 4 4 -4
5 0 0 -4 4 -4 -4 8 0 -4 -4 0 -8 0 0 4 -4
6 0 0 -8 0 -8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 -8 0 0
7 0 0 4 4 -4 -4 0 0 8 -8 4 4 4 4 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 8 0 0 -8
9 0 8 -4 -4 -4 -4 -8 0 0 0 4 -4 -4 4 0 0
10 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0 8 4 -4 -4 -4 4 -4 -4 -4
11 0 8 -4 4 4 4 0 0 -4 -4 0 0 8 0 -4 4
12 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0 8 -4 4 -4 4 4 4 4 4
13 0 -8 -4 -4 4 -4 0 0 -4 -4 8 0 0 0 -4 4
14 0 0 8 0 -8 0 0 0 -8 0 0 0 0 0 -8 0
15 0 8 4 -4 4 -4 8 0 0 0 4 4 -4 -4 0 0
In Chapter 4, we used the submatrix method to find better linear approximations inPRESENT
and SPONGENT than the previously found linear approximations.
3.3.2 Attacks on PRINTcipher
The block cipher PRINTcipher has been analyzed in several publications. Our work in
Chapter 5 presents the first analysis of PRINTcipher which basically showed how to avoid
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the key dependent layer of PRINTcipher to mount a differential attack on PRINTcipher.
All the subsequent attacks on PRINTcipher point to the existence of weak keys. Our work in
Chapter 6 introduces the Invariant Subspace Attack which can be seen as a partial fixed point
attack and applies it to PRINTcipher to distinguish the full round PRINTcipher for two
classes of keys, each class contains 2−29 fraction of all the keys, we call these keys “weak keys”.
Both of these attacks exploits the difference properties of the 3-bit Sbox used in PRINTci-
pher. In the following, we show the difference distribution table of the PRINTcipher Sbox.
Table 3.4: Difference distribution table for PRINTcipher Sbox. Note that the differ-
ence table is symmetric. 1-bit to 1-bit differences are marked with boxes. Each entry
divided by 8 gives the corresponding difference probability.
∆y
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
000 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
001 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
010 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
011 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0∆x
100 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
101 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 0
110 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0
111 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a one bit difference in the input of the Sbox causes a one bit
difference in the output difference with probability 28 . This allows the existence of some
specified 1-bit input difference and 1-bit output difference with probability 1 such as those
defined in Table 6.1. Since 1-bit input difference and 1-bit output difference with nonzero
probability cannot be avoided in an optimal 3-bit Sbox [77], similar properties as the one
showed in Table 6.1 would exist for any optimal 3-bit Sbox.
More recently, the work in [30] found all the classes of weak keys for both PRINTcipher-
48 and PRINTcipher-96. More specifically, 64 classes of weak keys have been found for
PRINTcipher-48 including the two classes mentioned in Chapter 6 and 115,669 classes of
weak keys have been found for PRINTcipher-96 including the two classes mentioned in
Chapter 6. However, for PRINTcipher-48 the two classes mentioned in Chapter 6 contain
the largest number of weak keys which is 251. It is also noted in [30], that these two specific
classes are not disjoint and contain 245 joint elements. In general, the classes of weak keys
found might have a non-trivial intersection.
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Two methods were proposed in [30] to find all the classes of weak keys in PRINTcipher.
The first method is based on a one-to-one correspondence between invariant subspaces in
PRINTcipher-n and subsets in Zn satisfying certain properties (refer to [30] for more de-
tails). It finds invariant subspaces in PRINTcipher-48 by finding subsets in Z48 that satisfies
certain properties. The method goes through all the possible permutation keys, that allow
the existence of invariant subspaces, which are 228 (out of 232 but 4 bits get affected by the
round constants (See Chapter 6)). After finding the permutation keys that have invariant
subspaces, the xor key is found. This method was able to find all the 64 classes of weak keys
existing in PRINTcipher-48. However, for PRINTcipher-96 this method is infeasible since
it exhaustively tries all the possible permutation keys, that allows the existence of invariant
subspaces, which are 260 (out of 264). Therefore, the second method was proposed. It is based
on a one-to-one correspondence between PRINTcipher-n and points of a certain polytope in
Zn. These points and thus the invariant subspaces in PRINTcipher are then found efficiently
using Mixed Integer Linear Programming. For more details, we refer the reader to [30].
The work in [72] combines differential and linear attacks. More specifically, linear approxima-
tions were used to increase the probability of differential characteristics in order to break 29
rounds and 31 rounds of PRINTcipher-48 for 4.54% and 0.036% of the keys, respectively.
In [6], linear attacks that break 28 rounds and 29 rounds of PRINTcipher-48 for 50% and
3.125% of the key space respectively were proposed.
3.3.3 Attacks on A2U2
In [36], a very efficient chosen plaintext attack against A2U2 is proposed. However, as we
are going to show here, the attack contains a flaw that makes it unapplicable against the real
A2U2 cipher.
Attack Idea: If the attacker could freely choose one plaintext bit for each clock, then he
can write the output equation as follows:
Yt = MUXAt(Bt + Ct, Bt + pt)
= MUXAt(Ct, pt) +Bt.
Depending on the amount of knowledge the attacker has about the plaintext, he can now learn
more about the inner state.
If the attacker can choose the plaintext, he can start by encrypting a plaintext that is identical
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to the counter sequence. In this case, the above equation simplifies to
Yt = MUXAt(Ct, pt) +Bt
= pt +Bt,
meaning that the attacker can learn the whole sequence (Bt)t≥0.
Next, he encrypts a plaintext that is the bitwise inverse of the counter sequence. This allows
him to distinguish for every ciphertext bit whether Ct or pt was encrypted, providing the
attacker with the full sequence (At)t≥0.
Now he has the sequences produced by the LFSR and by both NFSRs. All that remains is to
test for each round which key bit gives the correct NFSR update. This can be done in unit
time, yielding an extremely efficient attack.
The Catch: However, the initial assumption of the above attack is wrong, invalidating the
whole cryptanalysis. The problem is that plaintext is not used at a rate of 1 bit per round.
It is not possible to choose a plaintext bit for each round, because (1) some plaintext bits are
used in several rounds and (2) without knowledge of the sequence (At)t≥0, it is impossible to
say in which rounds a plaintext bit will be used. However, as it turns out, this attack can be
repaired. In Chapter 7, we show how to repair this attack besides providing other attacks.
Since the first version of this paper, this problem was acknowledged by Chai et al., and their
paper was updated accordingly3. Their new attack recovers first the sequence (At)t≥0 by choos-
ing two complementary plaintexts (pt and its complement p¯t) and xoring their corresponding
ciphertexts (c ⊕ c¯ = ∆c). Now, if ∆ct = 0 then At = 0, otherwise At = 1. This recovers the
sequence (At)t≥0 and consequently the sequence (Bt)t≥0 can then be simply recovered.
More recently, the work in [111] improved the guess-and-determine known plaintext attack in
Chapter 7. The main idea of [111] is in forming the recurrence relation
σ(i) = σ(i+ 1)−Ai and 0 ≤ σ(i) ≤ i
where 0 ≤ i ≤ n and n is the number of the ciphertext bits. The authors of [111] reduced
the computational time for determining registers A and B by guessing σ(n) (which is ≤ n
3A word on the chronological ordering of things seems to be in order here. The original Chai attack
was published on IACR Eprint May 17, 2011. Our attack proposed in Chapter 7 was submitted to
Eprint May 25, 2011. On the same day, a copy was sent to Chai et al., informing them about a possible
flaw in their attack and proposing the attack described below. On May 26, 2011, Chai et al. updated
their Eprint paper by removing the flaw and proposing a new attack similar (but not identical) to the
one the we submitted the day before.
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and thus a small number) in addition to guessing register A and then determining previous
states of registers A and B. The paper also shows by experiments that the quadratic equation
system obtained after determining the subkeys can easily be solved and most of the time there
is always a one key candidate. All these takes time complexity in the order of 224.7.
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Chapter 4
Differential and Linear
Approximations on PRESENT-Like
Ciphers
The lightweight block cipher PRESENT described in Chapter 3 (See Section 3.1.1) has re-
ceived a lot of attention from the cryptographic community and it has been recently adopted
by ISO as one of the international standards in lightweight cryptography [67]. PRESENT
has inspired some lightweight designs, namely, the block cipher Maya [52], the involution block
cipher PUFFIN [37]1, the block cipher PRINTcipher (See Chapter 3) and the core permu-
tation of the hash function SPONGENT (See Chapter 3). All these designs can be seen as
PRESENT-like ciphers (which is a definition we borrowed from [27]) as their algorithms are
very similar to the Algorithm of PRESENT (See Algorithm 4).
In this chapter we show how to find good differential and linear approximations on PRESENT-
like ciphers. We also study the effect of key scheduling on the distribution of differential and
linear approximations over all the key space.
In the first section, we present an approach to find low-weight differential and linear approxi-
mations on PRESENT-like ciphers and then apply it on PRESENT and SPONGENT. In
the second section, we study the effect of key scheduling on the distribution of differential and
linear approximations on PRESENT-like ciphers. In the final section, we conclude and give
some suggestions for future work.
1Note that both Maya and PUFFIN were completely broken using both differential and linear
cryptanalysis in [27,28] and [20,82] respectively. Therefore we do not consider them here.
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4.1 Estimating the Probabilities of Low-Weight Dif-
ferential and Linear Approximations
We estimate the probability of low-weight linear and differential approximations inPRESENT-
like ciphers. By using large but sparse correlation and difference submatrices, we overcome the
memory and time problems that appears in the branch and bound method [87] described in
Algorithm 2.3 when the number of good linear and differential trails grows exponentially. For
instance, there would be memory and time problems in the branch and bound method when
the number of differential and linear trails grows exponentially but using sparse correlation and
difference submatrices we can handle any number of trails and investigate many differential
and linear approximations with a negligible cost. For instance, all the linear approximations
of PRESENT at Table 4.2 come from a number of good and bad trails exceeding 289 which
clearly shows a convincing advantage of using sparse submatrices over the branch and bound
algorithm when the number of trails grows exponentially.
Using sparse correlation and difference submatrices of PRESENT and SPONGENT:
1. We report the first improved analysis on SPONGENT [22], specifically we improve the
linear cryptanalysis on the SPONGENT permutation presented by the designers by
one more round.
2. We present better linear approximations on PRESENT and present a 24-round statis-
tical saturation distinguisher that uses better input and output subspaces compared to
the original attack paper [39]. These approximations also show that the assumption,
made by all the previous analyses on PRESENT [38, 82, 93], that the linear approxi-
mations consisting of trails with one active Sbox at each round, yield the highest bias is
not valid. We also found many 16-round differential approximations activating at most
4 Sboxes per round with probability larger than 2−64, which could be used to mount a
differential attack on 18-round PRESENT similar to the ones in [18,109].
4.1.1 Description of Our Estimation Approach
Assuming that PRESENT-like ciphers are Markov ciphers [81,91], we make use of submatrices
of the correlation and the transition probability matrices of the target ciphers to find the best
linear and differential approximations. We focus only on describing how to find better linear
approximations. The case for finding better differentials is similar (use transition probability
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submatrix instead of correlation submatrix and input-output difference instead of input-output
masks).
Large Sparse Correlation and Difference Matrices
In [21, 22], a submatrix of the correlation matrix of size 4ns × 4ns was used to estimate the
correlation of a linear approximation, where ns is the number of the 4-bit Sboxes used in the
permutation where only input and output masks of Hamming weight one are considered. We
extend this approach by adding input and output masks with Hamming weight ≤ 4. This
results in having a large correlation submatrix whose entries activate at most 4 active Sboxes.
Suppose that we use a correlation submatrix with input and output masks with Hamming
weight less than or equal to m. Then the size of the submatrix will be
∑m
i=1
(n
i
) ×∑mi=1 (ni),
where n is the block size of the cipher in bits. The submatrix size is large but most of its entries
are zeros. For instance, we see that for any input element activating ‘s’ Sboxes (1 ≤ s ≤ m),
all the other output elements corresponding to the other Sboxes yield a zero correlation. Thus,
there are more than
m∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
− 15s
zero output elements for any input activating ‘s’ Sboxes. Thus, this submatrix has few non
zero elements and therefore it can easily fit in memory using a sparse matrix storage format
(See Section 4.2).
The construction of the correlation submatrix is straightforward. For instance to fill the
submatrix entries from an input with Hamming weight 5, we proceed as follows: for each
possible input, we determine the number of activated Sboxes which is in this case at least
2. Suppose we have i active Sboxes, then all the possible ordered solutions of the inequality
x1 +x2 + · · ·+xi ≤ m determine the Hamming weight of the output bits of each of the i active
Sboxes. Then we fill the submatrix entries corresponding to the specified input by considering
all the possible output bits of the specified Hamming weight. To estimate the cost of filling
these entries, we consider the simple case where we have two active Sboxes. The time cost for
filling the corresponding submatrix entries is
∑
2≤i+j≤5
(
4
i
)(
4
j
)
and the number of all the possible inputs with Hamming weight 5 activating 2 Sboxes is
N2 =
∑
w1+w2=5
(
n
4
2
)(
4
w1
)(
4
w2
)
.
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Now by symmetry, the cost of filling the corresponding entries that have outputs with Hamming
weight 5 activating 2 Sboxes is similar but we only exclude the duplicated cases where i+j = 5,
so the cost is
∑
2≤i+j<5
(4
i
)(4
j
)
. Therefore, the total construction time of input and output with
Hamming weight 5 activating 2 Sboxes is
2N2
∑
2≤i+j≤5
(
4
i
)(
4
j
)
−N2
∑
i+j=5
(
4
i
)(
4
j
)
.
One can see that the construction time can be generalized as follows.
Proposition 4.1.1. The time cost for computing the correlations corresponding to inputs and
outputs of Hamming weight ‘w’, 1 ≤ w ≤ m is in the order of:
2(N1
∑
1≤i≤w
(4
i
)
+N2
∑
2≤i+j≤w
(4
i
)(4
j
)
+ · · ·+Nw−1∑w−1≤i+···+z≤w (4i) · · · (4z))
+ Nw4w − N2∑i+j=w (4i)(4j) − · · · − Nw−1∑i+···+z=w (4i) · · · (4z), where N1 + · · · + Nw = (nw)
and Ni =
∑
w1+···+wi=w
(n
4
i
)( 4
w1
) · · · ( 4wi) is the number of elements with Hamming weight ‘w’
activating ‘i’ number of Sboxes.
Note that N1 = 0 when w ≥ 5 as in this case we have at least two active Sboxes. The total
construction time is in the order of the sum of construction times of all the possible input and
output weights (w), i.e. 1 ≤ w ≤ m, where the dominant term is when w = m.
After constructing the correlation submatrix, C. The correlation approximations after r rounds
is computed by Cr = ∏ri=1Mi, where Mi is the correlation submatrix at round i formed by
changing the signs of C according to the round key and the round constant used in the cipher.
The maximum correlation after r rounds is thus given by crmax := max |Crij |. This works in the
case of SPONGENT since we know that it uses an almost zero key at each round and thus we
can compute the actual correlation of each approximation but in the case of PRESENT, we
need to compute the average squared correlation of a linear approximation (See Proposition
4.2.2) in order to compute the capacity of the statistical saturation attack.
As the size of the correlation submatrix gets bigger when considering masks with Hamming
weight equal to 4, the matrix-matrix multiplications might not be always possible for high
number of rounds especially when there are many trails for most of the approximations as these
make the resulted submatrix Cr very dense and consequently we might run out of memory.
Thus, instead we use successive matrix-vector multiplications as described by Algorithm 5.
Note that before Step 3 in Algorithm 5 when we are computing the maximum absolute cor-
relation (for example in SPONGENT), we have to change the signs at some entries of the
correlation submatrix M at each round according to the corresponding round constant. The
time complexity of Algorithm 5 is in the order of l × (r − 1) matrix-vector multiplications
where l is the number of rows or columns of the submatrix. If l is a large number, then the
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Algorithm 5 Finding the best the average squared correlation (absolute correlation)
Require: Submatrix M of size l×l, M is a submatrix of the average squared correlation
matrix (or the correlation matrix).
Require: Two temporary vectors of length “l”, tempCorr and tempIndex.
Ensure: Finds the best r-round average squared correlation (absolute correlation) with
its corresponding input mask a and output mask b.
1: counter = 0.
2: for j = 1→ l do
3: Extract the jth Column Cj from M .
4: repeat
5: Cj = M × Cj.
6: Increment counter
7: until counter equals r − 1.
8: tempCorr(j) = max(|Cj|).
9: tempIndex(j) = The index of max(|Cj|) (which gives us the corresponding input
mask).
10: end for
11: return max(tempCorr) which yields the maximum average squared correlation
(absolute correlation) and its index yields the corresponding output mask b. Then
the corresponding input mask a = max(tempIndex(b)).
most convenient way is to consider correlation matrices with Hamming weight up to 2 or 3
bits depending on the size of the block cipher. Then, try to perform matrix-matrix multiplica-
tions and find the active input and output Sboxes that yield the maximum absolute value as
they would probably be the Sboxes that yield the maximum value when considering matrices
using Hamming weight more than 3. For example, experiments on the PRESENT correla-
tion submatrix with Hamming weight up to 3, where we are able to perform matrix-matrix
multiplication and thus determine the correlations of all the approximations, showed us that
the best linear approximations often come from an input mask activating only one Sbox and
also an output mask activating only one Sbox (which get permuted afterwards).
4.1.2 Improved Linear and Differential Approximations
We use the approach described in section 4.1.1 and report the best linear and differential
approximations we found in PRESENT and SPONGENT. We use the time complexity
formula, given at section 4.1.1, to specify the set of parameters (n ≡ block size and m ≡
maximum Hamming weight), where constructing the sparse matrices would be computationally
tractable in PRESENT and SPONGENT.
As shown in Table 4.1, the number of elements in the correlation and differences submatrices
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Table 4.1: n ≡ Cipher’s block size, m ≡ maximum Hamming weight of inputs and
outputs, size ≡ matrix size, nnzC ≡ non zero elements of the Correlation matrix,
nnzD ≡ non zero elements of the difference matrix, Time complexity of the correlation
or difference matrix construction ≡ O(t), − ≡ bounded by t since each step in t fills
an entry in the correlation or difference matrix. The time complexity unit is simple
arithmetic operations.
Cipher n m log2(size) log2(nnzC) log2(nnzD) log2(t)
PRESENT 64 4 19.37× 19.37 23.26 18.41 27.83
PRESENT 64 5 22.99× 22.99 - - 33.85
PRESENT 64 6 26.31× 26.31 - - 39.61
PRESENT 64 7 29.39× 29.39 - - 45.33
SPONGENT 88 4 21.22× 21.22 23.63 19.18 29.58
SPONGENT 88 5 25.31× 25.31 - - 36.04
SPONGENT 88 6 29.12× 29.12 - - 42.26
SPONGENT 136 4 23.74× 23.74 - - 32.00
SPONGENT 136 5 28.48× 28.48 - - 39.02
of both PRESENT and SPONGENT is huge. A standard matrix representation would cost
241.74 and 245.44 bytes for the difference matrix of PRESENT and SPONGENT respectively.
This is more than 1 TB. Therefore, we need to avoid running out of memory by using a
sparse matrix representation which reduces memory by only allocating space for the nonzero
elements. This will also speed the matrix-vector or matrix-matrix multiplications which we
perform to find the best linear and difference approximations.
Table 4.1 shows us that our submatrices are very sparse, for instance the first table entry
indicates that the density (= nnzSize×Size) of the difference transition submatrix of PRESENT
with input and output differences of Hamming weight up to 4 is 7.56 × 10−7. This confirms
that these large submatrices are considerably sparse. Therefore, using a sparse matrix storage
format where we only allocate storage for the nonzero elements, our large correlation submatrix
could easily fit in memory. The very general and simple format for storing sparse matrices
is called Compressed Column Storage (CCS). Using this format, the storage cost of a sparse
matrix depends on the number of its nonzero elements (nnz) and its column size (ncol). More
specifically, the cost of a real-valued sparse matrix in CCS format is equivalent to the cost
of nnz real-valued numbers and (nnz + ncol + 1) integers [102]. Thus, on a 64-bit machine,
where we have 8 bytes for both real and integer numbers, the total memory cost would be
8nnz+8(nnz+ncol+1) bytes. Using the numbers on Table 4.1, we see that the total memory
cost for a CCS sparse representation of PRESENT and SPONGENT difference submatrices
is 11014024 (≈ 223.4) and 29085768 (≈ 224.8) bytes respectively. Also the memory cost for a
CCS representation of PRESENT and SPONGENT correlation submatrices is 165990920
59
(≈ 227.3) and 226974888 (≈ 227.8) bytes respectively. Each of these submatrices costs less than
1 GB and thus would easily fit in memory.
Application on PRESENT:
We use the approach described above to find better differential and linear approximations.
Differential Approximations: We use a difference transition submatrix whose input
and output differences have Hamming weight less than or equal to four. Now, in order to
estimate the differential probability after r rounds, we raise our transition submatrix to r and
extract the maximum entry. The time and memory costs of this are negligible. We found that
the 2-round iterative characteristic in [23] has probability 2−74 for 15-round PRESENT but
the differential containing this characteristic has a higher probability equivalent to 2−63.50 for
a 15-round PRESENT. We also found many differentials with probability larger than 2−64
for 16 rounds PRESENT where the maximum one occurs with probability 2−62.58.
Moreover, the maximum differential probability we found for 25 rounds is equal to 2−97.38.
This is larger than the 2−100 differential characteristic bound for 25 rounds given in [23].
Here we note that the analysis provided in [23] is sound as the authors gave a bound for the
differential characteristic and not for the differential which is hard to bound. Nevertheless,
this shows that our approach can be useful in bounding the probability of a differential.
Linear Approximations and Statistical Saturation Attacks: All the previous
linear attacks on PRESENT used linear trails activating only one Sbox at each round. To
find better linear approximations, we considered trails activating at most 4 Sboxes. Thus, we
constructed a correlation submatrix using input and output masks of Hamming weight at most
4 bits. By searching for the best approximations among input masks and output masks in one
Sbox. We found that there are many approximations whose squared correlation is larger than
2−64 when ≤ 24 rounds of PRESENT are used.
As noted in [93], these approximations follow the normal distribution with mean zero and
variance equal to their squared correlation. Thus, the squared correlation is higher for 32% of
keys compared to the whole key space for some approximations where each approximation has
a different path. Thus when using multiple linear approximations, each key is more likely to
yield a high correlation with respect to some input and output masks [64]. Therefore statistical
saturation distinguishers based on linear approximations whose squared correlations are larger
than 2−64 work exactly as predicted for almost all the keys.
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Table 4.2 lists the 10 approximations spanned from U11 and V1 and also the 10 approximations
spanned from U11 and V3. All these approximations have a squared correlation larger than
2−64 and they give us two 24-round statistical saturation distinguishers. Using the input
subspace
U11 = span{e41, e42, e43, e44}
which corresponds to fixing the 4 bits entering the 11-th Sbox (counting from left to right)
and the output subspace
V1 = span{e1, e17, e33, e49}
which corresponds to the 4 bits resulted after applying the permutation on the output of the
first Sbox, we get a statistical saturation distinguisher on 24 rounds with an average capacity
equal to 2−60.53. Using the same input subspace with another different output subspace
V3 = span{e3, e19, e35, e51}.
We also get a statistical saturation distinguisher with an average capacity 2−60.53. Using
another input subspace
U10 = {e37, e38, e39, e40}
with each of the above two output subspaces we get distinguishers with the same capacities.
Now all these 24-round statistical saturation distinguishers can be used to mount a key recovery
attack for 16 bits of the last round key on 25 rounds of PRESENT using the whole code book.
However, using a 23-round distinguisher a key recovery attack on 25 rounds similar to the one
in [38] could be mounted using less than the code book.
Moreover, these 24-round distinguishers could be used to mount a 26-round key recovery attack
similar to [38] to recover 16 bits from the 1st round subkey (4 bits from each of the 9th, 10th,
11th and 12th Sbox) and also 16 bits from last round subkey (4 bits from each of the 1st,
5th, 9th and 13th Sbox) but still estimating the success probability and data complexity is
difficult. However, the statistical framework developed in [63] in order to estimate the success
probability and data complexity of the multidimensional attack could also be used to estimate
the success probability and data complexity of this attack, should we assume the independence
of the linear approximations used which is not true. This is in fact what has been done in [38] as
it has been noted in [64] that the linear approximations used in the 26-round multidimensional
attack of PRESENT can not be statistically independent as several approximations share the
same input mask.
Therefore, rather than giving the success probability and data complexity, we list in Table
4.3 the estimated squared Euclidean distance of the statistical saturation distinguisher with
input subspace U11 and output subspace V1 for various number of rounds along with the
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experimental Euclidean distance using 100 random master keys. We also list the Euclidean
distance obtained via a wrong key guess which was simulated by encrypting one more round
under the right key. Table 4.3 clearly shows that the experimental Euclidean distances are
close to the estimated capacities and the more plaintext we use the closer our experimental
distances get to the expected distances. Thus, using the above mentioned four statistical
distinguishers we could find 16 key bits from each of the first and last round keys using the
whole code book. We note that these statistical saturation distinguishers are better than the
distinguisher reported in the original attack [39] whose input and output subspaces are
U = V = span{e22, e23, e26, e27, e38, e39, e42, e43}.
This is because all the linear approximations spanned from U and V do not have a single
linear approximation with a squared correlation larger than 2−64 even when considering input
and output masks with Hamming weight at most 4 bits.
Application on SPONGENT:
Here we find linear approximations that can be used to distinguish 23 rounds of the SPONGENT-
88 permutation using the whole code book and this is one more round than what has been
provided in [22]. We also give the maximum differential characteristic probability we found
on 16-round SPONGENT-88.
Differential Approximations: We constructed a difference transition submatrix for
SPONGENT-88 with input and output differences having Hamming weight at most 4 bits.
The maximum differential probability obtained by powering the transition submatrix2 is a 16-
round differential and it has probability 2−77.83. One of the differentials having this probability
is
e1 ⊕ e4 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e20 → e9 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e75 ⊕ e77
and it consists of only one differential trail. This is one round less than the best differential
provided by the designers as their differential include characteristics with differences having
Hamming weight more than 4. It would be interesting to see whether input and output differ-
ences with Hamming weight at most 5 bits would yield better estimations. However, as noted
in Table 4.1 the time complexity is 236 arithmetic operations which have not tried due to the
2This is possible for the difference submatrices of PRESENT and SPONGENT but not for
their correlation matrices as they are dense
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Table 4.2: α ≡ input mask, β ≡ output mask, (C≤4(α, β))2 ≡ squared correlation of a 24-round
PRESENT linear approximation with input mask α and output mask β computed via a correlation
submatrix with Hamming weight at most 4. The first 10 approximations correspond to the output
subspace V1 while the second 10 approximations correspond to the output subspace V3. ei ≡ the unit
vector with single 1 at position i whose length is 64 (PRESENT’s block size). The values between
parentheses represent the log2 of the corresponding number of trails which are easily calculated by
replacing each nonzero entry with 1 in the correlation submatrix and then powering it to r
α β log2((C≤4(α, β))2)
e41 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 -63.98 (91.67)
e41 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e49 -63.77 (90.62)
e41 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 + e49 -63.97 (91.48)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 -63.80 (91.00)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e49 -63.97 (91.12)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 -63.97 (91.52)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e49 -63.60 (89.95)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e1 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e49 -63.77 (90.47)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e49 -63.80 (91.48)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e1 ⊕ e17 ⊕ e33 ⊕ e49 -63.96 (91.33)
e41 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 -63.98 (91.66)
e41 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.78 (90.62)
e41 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.97 (91.48)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 -63.81 (91.00)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e51 -63.97 (91.11)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 -63.97 (91.51)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.60 (89.95)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e3 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.77 (90.47)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e43 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.80 (90.81)
e41 ⊕ e42 ⊕ e44 e3 ⊕ e19 ⊕ e35 ⊕ e51 -63.97 (91.33)
lack of computing resources.
Linear Approximations: As mentioned in Chapter 3 (See Section 3.3.1), the SPON-
GENT Sbox was chosen carefully to avoid the many linear trails with one active Sbox in each
round existing on PRESENT. Here we use a correlation submatrix with input and output
masks of Hamming weight up to 4 to activate at most 4 Sboxes. As a result, we found many
linear approximations with correlations larger than 2−44 for 23-round of SPONGENT-88.
Thus, we improved the linear distinguishers provided by the designers one more round. Table
4.4 shows that correlations obtained from using correlation matrices with masks of Hamming
weight at most 2 bits, 3 bits and 4 bits do not vary significantly and this might indicate that lin-
ear characteristics covering more than 4 active Sboxes per round do not have a significant effect
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Table 4.3: The table shows the estimated Euclidean distance D together with the ex-
perimental Euclidean distance D′ averaged over 100 random keys with various amount
of plaintexts, namely 210 plaintexts are used for r = 2, 3, 212 for r = 4, 217 for r = 5, 6,
and 220 for r = 7, 8. D′∗ ≡ the Euclidean distance for a wrong key guess (this was
simulated by encrypting one more round under the same plaintexts and key guess used
in evaluating D′). We note that log2(D) = −∞ at r = 2 is a 2-round zero-correlation
distinguisher [25] in PRESENT. We note that Zero-correlation distinguishers can easily
be constructed in PRESENT for not more than 3 rounds since PRESENT achieves
full-dependency after exactly 3 rounds.
r 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 23 24
log2(D) −∞ -8.00 -9.99 -12.81 -15.23 -17.79 -20.37 -55.52 -64.53
log2(D′) -10.07 -7.70 -9.67 -12.74 -14.32 -17.09 -19.06 - -
log2(D′∗) -7.69 -9.03 -11.38 -14.34 -16.19 -19.49 -19.92 - -
in the total correlation. The table also shows that it is difficult to accurately estimate the total
correlation of some linear approximations. For instance for 22 rounds, |C≤2(e70⊕e71, e56⊕e78)|
is smaller than |C≤3(e70⊕ e71, e56⊕ e78)| but bigger than |C≤4(e70⊕ e71, e56⊕ e78)|. This sug-
gests that the characteristics with Hamming weight 4 bits contributed negatively to the total
correlation.
Since our results distinguish only 23 out of 45 rounds, they confirm that the SPONGENT
Sbox was a good choice. As SPONGENT use the same but a wider bitwise permutation
of PRESENT, we used a variant of PRESENT with the SPONGENT Sbox to check its
resistance against linear attacks. We found that there are no trails with one active Sbox at
each round when the number of rounds is larger than 6. Moreover, using submatrices with
entries that have Hamming weight at most 4, we found that the maximum average squared
correlation for 20 rounds is only 2−74.48. This 20-round average sqaured correlation is very low
compared to the best average squared correlations in 24 rounds of PRESENT shown in Table
4.2. All these give us further confirmation that the SPONGENT Sbox was a good choice.
4.2 The Effect of Key Scheduling on Differential and
Linear Approximations on PRESENT-Like Ci-
phers
In [45], Daemen and Rijmen provided a through study about the probability distributions
of differential and linear approximations in block ciphers in general and especially for the
so-called key alternating ciphers. Since PRESENT-like ciphers are key alternating ciphers,
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Table 4.4: r ≡ number of rounds, α ≡ input mask, β ≡ output mask, |C≤i| ≡ correlation
using a submatrix with input mask α and output mask β having Hamming weight at most i
bits, − ≡ not applicable. ei ≡ the unit vector with single 1 at position i whose length is 88
(SPONGENT-88’s block size).
r α β log2(|C≤2)|) log2(|C≤3|) log2(|C≤4|)
22 e6 ⊕ e7 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 - -43.82 -43.83
23 e6 ⊕ e7 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 - -43.81 -43.74
22 e6 ⊕ e7 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 ⊕ e69 - - -43.83
23 e6 ⊕ e7 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 ⊕ e69 - - -43.75
22 e70 ⊕ e71 e7 ⊕ e51 -42.06 -42.05 -42.05
23 e70 ⊕ e71 e7 ⊕ e51 -44.02 -44.01 -43.95
22 e70 ⊕ e71 e56 ⊕ e78 -42.03 -42.03 -42.04
23 e70 ⊕ e71 e56 ⊕ e78 -43.99 -43.99 -43.96
22 e70 ⊕ e71 e7 ⊕ e29 ⊕ e51 ⊕ e73 - - -42.04
23 e70 ⊕ e71 e7 ⊕ e29 ⊕ e51 ⊕ e73 - - -43.94
22 e9 ⊕ e10 ⊕ e11 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 - -43.99 -43.93
23 e9 ⊕ e10 ⊕ e11 e3 ⊕ e25 ⊕ e47 - -43.97 -43.88
22 e46 ⊕ e47 ⊕ e48 e34 ⊕ e56 ⊕ e78 - -42.72 -42.69
23 e46 ⊕ e47 ⊕ e48 e34 ⊕ e56 ⊕ e78 - -43.95 -43.89
then it is expected that the distribution of differential and linear approximations will be as
described in [45].
However, in the following we consider the behaviour of two ciphers that use identical round
keys, namely PRINTcipher and a variant of PRESENT with identical round keys. Their
behaviour is questionable since their round keys are identical and thus not independent. More
specifically, we study the distribution of differential approximations in PRINTcipher and
this was mainly motivated by the differential attack given in Chapter 5. We also study the
distribution of linear approximations in PRESENT with identical round keys to see the effect
of key scheduling on the distribution of linear approximations in PRESENT.
Distribution of Differential Approximations
We are interested on the distribution of the number of right pairs of a differential approximation
over all the keys. Firstly, we re-write the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence mentioned in
Chapter 3 as follows: Let pk be the probability of the differential when the secret key k is
used. Then the average probability over all the key space is p˜ = 1|K|
∑
k pk. Now the hypothesis
of stochastic equivalence suggests that pk ≈ p˜ [7]. Secondly, We recall the result of [45] about
the distribution of the right pairs following a differential.
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Proposition 4.2.1. [45]
In an n-bit key alternating cipher, the number of the right pairs X following a differential with
probability p is a random variable that follows the Binomial distribution B(2n−1, 2n−1p) and
also the Poisson distribution (since p is small) with mean λ = 2n−1p:
Pr(X = i) ≈
(
2n−1
i
)
pi(1− p)2n−1−i ≈ e
−λλi
i!
Experiments in [17] showed that the behaviour of differential approximations for a small variant
of PRESENT follows the binomial distribution and they further showed that there is no
significant difference between the expected probability and the mean averaged over all the
keys. Thus indicating that small variants of PRESENT and probably most PRESENT-like
ciphers satisfy the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence. Furthermore, recently experiments
in [7] also confirmed this behaviour.
However, in PRINTcipher the distribution might be different since the probability of a differ-
ential characteristic is based on the assumption of independent round keys and PRINTcipher
uses identical round keys. Therefore, we ran some tests to see if the theoretical probability
(
1
4
)r
of an input difference characteristic with Hamming weight one yielding an output difference
characteristic with Hamming weight one is actually met (See Chapter 5). Our experimental
data depicted in Figure 4.1 suggests that indeed the probability is slightly higher than ex-
pected which is due to the effect of intermediate characteristic values with Hamming weight
more than one which all add to the differential probability of input and output differences
with Hamming weight one.
Fig. 4.1: Experimental vs. theoretical estimates for the optimal differentials. The x-axis
shows the number of pairs yielding the correct output difference within 22r+4 tries. The
y-axis shows the relative frequency.
(a) 9 rounds (b) 10 rounds (c) 11 rounds (d) 12 rounds
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Linear Approximations’ Correlation Distribution
Assuming independent round-keys, we can compute the average and variance of the correlation
distribution of a linear approximation over all the keys. As the average of a sum of random
variables is the sum of the averages, the average bias is zero. Here, independent round-keys are
used to ensure that each single trail has average zero. Moreover, one can see that two distinct
linear trails Ci and Cj are pairwise independent. As the expected value of the correlation
distribution is zero, the variance of the distribution equals the average squared correlation
which equals the sum of the squares of the correlations of all trails (cf. Theorem 21 in [45]).
We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let F = Fr ◦ · · · ◦ F2 ◦ F1 be an r-round block cipher with independent
round-keys, the average correlation is zero, i.e.,
E(C) = 0.
Moreover, the average squared correlation is given by
E(C2) =
∑
i
Πrj=1cFj (α(j−1)i, αji)2.
PRESENT with Independent Round-keys
As mentioned before in Chapter 3, it was experimentally confirmed in [93] that the distribution
of the correlation of some linear approximations activating one Sbox per round nicely follows
a normal-distribution with mean zero and variance 2(−2r)2N (this can be shown using the
above proposition), where N is the number of the linear trails with input and output masks of
Hamming weight one and only one active Sbox per round. Thus, experimentally, we can notice
two facts: Firstly, for PRESENT different trails behave like independent random variables
and secondly, the contribution of the non-optimal trails (those activating more than one Sbox
at some rounds) does not significantly influence the distribution of approximations with input
and output masks with Hamming weight one. For instance, for 20-round PRESENT using
e43 as an input mask and e43 as an output mask and activating only one Sbox per round, the
average squared correlation for the linear approximation (e43, e43) is 2−55.71. Now activating at
most 4 Sboxes per round, we see no significant improvement as the average squared correlation
for the linear approximation (e43, e43) is 2−55.59.
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PRESENT with Identical Round-keys
Let us consider a variant of PRESENT with identical round-keys (and round-constants to
avoid trivial slide attacks [16] described in Chapter 2). As it turns out this is an intriguing
example of the influence of the key-scheduling on the distribution of the correlations. We
started by performing experiments on a large number of random keys and observed that the
total variance of the correlation distribution for some linear approximations of PRESENT
with identical round-keys is consistently bigger than that of standard PRESENT for any
number of rounds ≥ 5. Fig. 4.2 shows the distribution of the linear correlation for the identical
round-keys case vs. the original PRESENT key-scheduling for 17 rounds.
Fig. 4.2: The (normalized) probability distribution of the PRESENT-cipher with the
usual vs the identical round-keys case
The difference is significant in the sense that more rounds of PRESENT with identical round-
keys are vulnerable to linear attacks for a non-negligible fraction of keys. In other words, the
choice of the key-scheduling that makes the cipher secure or insecure against linear cryptanal-
ysis. To illustrate the difference consider a 20 round version. The fraction of keys with a
squared correlation larger than 2−53 is 33.7% in the case of identical round-keys but only 1.1%
in the case of the standard PRESENT key-scheduling.
For computing the variance of a sum of random variables it is sufficient to study the pairwise
covariance of the summands. In order to compute this variance, we need to figure out which
trails are distinct and which are non-distinct. So let us, suppose that we have the following
random variables, Si and Sj , representing the signs of the correlation of the ith trail and the
jth trail respectively of an r-round linear approximation (α, β) with input and output masks of
Hamming weight one and only one active Sbox per round in PRESENT with identical round
keys. Let (α = α0i, α1i, · · · , αri = β) denote the ith trail and (α = α0j , α1j , · · · , αrj = β)
denote the jth trail. Thus,
Si = (−1)<α0i,k>⊕<α1i,k>⊕···⊕<αri,k>
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and
Sj = (−1)<α0j ,k>⊕<α1j ,k>⊕···⊕<αrj ,k>
where k is the key at each round. One can see that Si and Sj are identical when
r⊕
x=0
αxi =
r⊕
x=0
αxj
In other words two trails are identical iff the (xor) sums of all intermediate masks are identical.
While in general, computing the number of trails is much more efficient than listing all trails,
it is still feasible for r ≤ 20 to compute the list of trails and sort this list according to the sum
of the intermediate masks. Thus, for r ≤ 20 we can relatively easily compute the expected
variance for the PRESENT-variant with identical round-keys. Table 4.5 shows the expected
variance (Var2) of the bias distribution of the optimal linear approximation for a specific one bit
input and output difference (i.e. input mask = e43, output mask = e43). For PRESENT with
identical round-keys the expected variance is very close to the observed variance (ObsVar)
sampled over 20000 random keys. Table 4.5 also shows the expected variance of the bias
distribution of the optimal linear approximation of (standard) PRESENT (Var1) along with
the number of trails (N1) with one active Sbox per round, and the number of independent
trails (N2), for number of rounds r, 5 ≤ r ≤ 20.
In the following, we explain exactly what happens for the distribution of the correlation of
the linear approximation (e43, e43) of 5 rounds of PRESENT using the same round key k =
(k1, k2, · · · , k64) and round constants affecting few of the rightmost bits. From Table 4.5, we
see that the linear approximation with input mask and output mask equal to e43 has 9 trails
where 5 of them are independent. As we know in PRESENT all the linear trails with one
active Sbox per round have the same correlation absolute value
(
1
4
)5
and only differs in the
sign of the correlation. The sign of the correlation of each trail represents a random variable
Si and it is a product of the sign of correlation from the Sboxes correlations and the sign of the
correlation from the round keys and round constants. Now for all the trails, the sign from the
Sboxes when 5 rounds are used is always positive and there are no round constants involved
in all the trails. More precisely, we have the following expression for the sign of each trail
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Table 4.5: Analytical and experimental data on r-round reduced PRESENT (possibly
with identical round-keys). N1 is the number of all linear trials with one active Sbox. N2
is the number of trails (among N1) that are independent from all the other trails. Var1
gives the expected variance of the bias of the optimal linear approximation of (standard)
PRESENT, while Var2 corresponds to PRESENT with identical round-keys. ObsVar
is the experimentally observed variance sampled over 20000 random keys.
r N1 N2 log2(Var1) log2(Var2) log2(ObsVar)
5 9 5 −16.83 −16.30 −16.28
6 27 13 −19.25 −18.45 −18.47
7 72 19 −21.83 −20.93 −20.94
8 192 51 −24.42 −23.27 −23.29
9 512 101 −27.00 −25.85 −25.84
10 1344 180 −29.61 −28.40 −28.43
11 3528 318 −32.22 −30.87 −30.86
12 9261 498 −34.82 −33.23 −33.34
13 24255 723 −37.43 −35.74 −35.73
14 63525 991 −40.04 −38.18 −38.34
15 166375 1184 −42.66 −40.71 −40.71
16 435600 1232 −45.26 −43.15 −43.28
17 1140480 1143 −47.88 −45.63 −45.61
18 2985984 890 −50.49 −48.03 −48.12
19 7817472 575 −53.10 −50.50 −50.52
20 20466576 300 −55.71 −52.88 −52.92
S1 = (−1)k43⊕k43⊕k43⊕k43⊕k43⊕k43
S2 = (−1)k43⊕k43⊕k27⊕k39⊕k42⊕k43
S3 = (−1)k43⊕k43⊕k11⊕k35⊕k41⊕k43
S4 = (−1)k43⊕k27⊕k39⊕k42⊕k43⊕k43
S5 = (−1)k43⊕k27⊕k23⊕k38⊕k42⊕k43
S6 = (−1)k43⊕k27⊕k7⊕k34⊕k41⊕k43
S7 = (−1)k43⊕k11⊕k35⊕k41⊕k43⊕k43
S8 = (−1)k43⊕k11⊕k19⊕k37⊕k42⊕k43
S9 = (−1)k43⊕k11⊕k3⊕k33⊕k41⊕k43
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From the above equations, we see that
S2 = S4 = (−1)k27⊕k39⊕k42⊕k43
and
S3 = S7 = (−1)k11⊕k35⊕k41⊕k43
and the other five random variables S1, S5, S6, S8 and S9 are independent from them. Now
the correlation of each trail Ci = (14)5Si is a random variable following the binary distribution
with mean zero and variance C2i = (14)10. Thus, the variance of the distribution of the linear
approximation (e43, e43), Var2 is calculated as follows:
Var2 = Var(C1 + C2 + C3 + C4 + C5 + C6 + C7 + C8 + C9)
= Var(C1 + 2C2 + 2C3 + C5 + C6 + C8 + C9)
= Var(C1) + 4Var(C2) + 4Var(C3) + Var(C5) + Var(C6) + Var(C8) + Var(C9)
= 13C2i ≈ 2−16.30.
4.3 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we used sparse difference and correlation submatrices to estimate the prob-
abilities of low-weight differential and linear approximations respectively in PRESENT-like
ciphers. This estimation approach can also be used in any cipher allowing low-weight differ-
ential and linear characteristics. Using these sparse matrices, we found linear distinguishers
for 23-round of SPONGENT-88. While this is far from distinguishing the full 45 rounds of
SPONGENT-88, it is the best currently known result against SPONGENT. We also pre-
sented four 24-round statistical saturation distinguishers which break 26-round of PRESENT
and that is more than the rounds attacked by the original statistical saturation attack [39].
It would be interesting to investigate whether using large difference and correlation subma-
trices for PRESENT and SPONGENT-88 with entries having Hamming weight at most 5
would make some improvements over this work. Looking at Table 4.1 we see that the time
complexities for constructing these submatrices take around 234 and 236 arithmetic opera-
tions for PRESENT and SPONGENT-88 respectively which could be feasible using parallel
computing.
We also showed that the key scheduling algorithm can significantly affect the distribution
of linear approximations in PRESENT-like ciphers (See also Chapter 6). More specifically,
we showed that the distribution of linear approximations with input and output masks of
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Hamming weight one in PRESENT with identical round keys is significantly larger than
PRESENT with independent round keys. As a further work, it would be interesting to
compare the correlation distribution in PRESENT with identical round keys and PRESENT
with independent round keys when input and output masks of Hamming weight more than one
are used since these input and output masks yield better approximations as shown in Table
4.2.
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Chapter 5
Differential Cryptanalysis of
Round-Reduced PRINTcipher:
Computing Roots of Permutations
In this chapter, we mount a differential attack on the block cipher PRINTcipher described in
Chapter 3 (See Section 3.1.2). As PRINTcipher uses a key-dependent permutations, it might
seem first that mounting a differential attack on PRINTcipher is difficult due to the unknown
bit permutations which make it impractical to use the submatrix approach method explained
in the previous Chapter. We show in this chapter that this is not the case. We present two
differential attacks that successfully break about half of the rounds of PRINTcipher.
Moreover, one of the attacks is of independent interest, since it uses a mechanism to compute
roots of permutations. If an attacker knows the many-round permutation pir, the algorithm
can be used to compute the underlying single-round permutation pi. This technique is thus
relevant for all iterative ciphers that deploy key-dependent permutations. In the case of
PRINTcipher, it can be used to show that the linear layer adds little to the security against
differential attacks.
We close the chapter by explaining how to design an authentication protocol whose security
is based on a multi-valued function, namely, the r-th roots of a permutation in the symmetric
group Sn.
5.1 Using Differential Cryptanalysis To Recover the
Permutation Key
For PRINTcipher, the classical differential attacks described in Chapter 2 can not be directly
applied in a straightforward fashion, since finding good differentials requires the knowledge of
the linear layer, which for PRINTcipher is key-dependent and thus unknown. As already
pointed out, however, this disadvantage can also be turned into an advantage for the attacker:
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It can be used to learn something about the part of the key that defines the linear layer.
5.1.1 Optimal Differential Characteristic
We start our analysis by proving the following fact about the optimal PRINTcipher charac-
teristic.
Theorem 5.1.1. Given an input difference α of weight one, the unique most probable r-round
differential characteristic is
α→ (P ◦K)(α)→ (P ◦K)2(α)→ (P ◦K)r(α),
which will occur with probability
(
1
4
)r
, where the symbol ‘◦’ refers to the composition operation
of the symmetric group (S48 or S96).
Proof. The difference distribution table for the PRINTcipher Sbox (See Table 3.4) shows
that all occurring differences are equally probable (prob. 14) and that for every 1-bit input
difference, there exists exactly one 1-bit output difference. From this, it follows that starting
with a 1-bit input difference, a 1-bit differential trail through r rounds of PRINTcipher
occurs with probability
(
1
4
)r
. Note also that this trail has the minimum possible number of
r active Sboxes and that no other Sbox difference is more probable, meaning that this trail is
the most probable one.
Also note that in Table 3.4 the 1-bit output difference always occurs in the same bit position
as the 1-bit input difference. This means that if the 1-bit differential occurs, the Sbox does
not permute the active bit - its position on the differential trail is only influenced by the
fixed permutation P and the key-dependent permutation K. Thus, the difference α is indeed
mapped to (P ◦K)r(α), which proves the theorem.
5.1.2 Targeting the Xor Key
In the following, we assume that the attacker has the full code book at his disposal (i.e. 248
plaintext/ciphertext pairs for r rounds of PRINTcipher-48). For every 1-bit input difference
α1 = (100...0), α2 = (010...0), . . . , α48 = (000...1), the attacker now forms all 247 input pairs
with x ⊕ x′ = αi and checks whether the output difference also has weight one. If yes, he
assumes that he has found the above optimal characteristic. It turns out that as long as
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r ≤ 22, this is very likely to happen1.
Every successful 1-bit differential gives the attacker information about the internal behaviour
of the cipher which can be used to reconstruct part of the xor key. Consider the first round of
the cipher and note that according to [77], the order of Sbox and key-dependent permutation
can be inversed by adding two constants c and d that do not affect the differential. Thus, we can
alternatively consider one PRINTcipher round to consist of key addition, fixed permutation,
round constant, adding c, Sbox, key-dependent permutation, and adding d. In particular, for
the purposes of differential cryptanalysis, we can assume the Sbox to follow directly after the
key addition.
Now consider a successful differential with input difference α1 = (100...0). Three key bits
(with indices 1, 17 and 33) will affect the bits that go into the first Sbox. There are a priori
8 possible choices for these bits, generating all possible 3-bit Sbox input pairs with difference
α1. However, as shown in Table 3.4, only 2 of them will lead to a 1-bit output difference after
running through the Sbox. Thus, only 14 of all keys meet the condition for the first Sbox,
reducing the key entropy by 2 bit. Thus, finding 16 successful 1-bit to 1-bit differentials (one
for each Sbox) will reduce the key entropy by 32 bit, leaving a brute-force effort of 248 steps.
This work factor could be reduced further, but without greatly affecting the overall running
time, which is dominated by the 248 steps of computing the full code book anyway.
The False Positive Problem: The above description is a simplification since it does not
take false positives into account. For every 1-bit differential, trying out 247 plaintext pairs
will yield 247 · 48248 = 24 false positives on average, i.e. 1-bit output differences that occur
accidentially and not as a result of the correct differential. The question remains how they
can be distinguished from the cases where the 1-bit output differences really result from the
desired differential. It turns out that for 22 rounds, the probability that all 48 differentials
are met at least three times is 0.514, meaning that in more than half of the cases, the correct
1-bit difference should be recognizable by occuring more often than the false positives, which
very rarely occur more than twice.
5.1.3 Targeting the Linear Layer
As it turns out, there is also a different way of using the above differential to cryptanalyze
PRINTcipher. Remembering that according to Theorem 5.1.1, every 1-bit to 1-bit char-
1We have 247 pairs and a success probability of
( 1
4
)22 = 2−44, yielding a success probability close
to 1 for any single index i and of ≈ 0.984 for all 48 indices. When increasing the number of rounds to
r = 23, the success probability drops to 0.865 for any single index and to 0.001 for all 48 indices.
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acteristic is optimal and describes the mapping α → (P ◦ K)r(α), the following corollary
immediately follows:
Corollary 5.1.2. Learning all optimal characteristics is the same as learning (P ◦K)r.
If the attacker has the full code book available, he can form 247 plaintext pairs for every 1-bit
input difference. The probability that at least one example of all 48 1-bit differentials is found
is 0.984, and as stated above, the probability that they all can be distinguished successfully
from false positives is 0.514. Thus, for up to r = 22 rounds of PRINTcipher-48, the attacker
can learn the permutation (P ◦K)r.
If he can find the r-th root of this permutation, then he has derived P ◦K and thus the linear
layer key K. Once this has been done, the xor key can be retrieved bitwise, using a simple
divide-and-conquer attack similar to the one described in Subsection 5.1.2. It turns out that
here too, the overall running time is dominated by computing the code book, i.e. the attack
requires about 248 computational steps.
This type of differential attack is the dual to the one targeting the xor key and is relevant
for all SPN-like ciphers that use key-dependent permutations. For this reason, it is not only
interesting for the analysis of PRINTcipher, but also for the understanding of key-dependent
permutations in general. In the rest of this chapter, we will thus discuss the computation of
permutation roots in more detail.
5.2 Finding (PRINTcipher)-Roots of a Permutation
From the previous section, we see that our problem of finding the permutation key can be
reduced to the problem of finding the r-th roots of a given permutation in the symmetric
groups, S48 and S96, where r is the number of rounds.
Any permutation can be expressed as a product of disjoint cycles, and it is this representation
that is most useful when computing roots. In particular, the permutation found through
differential cryptanalysis can be expressed as a product of disjoint cycles in S48 and S96.
As the elements of Sb ranges from 1 to b, we re-arrange the bitwise permutation of PRINT-
cipher with block size b described in Chapter 3 to be in the range from 1 to b rather than
from 0 to b− 1. The PRINTcipher bit permutation P (i) can be re-written as follows
P (i) =
 3i− 2 mod b− 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ b− 1,b for i = b,
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where b ∈ {48, 96} is the block size.
Before describing how to find a root for a permutation in general, we outline the basic ideas.
For this, let us first see what happens when we raise a single cycle to the r-th power.
Let c = (c0, c1, . . . , cl−1) be a cycle of length l in Sn. Then c2 will remain a single cycle when
l is odd, namely, c2 = (c0, c2, . . . , cl−1, c1, c3, . . . , cl−2), and will be decomposed into 2 cycles
when l is even, namely, c2 = (c0, c2, . . . , cl−2)(c1, c3, . . . , cl−1). In general, depending on l, cr
will either remain a single cycle or be decomposed into a number of cycles having the same
length (See Lemma 5.2.1). Each element ci will be in a cycle, say, (ci, ci+r, ci+2r, . . . , ci+(k−1)r),
where i+kr ≡ i (mod l) and i+ jr is reduced modulo l for each j. So in order to find the r-th
root we have two cases, the first one is when cr is a single cycle, and here cr equals exactly
(c0, cr, c2r, . . . , c(l−1)r). The second case is when cr consists of a number of disjoint cycles, and
here we combine these disjoint cycles into a single cycle in a certain way in order to get c (see
the proof of Theorem 5.2.2). To illustrate this, let us find the square root of the permutation
σ2 = (1, 3, 2)(4, 6, 7)(5)(8) in S8. According to the above explanation, we know that cycles of
the same length are either a decomposition of a single cycle in the root σ or a reordering of a
single cycle in the root σ. Considering cycles of length 1, (5) and (8), it is obvious that they
arise from either (5)(8) or (5, 8).
Thus, there are two possibilities for cycles of length 1 in σ. Cycles of length 3, (1, 3, 2)
and (4, 6, 7), are either a decomposition of a single cycle in σ, this could be (1, 4, 3, 6, 2, 7),
(1, 6, 3, 7, 2, 4) or (1, 7, 3, 4, 2, 6); or a reordering of disjoint cycles in σ and this could only be
(1, 2, 3)(4, 7, 6). Summarizing, there are four possibilities for cycles of length 3 in σ. So the
total number of square roots for the permutation σ2 is 8.
5.2.1 The General Case
The procedure for constructing an r-th root for a permutation, described in [110], is based on
the following basic fact in the theory of symmetric groups which can be easily deduced from
the previous explanation.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let C ∈ Sn be a cycle of length l and let r be a positive integer. Then Cr
consists of gcd(l, r) disjoint cycles, each of length lgcd(l,r) .
The following theorem is due to A. Knopfmacher and R. Warlimont [110, p. 148]. We recall
its proof, as the proof describes how to construct an r-th root. Throughout the rest of this
chapter, we use the notation l-cycle to mean a cycle of length l.
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Theorem 5.2.2. [8, 110] Let r = pi11 p
i2
2 . . . p
in
n , where p1, p2, . . . , pn are the prime factors of
r. A permutation Q ∈ Sn has an r-th root, iff for every integer l ≥ 1, the number of l-cycles
in Q is divisible by ((l, r)) := ∏{j:pj |l} pijj .
Proof. (⇐): to prove this, we construct an r-th root, R, of Q. Let al be the number of l-cycles
in Q. Let g = ((l, r)). Then al = gm, where m is an integer, so we can divide the l-cycles
of Q into m groups where each group consists of g l-cycles. Assume that we have the cycles,
cij = (c(0)ij , c
(1)
ij , . . . , c
(l−1)
ij ) where 1 ≤ i ≤ g and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For each j, we construct a cycle of
length gl, say
Rj = (c(0)1j , c
(0)
2j , . . . , c
(0)
gj , c
(d)
1j , c
(d)
2j , . . . , c
(d)
gj , . . . , c
((l−1)d)
1j , c
((l−1)d)
2j , . . . , c
((l−1)d)
gj ),
where d = rg and sd is reduced modulo l for each 1 ≤ s ≤ l− 1. Now Rj is a cycle of length gl,
so according to the previous lemma, Rrj consists of gcd(gl, r) cycles of length
gl
gcd(gl,r) . Now,
since g = ((l, r)), then gcd(l, rg ) = 1 and so gcd(gl, r) = g, which means that Rrj consists of g
cycles of length l, namely, c1j , c2j , . . . , cgj . So
∏
j:1≤j≤mRj is an r-th root for the l-cycles of
Q. Repeating the same procedure for all l will yield an r-th root of Q. For the proof of (⇒),
see [8].
In [55, 84], a procedure to find all the roots of Q is described. Going back to the previous
theorem, we see that the main property that enables us to construct an r-th root for the
l-cycles of Q is having gcd(gl, r) = g. Repeating the same procedure for all the g’s that satisfy
gcd(gl, r) = g will allow us to find all the possible roots that can come from the l-cycles.
Note that g is bounded by al (the number of l-cycles). To find all the roots, for each group
consisting of l-cycles in Q, we proceed as follows.
First we construct the set Gr(l, al) = {gi : gcd(gil, r) = gi and 1 ≤ gi ≤ al}. Now, this tells us
that the roots have cycles of length gil, but we do not know how many of them. For this, we
solve the following Frobenius equation for xi ≥ 0:
g1x1 + g2x2 + · · ·+ gkxk = al where k = |G| (5.1)
This equation will usually have more than one solution. Each solution corresponds to a possible
cycle structure of the roots. For instance, the solution x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk), tells us that each
corresponding root for the l-cycles of Q consists of xi cycles of length gil for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The efficiency of computing all roots is of course bounded by the total number of roots. If a
permutation has a huge number of roots, computing all of them is very time consuming. It is
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therefore of interest to know the number of roots in advance.
In [84], using the above information about the cycle structure of permutations that have an
r-th root, the following explicit formula2 for calculating the number of all the possible roots
is provided.
Theorem 5.2.3. [84] Let r be a positive integer and Q ∈ Sn. Let al be the number of l-cycles
in Q, where 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Let X(l, al) be the set of all the possible solutions of equation (5.1).
Then the number of r-th roots of Q is
∏
al 6=0
al!
( ∑
x∈X(l,al)
k∏
i=1
l(gi−1)xi
gxii xi!
)
(5.2)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) and {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} are the elements of Gr(l, al).
To get a feeling of how many roots of a permutation can be expected for the case ofPRINTcipher-
48, let us take the following permutation in S48, suppose we have
τ24 =(1, 7, 47)(2, 19, 45)(3, 48, 17)(4, 9, 38)(5, 16)(6, 33, 32)(8, 28)(10, 35)(11,
27, 18)(12, 20)(14, 19, 41)(15, 46)(21, 26, 30)(22, 34)(23, 36)(25, 42, 39)
(40, 44)(13)(24)(31)(37)(43) (5.3)
So we have a1 = 5, a2 = 8, a3 = 9 and al = 0 for 4 ≤ l ≤ 48. G(1, a1) = {1, 2, 3, 4},
X(1, a1) = {(0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1, 0), (3, 1, 0, 0), (5, 0, 0, 0)}, G(2, a2) = {8},
X(2, a2) = {(1)} and G(3, a3) = {3, 6}, X(3, a3) = {(3, 0), (1, 1)}. Plugging these values into
equation (5.2), we find that the number of roots is ' 251.3. Moreover, the case where τ22 is
the Identity has ' 2192 roots in S48.
Note that out of all 48!(96!) permutations only a tiny fraction of 232(264) permutations actually
correspond to a valid key in PRINTcipher-48(96). We can therefore expect that in the
above example out of the ' 251.3 only a very small number will actually correspond to a
PRINTcipher-permutation. In particular there is only one root for equation (5.3) that
corresponds to a PRINTcipher permutation.
The main purpose of the next section is to describe a method that filters out wrong can-
didates as soon as possible, allowing to considerably speed up the computation of all valid
PRINTcipher-roots.
2 A more complicated formula was previously found by Pavlov in [96].
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5.2.2 PRINTcipher-Roots
As discussed in the last section, computing all the roots of (P ◦ K)r in order to find the
right permutation key is inefficient. In this section we describe a method that finds the
permutation roots P ◦K belonging to the 232(264) possible permutations in PRINTcipher-
48(96). Throughout the rest of this chapter, we only discuss PRINTcipher-48 and unless
mentioned explicitly, the assumption is that everything about PRINTcipher-48 follows for
PRINTcipher-96 with a slight modification.
Our method uses the fact that when we apply the fixed permutation, P , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 16, the
3 bits i, i + 16 and i + 32 go to the ith Sbox, where depending on the permutation key, they
are permuted to only four out of the six possible permutations. So the result of applying the
fixed permutation, P , and then applying the keyed permutation, K, on a 48 bits plain text,
is a permutation P ◦K that satisfies the following two properties:
1. Property 1: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ 48, P ◦K(i) equals one of the following three possible values
depending on K,
P ◦K(i) =

3i− 2 (mod 48 if 3i− 2 6= 48)
3i− 1 (mod 48 if 3i− 1 6= 48)
3i (mod 48 if 3i 6= 48)
2. Property 2: Only 4 out of the 6 possible 3-bit permutations are valid, namely, P ◦K(i),
P ◦K(i+ 16) and P ◦K(i+ 32) are permuted to one of the four possible permutations,
i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 48, the following two permutations are not allowed:
(a) P ◦K(i) = 3i− 1, P ◦K(i+ 16) = 3i and P ◦K(i+ 32) = 3i− 2.
(b) P ◦K(i) = 3i, P ◦K(i+ 16) = 3i− 2 and P ◦K(i+ 32) = 3i− 1.
Definition 4. A PRINTcipher permutation root is any permutation on 48 elements satis-
fying both Property 1 and Property 2.
Definition 5. A PRINTcipher permutation(cycle) is any permutation(cycle) on less than
48 elements satisfying both Property 1 and Property 2.
To explain these definitions, consider the following two cycles (14, 41, 25, 26, 30, 42, 29, 39, 21)
and (14, 42, 30, 41, 25, 26, 29, 39, 21). We want to investigate whether these cycles are PRINT-
cipher cycles or not. The latter cycle satisfies the two properties and so it is a PRINTcipher
cycle, in other words it can be part of a PRINTcipher permutation root, P ◦K. The for-
mer cycle satisfies only Property 1 but not Property 2 since we have P ◦ K(14) = 41 and
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P ◦ K(30) = 42 and therefore P ◦ K(42) = 40 , and this is one of the two disallowed per-
mutations (see item (a) in Property 2) and so it cannot be part of a valid PRINTcipher
permutation root, P ◦ K. Sometimes we can have a permutation consisting of two or more
cycles having same or different lengths, that satisfies Property 1 but not Property 2. For exam-
ple, the following permutation, (1, 2, 6, 17)(5, 15, 44, 34), satisfies Property 1 but not Property
2 as we have P ◦K(2) = 6 and P ◦K(34) = 5 and therefore P ◦K(18) = 4, which is an invalid
PRINTcipher permutation (see item (b) in Property 2).
Since the same cycles and permutations can be written in different ways, our method adopts
the notion that starts writing each cycle by its smallest element and lexicographically order
the disjoint cycles of the same length of a permutation in order to avoid repetitions in the
permutation roots of (P ◦K)r. Our method consists of two algorithms: the first one constructs
a PRINTcipher cycle of length gl and the second one uses the first algorithm to construct k
combined disjoint cycles, each of length gl. In what follows, we shall give a detailed description
of the two algorithms and end this section by showing how to use Algorithm 7 to find the whole
PRINTcipher permutation roots of (P ◦K)r.
Finding single PRINTcipher cycles
Given al cycles of length l, the following algorithm constructs all the possible PRINTcipher
cycles of length gl beginning with an element called first specified in the input (must be one
the the first elements in one of these al cycles). The algorithm performs a depth first search
to find all the other possible g − 1 cycles with minimal elements larger than first and can
be combined with the cycle containing first as described in Theorem 5.2.2 in order to form a
PRINTcipher cycle (or just reorder the given cycle in the case g = 1 as described previously).
Plugging all the 2-cycles of equation (5.3) and setting first = 5 and g = 8 will produce the fol-
lowing PRINTcipher cycle of length 16, (5, 15, 44, 36, 12, 35, 8, 22, 16, 46, 40, 23, 20, 10, 28, 34).
Algorithm 6 enables us to find a PRINTcipher permutation consisting of only one cycle of
length gl but note that some of the xi’s in equation (5.1) can be more than 1. So we need
another algorithm which can find a PRINTcipher permutation consisting of k disjoint cycles
where k ≥ 1.
Finding k combined PRINTcipher cycles
Given al cycles of length l, the following algorithm constructs a permutation beginning with
an element called first specified in the input (must be the first element in one of these al
cycles) and consisting of k combined and disjoint cycles ordered lexicographically. It basically
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Algorithm 6 finds a PRINTcipher cycle of length gl
find-cycle(cycle, current, g, l-cycles)
Require: l-cycles numbered from 1 to al where al ≥ g
Require: current = first, cycle = first
Ensure: cycle is a PRINTcipher cycle of length gl
1: for count=0 to 2 do
2: next = 3 × current - count
3: if next ∈ l-cycles then
4: if next > first and next.cycleno 6= first.cycleno and cycle.length < g then
5: if next.cycleno 6= the cycleno of all the elements of cycle then
6: Add next to cycle
7: current = next
8: Perform again this algorithm on cycle, find-cycle(cycle, current, g, l-cycles)
9: end if
10: else if cycle.length = g and next.cycleno = first.cycleno then
11: Complete the construction of cycle by combining the g different cycles to get a
single cycle of length gl as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 (when g = 1, reorder
the cycle containing first as described previously and assign it to cycle)
12: if cycle satisfies Property 2 then
13: cycle is a PRINTcipher cycle of length gl
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
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performs a recursive depth first search. The recursive algorithm begins by invoking Algorithm
6 which outputs single cycles of length gl beginning with first. It then proceeds from each cycle
found by Algorithm 6 and concatenates it with the previously i−1 concatenated disjoint cycles
found after the ith recursive call and if the concatenation satisfies Property 2, it recursively
calls itself a number of times, each time with a different first element to begin the required
permutation with as this will enable us to find all the possible i+1 disjoint cycles, on a reduced
number of l-cycles (exactly al − gi cycles) consisting of all the l-cycles except the gi cycles
involved on the i concatenated disjoint cycles (in each invocation first is set to the smallest
element on one of the currently available al− gi cycles). Each recursive call stops when i = k,
or when Algorithm 6 returns nothing, or when each concatenation of i cycles does not satisfy
Property 2.
Using Algorithm 6 for all the possible g’s along with all the possible first values and setting
a1 = 48, we can find all the possible PRINTcipher cycles. For instance, when g = 1 and
a1 = 48, Algorithm 6 returns four 1-cycles when trying all the possible values for first, namely,
(1), (24), (25) and (48). When g = 2 and a2 = 48, we found that there are six possible
2-cycles, namely, (6, 18), (7, 19), (12, 36), (13, 37), (30, 42) and (31, 43). When g = 3, we
found there are eight possible 3-cycles. This information enables us to reduce the size of the
cycle structure of the roots by removing any structure containing more than four 1-cycles, six
2-cycles and eight 3-cycles. It also enables us to easily find some roots, for example, knowing
all PRINTcipher cycles of length 1 and 2, we can easily find that (24)(13, 37)(30, 42) is a
PRINTcipher permutation that is a root for the 1-cycles of equation (5.3).
Moreover, using Algorithm 7 we find that we cannot have a permutation consisting of more
than 6 disjoint cycles of length 5 in PRINTcipher-48 and not more than 9 cycles of length
4, 12 cycles of length 5, 13 cycles of length 6 and 12 cycles of length 7 in PRINTcipher-96.
This will generally reduce the number of solutions of equation (5.1) and therefore the size of
the cycle structure which will speed up the process of finding PRINTcipher permutations
roots.
Finding PRINTcipher permutations
Now, when given al cycles of length l, Algorithm 7 enables us to find PRINTcipher permu-
tations beginning with a specified element and consisting of k cycles, each of length gl. But in
order to find the rth permutation roots for all the l-cycles we use Algorithm 7 together with
the elements of the sets G(l, al) and X(l, al). Each entry xj = (xj1, xj2, . . . , xjk) ∈ X(l, al)
where k = |G(l, al)|, represents the cycle structure of many rth roots for the l-cycles and it
might correspond to few or none PRINTcipher permutations, so for each xj ∈ X(l, al), we
try to find all the possible PRINTcipher permutations beginning with a specific element
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Algorithm 7 finds a PRINTcipher permutation that has k disjoint gl-cycles
find-k-cycles(C, current, k, g, l-cycles)
Require: l-cycles numbered from 1 to al where al ≥ g
Require: current = first
Require: C = {}
Ensure: k disjoint PRINTcipher gl-cycles, or return {} if there is no k disjoint PRINT-
cipher cycles
1: Invoke Alg. 6 on the current l-cycles
2: if number of cycles found by Alg. 1 > 0 then
3: if the number of disjoint cycles in C consists of k − 1 disjoint cycles then
4: for each permutation cycle found by Alg. 6 do
5: C = C ∪ cycle
6: if C satisfies Property 2 then
7: return C
8: else
9: return {}
10: end if
11: end for
12: else
13: for each cycle found by Alg. 6 do
14: C = C ∪ cycle
15: if C satisfies Property 2 then
16: Delete all the l-cycles involved in C from the al cycles of length l
17: for each cycle ∈ currently available l-cycles do
18: {Perform again this algorithm on the current l-cycles to find the other k − 1
cycles}
19: current = first element in cycle
20: find-k-cycles(C, current, k, g, l-cycles)
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
24: end if
25: else
26: return
27: end if
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called first (must be the first element in one of these al cycles) and that can be roots for the
l-cycles by applying Algorithm 7 through all the nonzero entries of xj . Trying all the possible
values for first gives us all PRINTcipher permutations that are roots for all the l-cycles.
Now, assume that we find all the possible PRINTcipher permutations for each l, say σli , for
1 ≤ i ≤ ηl where ηl is the number of permutation roots of the l-cycles of (P ◦K)r, so all the
possible products
∏
al>0 σli where 1 ≤ l ≤ 48 and 1 ≤ i ≤ ηl, represent the PRINTcipher
permutation roots which are the possible values for P ◦K and by brute forcing these P ◦K
values we can recover the permutation key, K.
Let us try to find PRINTcipher permutations that are roots for the nine 3-cycles in equation
(5.3). We have G(3, a3) = {3, 6} and X(3, a3) = {(3, 0), (1, 1)}. We start with, x1 = (3, 0),
here we only need to apply Algorithm 7 using any possible first because the 3 disjoint cycles
of length 9 would come from all the 9 cycles. Setting first = 1 and applying Algorithm 7
doesn’t give us 3 disjoint cycles of length 9, so we conclude that there is no root having the
cycle structure x1. So we go to the next cycle structure, x2 = (1, 1), we start with x21 = 1 and
use Algorithm 7 on all the possible first values. Setting first = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 11 doesn’t yield
a single cycle of length 9, while first = 14 yields the cycle (14, 42, 30, 41, 25, 26, 29, 39, 21),
we save it and continue to the next element x22 = 1 where we use Algorithm 7 on the
6 cycles that are not involved in the previous found cycle. Now we want to construct
a cycle of length 18, so all the 6 cycles would be involved in it, setting first = 1, yields
(1, 2, 4, 11, 33, 3, 7, 19, 9, 27, 32, 48, 47, 45, 38, 18, 6, 17). Concatenating this cycle with the pre-
vious found cycle, we get (14, 42, 30, 41, 25, 26, 29, 39, 21)(1, 2, 4, 11, 33, 3, 7, 19, 9, 27, 32, 48, 47,
45, 38, 18, 6, 17) which satisfies Property 2. This means that it is a PRINTcipher permutation
that is a root for all the 3-cycles in equation (5.3). Now, we have found the roots for all the
l-cycles in equation (5.3). Concatenating them together gives us the following PRINTcipher
permutation root: (1, 2, 4, 11, 33, 3, 7, 19, 9, 27, 32, 48, 47, 45, 38, 18, 6, 17)(5, 15, 44, 36, 12, 35, 8,
22, 16, 46, 40, 23, 20, 10, 28, 34)(14, 42, 30, 41, 25, 26, 29, 39, 21)(13, 37)(30, 42)(24).
5.3 Experimental Verifications
To demonstrate the efficiency of our attack we implemented the above algorithms. Experiments
show that (P ◦K)r could yield more than one PRINTcipher root when (P ◦K)r contains
several 1-cycles, but in most cases there was exactly one PRINTcipher root.
To derive bounds for the number of PRINTcipher permutations roots, we computed the
number of all PRINTcipher permutation roots for (P ◦K)r = Identity where 2 ≤ r ≤ 22.
This seems the worst case that could happen for any r since a1 = 48, which is a1’s largest
value, and as shown in Table 5.1, the number of PRINTcipher roots when r = 22 is 222.04.
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Algorithm 8 finds the permutation roots of the l-cycles of (P ◦K)r
Require: an ARRAY to hold all the roots of l-cycles of (P ◦K)r
Require: G(l, al), X(l, al), k = |G(l, al)|
Ensure: possible candidates for the roots of l-cycles.
1: for al 6= 0 in (P.K)r do
2: for each xj = {xj1, xj2, . . . , xjk} ∈ X(l, al) do
3: for each cycle ∈ al cycles of length l do
4: Select the first i such that xji > 0
5: Invoke Alg. 7 to find xji cycles of length gil (current = first element in cycle)
6: Save the roots found in the last step in the roots ARRAY
7: if the number of roots found in step 5 = 0 then
8: goto step 2
9: else
10: for i = i + 1 → k do
11: prevARRAY = ARRAY
12: ARRAY = {}
13: if xji 6= 0 then
14: for e ∈ prevARRAY do
15: Delete all the cycles involved in e from the l-cycles of (P.K)r
16: for each cycle ∈ currently available l-cycles do
17: Invoke Alg. 7 to find xji cycles of length gil (current = first
element in cycle)
18: Concatenate each root found in the last step with the current
element
19: for each concatenation do
20: if all the 3-bit permutations in the concatenated cycles are valid
then
21: Add the concatenated cycles as a one element to ARRAY
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: end if
27: end for
28: end if
29: end for
30: end for
31: end for
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Table 5.1: Results of the 104 trials and the worst case for 2 ≤ r ≤ 22, nk ≡ the number
of keys that yield more than one PRINTcipher permutation root, nw ≡ the number of
PRINTcipher permutation roots in the worst case.
r log2 nk log2 nw r log2 nk log2 nw r log2 nk log2 nw
2 - - 9 7.66 8.58 16 10.80 18.95
3 - - 10 8.33 11.90 17 8.71 -
4 6.11 2 11 7.94 9.31 18 11.16 20.67
5 2 - 12 11.46 17.39 19 8.77 -
6 9.30 4.17 13 8.47 - 20 10.68 21.54
7 3.70 - 14 9.10 16.27 21 9.18 18.73
8 9.59 10.07 15 9.77 16.63 22 9.59 22.04
These roots are found within less than 3 hours on a standard PC.
Furthermore, we tried 104 random PRINTcipher-48 permutation keys excluding the ones
that yield (P ◦ K)r = Identity. Note that, for a random key, the probability for the worst
case is 2
22.04
232 = 0.001 for 22 rounds and less than that for r < 22. These experiments took
a few seconds on average on a standard PC and they show that most of the time there is a
unique PRINTcipher permutation root. Table 5.1 shows the number of keys (nk), out of the
104 random keys, that yield more than one PRINTcipher permutation root. It also shows
the number of PRINTcipher permutation roots in the worst case (nw) for each number of
rounds.
5.4 Security Based on the Many r-th Roots of a
Permutation
Almost all the current authentication protocols base their security proofs on a one-way cryp-
tographic function. In contrast, we propose an authentication protocol whose security is based
on a multi-valued function which is interestingly the roots of a permutation pi in the group of
all permutations Sn.
From the previous sections, we know that the number of r-th roots of a permutation (P ◦K)r
can be very large. We also know that we are only able to recover the PRINTcipher permu-
tation key K because we know the structure of K and the whole permutation P . However, if
the structure of K is unknown, then the above attack would not work. Based on these two
observations we can construct the following authentication protocol.
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An Authentication Protocol Based on a Multi-Valued Function: Assume that
there are two parties P (Prover) and V (Verifier) who share a secret key K ∈ Sn. P wants to
prove to V that it knows the secret key K. Our authentication protocol can be described as
follows:
1. V generates a random permutation Cp ∈ Sn.
2. V sends a challenge Cp ∈ Sn to P.
3. P generates a random permutation Cv ∈ Sn and computes Q = (Cv ◦K ◦Cp)r, where r
is a composite number chosen in a specific way (If r is prime, the number of roots could
possibly be smaller than when it is composite).
4. P sends Q, Cv and r to V (we can hide r to add more security at the cost of increasing
the verification time for V).
5. V checks whether (Cv ◦ K ◦ Cp)r equals Q or not (if r is not sent V starts by trying
r = 2 and incrementing r until a match is found).
6. If it equals then “P knows K, Success” else “P doesn’t know K, failure”.
Security Analysis: The obvious way for an adversary to recover K, is to compute the
r-th root of Q. Computing the r-th root of Q is easy but there could be many roots. If Q ∈ S64
then depending on the choice of r, there can be more than 264 roots and sometimes more than
2128. Thus if our security parameter is 64-bit or 80-bit, the protocol can be secure against this
specific attack. Therefore, we need to choose r so that (Cv ◦K ◦Cp)r has r-th roots more than
2s where s is our security parameter. Using formula 5.2 for computing the number of roots,
we fix the number of 1-cycles (a1) and r and check the corresponding number of roots. We
varied both a1 from 20 to 32 and r from 4 to 20, and calculated the corresponding number
of roots resulting only from the 1-cycles. The following table shows the minimum values of r
and a1 that gives us at least 264 or 280 number of rounds.
The above table shows that when r ≥ 4 and the number of 1-cycles of the permutation
Q = (Cv ◦K ◦ Cp)r is ≥ 30 then the number of the rth roots of Q is ≥ 280. Thus, it would
be infeasible to compute the r-th roots of Q in order to find the secret key K. This might be
one step towards proving that the protocol is secure. However, as pointed by Shamir in any
challenge-response application the secret key (here K) and the challenge (here Cp) should be
securely mixed similar to the mixing of the secret and IV in stream ciphers and then base the
response on the result of the mixing function [105].
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Table 5.2: The table shows the minimum combination of both r and a1 that makes the
number of rth roots of a permutation consisting only of cycles with length 1 at least 264
or 280. Note that r is a composite number as for some prime numbers, the number of
r-th roots is less than 280 or 264.
min(r) min(a1) min(# of r-th roots)
4 30 280
4 26 264
6 27 280
6 23 264
15 26 280
Therefore to avoid passive attacks that might exploit the algebraic structure of the permutation
Cv ◦K ◦ Cp or active attacks that might fix Cp to a certain permutation such as the Identity
permutation and exploit the algebraic structure of Cv◦K — for example by fixing the structure
of K to a certain class of permutations such as that of PRINTcipher, we need to use a simple
mixing function Mix(Cv,K,Cp) that yields a permutation M and then return Q = M r as a
response to the challenge Cp. The additional random value Cv is generated mainly to prevent
replay attacks.
More research needs to be done in order to specify a simple and suitable mixing function
that yields a permutation. Note that a permutation in Sn where n is a power of 2 can be
represented as an (log2 n)-bit Sbox in hardware [73]. Note also that the inputs to the mixing
function do not need to be permutations but only the output needs to be a permutation in
Sn. We believe that finding a suitable mixing function beside a hardware implementation for
this protocol are two interesting topics for future work.
5.5 Conclusions
We have described two differential attacks against 22 rounds of PRINTcipher-48, requiring
the full code book and about 248 computational steps. Similar results can be obtained for the
96-bit version of the cipher.
One of the attacks is a new technique targeting the key-dependent permutations used in
PRINTcipher. Since such key-dependent permutations are currently not well-studied, the
attack is of importance to past and future designs that use them. We introduced a novel
technique for computing permutation roots, making it possible to retrieve the key-dependent
single-round permutation pi given nothing but the r-round permutation pir and the cipher
description. While our technique so far applies only to the case where the linear layer is a (key-
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depended) bit permutation, future designers of cryptographic primitives using key-dependent
permutations should be aware of this technique when choosing parameters like round numbers
or Sbox layout for their algorithms.
We also showed how to design an authentication protocol whose security is based on a multi-
valued function, namely, the r-th roots of a permutation in the symmetric group Sn.
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Chapter 6
Cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: The
Invariant Subspace Attack
In this chapter, we present a new attack called invariant subspace attack that breaks the full
cipher for a significant fraction of its keys. For such weak keys, a chosen plaintext distin-
guishing attack can be mounted in unit time. This new attack can be seen as a weak-key
variant of a statistical saturation attack. We show that for weak keys, strongly biased linear
approximations exists for any number of rounds. In this sense, PRINTcipher behaves very
differently to what is usually – often implicitly – assumed.
In a nutshell, the attack is based on the observation that for PRINTcipher there exist
cosets of subspaces of Fn2 that the round function maps to cosets of the same subspace. The
exact coset is determined by the round key only. Now, if the round key is such that a coset
gets mapped to itself, the fact that all round keys are identical in PRINTcipher (almost)
immediately leads to the conclusion that for certain (weak) keys some affine subspaces are
invariant under encryption. The round constants, mainly introduced to avoid slide attacks,
do not prevent the attack as the round constants are included in the subspace. The principle
of the attack is described in Section 6.1.1.
More particular, using this new attack technique, which we call (for obvious reasons) invariant
subspace attack, we demonstrate the existence of 252 weak keys (out of 280) for PRINTcipher-
48 and 2102 weak keys (out of 2160) for PRINTcipher-96. If a key is weak, our attack results
in a distinguisher using less than 5 chosen plain- or ciphertexts. That is, even in the case of
RFID-tags, where the amount of data available for a practical attack is strictly limited, our
attacks apply. In a known plain- or ciphertext scenario the data complexity increases by a
factor of 216 (PRINTcipher-48) resp. 232 (PRINTcipher-96).
Besides the low data complexity of the distinguisher, the attack technique has interesting
relations to statistical saturation attacks and truncated differential attacks. In this chapter, we
are concerned only about its relation to the statistical saturation attack. For more information
on its relation to the truncated differential attack, we refer the reader to the original paper [83].
It follows in particular that PRINTcipher is an example of a non-toy cipher where attacks
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do not behave as we usually expect them to. The bias for statistical saturation attacks and
the bias of linear hulls are extremely key-dependent. For a weak key, increasing the number
of rounds up to the full number of rounds does not increase the security of the cipher with
respect to these attacks.
6.1 The Invariant Subspace Attack
6.1.1 General Idea
Consider an n-bit block cipher with a round function Ek consisting of a key addition and an
SP-layer
E : Fn2 → Fn2 ,
that is Ek is defined by Ek(x) = E(x + k). Assume that the SP-layer E is such that there
exists a subspace U ⊆ Fn2 and two constants c, d ∈ Fn2 with the property:
E(U + c) = U + d.
Then, given a (round) key k = u+ c+ d with u ∈ U , the following holds:
Ek(U + d) = E((U + d) + (u+ c+ d)) = E(U + c) = U + d,
i.e. the round function maps the affine subspace U + d onto itself. If all round keys are in
k ∈ U + (c+ d) (in particular if a constant round key is used), then this property is iterative
over an arbitrary number of rounds. This yields a very efficient distinguisher for a fraction of
the keys. U should be as large as possible to increase this fraction. We call this new attack
technique an invariant subspace attack. In the next section we show an example of how to
apply it to the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher.
6.1.2 Attack against PRINTcipher
An Attack on PRINTcipher
One interesting property of the PRINTcipher Sbox is that a one bit difference in the input
causes a one bit difference in the same bit in the output with probability 28 . That is, there
exists exactly one pair for each one bit input difference resulting in a one bit output difference
(at the same position). More precisely, denoting by ∗ an arbitrary value in F2, the following
holds for the PRINTcipher Sbox:
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Table 6.1: Specific 1-bit input and 1-bit output differences with probability 1
S(000) = 000
S(001) = 001
⇔ S(00*) = 00*
S(100) = 111
S(110) = 101
⇔ S(1*0) = 1*1
S(011) = 110
S(111) = 010
⇔ S(*11) = *10
In addition, there exists a subset of Sboxes such that (1) two output bits of those Sboxes map
onto two input bits of the same Sboxes in the next round and (2) the round-dependent RCi is
not involved (See Figure 6.1).
Fig. 6.1: A subset of PRINTcipher-48 Sboxes mapping onto itself.
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Now consider an xor-key sk1 of the form
Xor key = 01* *11 *** *** 01* *11 *** *** 01* *11 *** *** 01* *11 *** ***,
and a permutation key with the following restrictions:
Perm. key = 0* 11 ** ** 10 01 ** ** 11 *0 ** ** *0 11 ** **,
where again ∗ denotes an arbitrary value in F2. For those keys the following structural iterative
one round property holds:
Start 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** ***
Key xoring 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** ***
Lin. layer 00* 11* *** *** 0*0 1*1 *** *** *00 *11 *** *** 00* 11* *** ***
RC 00* 11* *** *** 0*0 1*1 *** *** *00 *11 *** *** 00* 11* *** ***
Perm. layer 00* *11 *** *** 00* *11 *** *** 00* *11 *** *** 00* *11 *** ***
Sbox layer 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** ***
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This property holds with probability one if both keys are of the above form. The fraction
of those keys is 2−16 for the XOR key and 2−13 for the permutation key, meaning that the
property is met for a fraction of (2−29 of all keys. In other words, there exist 251 weak keys of
this form.
Thus, one can very efficiently check if a key of the above form is used by encrypting a few
texts of the above form and check if the ciphertext is again of the same form. Given that the
probability for false positives is ≈ 2−16, trial encrypting just a handful of selected plaintexts
will uniquely identify such a weak key. If such a key is found, we do of course immediately
have a distinguisher on PRINTcipher.
Invariant Subspace Description:
Let us briefly rephrase the attack in terms of an invariant subspace attack. For this we fix a
permutation key of the above form. Remember that the inner state at the beginning and the
end of each round was
Start = 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** ***.
This means that the relevant subspace U ⊂ F482 is defined by
U = {00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** ***}, (6.1)
and that the affine subspace is defined by any fixed vector d of the form
d = 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** *** 00* *10 *** ***. (6.2)
Then for any fixed vector c of the form
c = 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** *** 01* *01 *** ***, (6.3)
and any xor-key k ∈ (U + c+ d), the round function does indeed map U + d onto itself.
6.1.3 Other Attack Profiles
In the following we describe other sets of weak-keys for PRINTcipher-48 and similar ones
for PRINTcipher-96.
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Other weak keys for PRINTcipher-48
As it turns out, there are some more invariant subspaces that also can be used forPRINTcipher-
48. They are all of the form
00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** *** 00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** ***,
where an ’X’ marks a bit position where the attacker has to make an arbitrary assignment.
Note that each position can be filled independently of the others. Thus, we have 26 possible
plaintexts that we can work with, each of which targets another class of weak keys.
For each such assignment, the cipher behaves as follows:
Start (1) 00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** *** 00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** ***
Key xoring (2) 0X* X01 *** X*1 01* *0X *** *** 0X* 001 *** X*X 01* *0X *** ***
Lin. layer (3) 00* XXX *** X*X 0*0 1*1 *** *** *00 XXX *** 10* 00* 11* *** ***
RC (4) 00* XXX *** X*X 0*0 1*1 *** *** *00 XXX *** 10* 00* 11* *** ***
Perm. layer (5) 00* XXX *** 1*0 00* *11 *** *** 00* XXX *** 1*0 00* *11 *** ***
Sbox layer (6) 00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** *** 00* XXX *** 1*1 00* *10 *** ***
The behaviour is best understood by traversing the cipher in the inverse direction, i.e. by
starting from the end and then finding the key bits that ensure that all fixed bits in line (1)
match their counterparts in line (6).
Let us start with the output of the Sbox, i.e. line (6), and let the bit positions marked by ’X’
be arbitrarily and independently be fixed to either 0 or 1. Then going backwards through the
Sbox uniquely determines the bits in line (5). We then use a permutation key of the form
Perm. Key = 0* ** ** (00 or 11) 10 01 ** ** 11 ** ** 10 0* 11 ** **
to obtain line (4), noting that 2−13 of all permutation keys meet this property. We then apply
round counter and linear layer to obtain line (2). Now note that line (2) contains 22 bits that
are fixed and that have to match the corresponding bits in line (1). Thus, 22 key bits of the
xoring key are determined, meaning that 2−22 of all xoring keys are suitable for the attack.
Summing up, for each of the 26 possible assignments to the bits marked by ’X’ in line (1) or
(6), a fraction of exactly 2−35 keys are weak, meaning that in total, we have found another
fraction of 2−29 weak keys that can be attacked by the above technique.
Analysis of PRINTcipher-96
As it turns out, the same attack can also be applied to PRINTcipher-96. Again, there are
two types of weak keys. The first type is based on 32 active bits and is met by a fraction of
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2−59 of all keys. The second type is based on 44 active bits and has an additional 12 freely
chosable input bits. Each of the resulting 212 inputs targets a fraction of 2−71 keys, meaning
that this group, too, contains a fraction of 2−59 weak keys in total. The active bits for these
weak keys are given in Table 6.2.
Subset 1 Active input bits for linear layer:
(0 1) (4 5) (12 13) (16 17) (24 25) (28 29) (36 37) (40 41)
(48 49) (52 53) (60 61) (64 65) (72 73) (76 77) (84 85) (88 89)
Active output bits for linear layer:
(0 2) (3 5) (12 13) (15 16) (25 26) (28 29) (36 38) (39 41)
(48 49) (51 52) (61 62) (64 65) (72 74) (75 77) (84 85) (87 88)
Subset 2 Active input bits for linear layer:
(0 1) (3 4 5) (9 11) (12 13) (16 17) (24 25) (27 28 29)
(33 35) (36 37) (40 41) (48 49) (51 52 53) (57 59) (60 61)
(64 65) (72 73) (75 76 77) (81 83) (84 85) (88 89)
Active output bits for linear layer:
(0 2) (3 4 5) (9 10) (12 13) (15 16) (25 26) (27 28 29)
(33 35) (36 38) (39 41) (48 49) (51 52 53) (58 59) (61 62)
(64 65) (72 74) (75 76 77) (81 82) (84 85) (87 88)
Table 6.2: Subsets of active bits for PRINTcipher-96, grouped according to Sboxes
6.1.4 Protecting Against the Attack
The above attack against PRINTcipher is a special case of the general attack described in
the beginning of the section, since the subspace is described by simply fixing some of its bits.
In theory, describing the subspace by a set of linear equations is possible, opening for a wide
range of attacks. The full potential of this generalized attack is yet to be determined.
As for the special case used against PRINTcipher, it is relatively easy to protect the design
against the attack. Note that the list of attack profiles by fixing bits given here is com-
plete, and that all attack profiles fix two of the bits 39-41 (PRINTcipher-48) resp. 87-89
(PRINTcipher-96). Thus, it would suffice to spread the round counter over the last three
Sboxes, e.g. by assigning two counter bits to each Sbox. This would destroy the only attack
profiles available.
We also analyzed the block cipher NOEKEON, which was proposed by Daemen et al. in
2000 [42]. NOEKEON is a 16-round block cipher with a constant round key, making it a
particularly tempting target for the attack. However, as it turns out, the linear mixing layer
of NOEKEON is much more resistant against the above type of attack. Here, the stronger
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round function (necessary for a cipher with only 16 rounds) works to the advantage of the
cipher. As it turns out, even if there was no round counter involved in NOEKEON, the simple
attack described above – i.e. where the subspace is defined by fixing certain bits – could not
be applied. Whether or not the generalized attack has a better chance of succeeding remains
yet to be determined.
6.2 Statistical Saturation Attacks
The attack on PRINTcipher discussed in Section 6.1.2 is clearly strongly related to statistical
saturation attacks described in Chapter 2. In this section, we show that for PRINTcipher
there exist strongly biased linear approximations for any number of rounds, if the key is weak
in the sense of the invariant subspace attack. This result follows using a link between statistical
saturation attacks and multi-dimensional linear attacks (see Chapter 2 or [82]).
6.2.1 On the Choice of the Values of the Fixed Bits
We use the statistical saturation attack as described in Chapter 2 where the encryption function
e : Fr2×Fs2 → Ft2×Fu2 defined in equation (2.8) is restricted to hy : Fs2 → Ft2 defined in equation
(2.9). We now focus on the case where r = t, that is the number of fixed bits is the same as
the number of bits considered at the output.
Assume that we have a cipher ‘e’ that is vulnerable to an invariant subspace attack. As for
statistical saturation attacks, up to a fixed bijective linear transformation before and after the
cipher, we can assume that, for a weak-key, the affine subspace of the form {d}×Fs2 is mapped
to a affine subspace of the form {d} × Fs2. It then follows immediately that (for a weak key)
the function of the restriction hy for y = d is a constant, more precisely
hd(x) = e(1)(d, x) = d (6.4)
For the special choice of the values of the fixed bits the capacity of the probability of the
output distribution is maximal. Hence for a weak key this special fixing of the bits leads to an
optimal statistical saturation attack. Note that Theorem 2.2.4 does not reveal the existence
of such extreme cases, as it only considers the average capacity of the restrictions.
While in an invariant subspace attack, given the subspace, the choice of the coset is crucial, for
statistical saturation attacks the fixed bits are usually assigned with random values. As the
invariant subspace attack on PRINTcipher does not imply that PRINTcipher is in general
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vulnerable to a statistical saturation attack, it does not come as a surprise that the experiments
in [78] did not reveal any weakness of PRINTcipher with respect to those attacks.
6.2.2 On the Existence of Highly Biased Approximations
The following corollary follows from Identity (2.10).
Corollary 6.2.1. Assume an n-bit block cipher Ek is vulnerable to an invariant subspace
attack, that is there exist a subspace U , a constant d and keys k such that
Ek(U + d) = U + d.
Then, for those keys, there exist linear approximations with a correlation c such that
c ≥ 2dim(U)−n − 22(dim(U)−n).
Proof. Let py be the the probability distribution of the r output bits of hy and let also pd be
the the probability distribution of the r output bits of hd. As defined by equation (6.4), hd is
a constant function. Thus Cap(pd) = 2r − 1 and furthermore
∑
y∈Fr2
Cap(py) ≥ Cap(pd) = 2r − 1.
Considering Identity (2.10) it follows that
∑
a∈Fr2 ×{0}
b∈Ft2 ×{0},b6=0
(ê(a, b))2 ≥ 22n(1− 2−r)
Lower bounding the maximal value by the average (and recalling that r = t), we compute
max
a,b 6=0
(ê(a, b))2 ≥ 2−2r
∑
a∈Fr2 ×{0}
b∈Ft2 ×{0},b6=0
(ê(a, b))2 ≥ 22n−2r(1− 2−r)
Thus there exists at least one Fourier coefficient such that
|ê(a, b)| ≥ 2n−r
√
1− 2−r ≥ 2n−r − 2n−2r
Applying identity (2.1) and remembering that r = n− dimU , the theorem follows.
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Clearly, this Corollary is only interesting for the case where dim(U) > n2 as the existence of
the stated approximations otherwise is trivial. For the case of PRINTcipher-48 the following
Corollary holds.
Corollary 6.2.2. Given a weak key for any round r ≤ 48 there exists at least one linear
approximation for PRINTcipher-48 with correlation at least 2−16 − 2−32.
Understanding the Large Correlations
Here we summarize the analysis described in [2] about the above large correlations which are
caused by the invariant subspace. One can see that the linear approximations with large cor-
relations in PRINTcipher have input masks α and output masks β that lie in the orthogonal
subspace of U , i.e. α, β ∈ U⊥. This is because the orthogonal of the subspace U defined in
6.1,
U⊥ = {**0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000}
corresponds to the plaintext and ciphertext bits that are fixed in the invariant subspace.
Thus to study the large correlations of these linear approximations, the work in [2] split their
linear hull represented by Equation (2.2) into two sums where the first sum corresponds to
the linear trails with intermediate masks residing in U⊥ and the second sum corresponds to
the other linear trails with intermediate masks outside U⊥ for at least one round. Thus for an
iterated block cipher F ,
CF (α, β) =
∑
αi∈U⊥
(−1)si⊕di |Ci|+
∑
αi /∈U⊥
(−1)si⊕di |Ci| (6.5)
Now, let Mi be the correlation matrix of the ith round function of an iterated block cipher with
identical round keys and small round constants. Let A be the submatrix of Mi whose entries
correspond to input and output masks in U⊥ and are not affected by the round constants. Note
that since the round constants do not affect the entries of A, so we have the same submatrix
for each round in PRINTcipher. Thus, Ar describes exactly the contribution to the linear
hull from the linear trails with intermediate masks residing in U⊥. If the entries of Ar have a
large magnitude, then the corresponding elements of the product MrMr−1 · · ·M1 have more
or less the same magnitude, unless the contributions from the second sum cancel those from
the first sum.
As the asymptotic behaviour of Ar is related to the spectrum of A [29, 94], the work in [2]
studied the eigenvalues of A. Define v = (vα)α∈U⊥ where vα = (−1)〈d,α〉. It was shown in [2]
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that vT is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 iff F (U + d) = U + d where F is an invertible
vectorial Boolean function. Moreover, it was shown that in the case where there is no other
non-trivial1 eigenvector with eigenvalue 1, the sequence Ar converges to (2dim (U⊥) − 1)−1vT v
as r → ∞. Thus in equation 6.5, if the contribution to CF (α, β) from the second sum are
negligible, then all trails with nonzero α, β ∈ U⊥ have absolute correlations ≈ 2− dim (U⊥).
Furthermore, experiments were performed in [2] to verify that PRINTcipher behaves accord-
ing to the above stated results. The submatrix A of PRINTcipher-48 was constructed ac-
cording to the class of weak keys described in Section 6.1.2 and it was verified that AvT = vT .
Also 16 linear approximations with absolute correlations approximately equal to 2−16 were
found. For more information about these results, we refer the reader to [2, 5].
6.3 Conclusions
We have presented a new attack against iterative block ciphers named invariant subspace
attack and demonstrated its validity by breaking PRINTcipher for a significant fraction of
its keys. The presented invariant subspace attack verifies that there exist 252 weak keys of
the 280 possible keys for PRINTcipher-48 and 2102 weak keys of the 2160 possible keys of
PRINTcipher-96. Note that as pointed in Chapter 3 that all the classes of weak keys that
lead to invariant subspaces have been identified in [30].
Moreover, we have shown that the invariant subspace attack has relationships to other classes
of attacks as in multi-dimensional attack linear attack and statistical saturation attack. This
link shows that for PRINTcipher there are strongly biased linear approximations with ab-
solute correlation at least 2−16 for any number of rounds, if a weak key is chosen. We have
also given a brief description about the work in [2] which mainly explains why the invariant
subspace causes these strongly biased linear approximations.
1Note that (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)T is an eigenvector of A with eigenvalue 1.
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Chapter 7
Cryptanalysis of the Lightweight
Cipher A2U2
In this chapter, we present a cryptanalysis of the stream cipher A2U2 described in Chapter
3. We start by describing some useful properties used to attack the cipher (Section 7.1) and
by showing how to repair the nonfunctional chosen plaintext attack on A2U2 described in
Chapter 3 (See Section 3.3.3), yielding an attack for the chosen plaintext case that requires
less than a second running time and very little data (Section 7.2).
We then proceed to discuss the more challenging class of known-plaintext attacks. In Sec-
tion 7.3 we describe a guess-and-determine attack that requires guessing 249 inner state bits
in order to retrieve the starting state.
In addition, we present a chosen-IV attack that makes use of the special key/IV setup of the
cipher. A special design feature of A2U2 is that the number of initialization rounds varies and
depends on an internal counter. The number of rounds varies from 9 to 126. In Section 7.4, we
propose a differential-style attack which first enables us to find the 5-bit counter key. Moreover,
we present an attack that recovers the master key in the case that only 9 initialization rounds
are used. The latter attack requires only 238 computational steps.
Finally, in Section 7.5, we describe urgent changes that should be done to the cipher design
in order to avoid the above attacks. We also give some further research directions, both for
cryptanalysis and improvement of the cipher.
In this chapter, we use the notations and algebraic equations described previously in Chapter
3 (See Section 3.1.3).
7.1 Useful Properties Used in the Attacks
In the following, we point out some properties of the cipher that will be used by our attacks.
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Known Counter: Since the counter has the all-one state after initialization, the attacker
can compute all successive counter states and does know the bit Ct for any t ≥ 0. This
simplifies significantly some of the algebraic equations described in Chapter 3 (See Section
3.1.3).
Chosen Randomization Vector: Instead of using a nonce that is chosen solely by the
encrypting party as is common practice with stream ciphers, the random vector used for
initialization is generated in collaboration between sender and receiver. According to the
design specification of the cipher [46], both sender and receiver each choose a 32-bit random
number which is then sent over the communication channel. Both inputs are then combined by
xor into the actual randomization vector. Note that this procedure enables an active attacker
to choose the randomization vector: He waits for the legitimate party’s input and chooses
his own such that the xor sum will be the desired number. In particular, he can introduce
arbitrary differences between randomization vectors and even force the encryption device to
use the same randomization vector twice, thus violating an important design principle for
stream ciphers.
Chosen Plaintext: Due to the unusual output generation, a chosen plaintext attack is
more powerful than a known plaintext attack. This is another difference to traditional stream
cipher designs, where no extra information is gained if the attacker is allowed to choose the
plaintext himself.
7.2 A Chosen Plaintext Attack
7.2.1 A Leak in the Output Function
In the following, we will demonstrate a leak in the output function that can even be used for
general known-plaintext attacks and will then expand this weakness into a chosen plaintext
attack that reminds of the one described in Chapter 3 (See Section 3.3.3) but is actually
functional.
Known plaintext: Assume that the inner sequences At and Bt are statistically close to
random. Then in particular, Pr(At = 0) = 12 for all t. We can now consider two cases for the
output function:
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 If At = 0, then Yt = Bt + Ct. Since we know Ct, we can rewrite this as Bt = Yt + Ct.
For At = 0, this is always true.
 If At = 1, we have Yt = Bt + Pσ(t), with Pσ(t) unknown. If we assume that Pσ(t) = Ct
with probability 12 ,
1 then the equation Bt = Yt + Ct is also true with probability 12 .
In total, the equation Bt = Yt + Ct is thus met with probability 12 +
(
1
2
)2
= 34 , i.e. by
observing the keystream and knowing the behaviour of the counter LFSR, we can predict the
inner stream (B0, B1 . . .) with probability 34 per bit.
Chosen plaintext: Note that when we can choose the plaintext, we can increase the
probability of Pσ(t) = Ct and thus the probability of the equation Bt = Yt +Ct being correct.
As an example, consider the first 5 output bits of the LFSR, which are (1, 0, 0, 0, 0). Thus, if
we choose a plaintext (1, 0, 0, 0, 0), then Pσ(t) = Ct is true with probability 1 for the first bit,
1− 12 for the second, 1− 14 for the third, 1− 18 for the fourth, and 1− 116 for the fifth bit. Thus,
we can predict the inner state bits (B0, . . . , B4) with probabilities 1, 34 ,
7
8 ,
15
16 ,
31
32 .
7.2.2 The Attack
The most useful plaintexts for this kind of analysis seem to be (0, 0, ...) and (1, 1, ...), since
for them, the attacker knows exactly the bit Pσ(t) for every time slot t. Let us start with the
all-zero sequence. The attacker knows that the plaintext sequence (Pσ(t))t≥0 consists only of
zeros. He now looks at all time slots t with Ct = 0. For those time slots, it holds that Bt = Yt,
independent of the choice of At. Thus, he learns about half of the bits of the sequence B.
The remaining bits can be learned using the all-one sequence. In this case, in all positions
where Ct = 1, the attacker learns Bt = Yt + 1, also independent of At. Thus, he has fully
reconstructed the sequence B.
What is more, he can also use this new information to learn the sequence A as well. For every
time slot, he picks the ciphertext bit Yt corresponding to the plaintext bit Pσ(t) 6= Ct. If it
holds that Bt = Yt + Ct, then At = 0, otherwise At = 1.
After this step, the attacker knows the sequences generated by all three registers A, B, and C.
The remaining attack proceeds as follows. Knowing the sequences A, B and C the attacker
can determine the values ht because
ht = Bt−9 +Bt−8Bt−7 +Bt−6 +Bt−3 +At + 1.
1Note that if the probability for Pσ(t) = Ct significantly differs from 12 , then the success probabilities
for the rest of the attack are even better than claimed.
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Furthermore, it holds that
ht = MUXCt−5(St0, St1) ·MUXCt−1(St4, At−2) + MUXCt−3(St2, St3) + 1,
where Ct−i for i = 1, 3, 5 and At−2 are known. This equation is at most quadratic and in
about half of the cases (when Ct−1 = 1) it is linear. Determining 56 values of ht yields a fully
determined quadratic Boolean equation system, which can be solved by e.g., using Gro¨bner
basis techniques. As about half of the equation are linear, a linear equation system can be
obtained after determining 112 values of ht. After 11 clockings of the algorithm the key
register is rotated once and the key bits are reused, thus it can happen that the same equation
is generated twice. However, experiments showed that this does not happen frequently, thus
we expect that observing around 120 values of ht is sufficient to generate a fully determined
linear equation systems in 56 unknowns.
Effort: The attack requires two chosen plaintexts of length around 60 bits which are en-
crypted using the same key and initialization vector in order to recover secret key bits (exclud-
ing the 5 bits which are used to initialize the counter). Note that a 60 bit plaintext corresponds
to a ciphertext of length 120 bit on average. The main computational effort consists in solving
a linear Boolean equation system which can be done in well under a 1 second. Thus, in the
chosen plaintext scenario, the cipher must be considered as completely broken.
7.3 Guess-and-Determine Attack
In this section we discuss a known plaintext attack which is in general a more likely scenario
than a chosen plaintext attack. When we know but are not allowed to choose the plaintext
we cannot use the same trick as in Section 7.2 to determine the sequence (Bt)t≥0. We cannot
simply calculate this sequence for a given plaintext/ciphertext pair because we do not know
which bits of the ciphertext correspond to the plaintext bits. This is controlled by register A.
The idea of this attack is to guess the sequence of (At)t≥0, meaning we guess at which positions
of the ciphertext a plaintext bit was used. These guesses are used to determine additional bits
of register B and then later on the value of ht. As we know the value of the counter at any
time during the encryption process, given ht and At−2 we obtain a Boolean equation in the
key bits which is at most quadratic and contains at most three variables. If we are able to
collect sufficiently many of those equations we will be able to recover the key bits by solving
the equation system.
We denote by A0 the content of the last cell of the first NFSR at the time when the ciphertext
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generation starts. The attack is divided into three parts of guessing bits.
In the first part we guess the value At for t = 0, . . . , 8 for 9 consecutive clockings of the
algorithms. Depending on our guess we know if the counter bit or a plaintext bit was used to
generate the corresponding ciphertext bit and we can determine the value of Bt for t = 0, . . . , 8.
After guessing 9 bits we know the full second NFSR and about the lower half of the first NFSR.
In the next part we continue guessing the value of At for t = 9, . . . , 16 and determine the
value of Bt for t = 9, . . . , 16. Additionally, we obtain the value of ht for t = 9, . . . , 16 and the
corresponding Boolean equation in the key bits, because it holds that
ht := At +Bt−9 +Bt−8Bt−7 +Bt−6 +Bt−3 + 1, (7.1)
the full register B is known and we guessed the value of At. After the second part of the
attack both registers are known and we have already obtained 8 equations.
In the third part we want to determine the value of ht for further clockings of the cipher. The
full register A is known and in order to update register B only bits of register A are used. This
means we can update register B and know the value which was use to encrypt next ciphertext
bit (bit 17, 18 etc). Furthermore, we know the counter value Ct and the plaintext bit p that
might have been used (according to our guess). As mentioned before we want to determine the
value of ht and obtain the corresponding equation. Using equation (7.1) we need to determine
At in order to obtain ht. Depending on the values of counter Ct and the value of the plaintext
bit Pσ(t) we can either calculate the value of At or we have to guess it. The output generation
can be presented as a quadratic equation
Yt +Bt + Ct = At(Ct + Pσ(t)). (7.2)
This means if Ct 6= Pσ(t) and thus Ct+Pσ(t) = 1 we can simply use Equation (7.2) to determine
the value of At. However, if Ct = Pσ(t) and thus Ct + Pσ(t) = 0, Equation (7.2) does not yield
any information about At and we have to guess the value of At as before.
Effort: We need to collect at least 56 equations to determine a unique solution in 56 key
variables. In the first two parts of the attack we guess 17 bits and obtain 8 equations. We
expect that we have to guess every second value for At in the third part of the attack. Thus,
we expect that we have to guess at least 24 further bits in the third part of the attack in order
to obtain a fully determined equation system. This leads to a complexity of at least 241.
There are two factors that increase the attack complexity. Firstly, the equation system is non-
linear and therefore it might not have a unique solution even though it is fully determined.
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However, it is often sufficient to add a few extra equations to get a unique solution. This will
slightly raise the complexity of the attack.
Secondly, the key register is rotated once after 11 clockings of the algorithm and thus key
bits are reused. This property will on the one hand increase the complexity of the attack for
the correct guess but on the other hand enable us to discard wrong guesses in an early stage.
After producing 11 ciphertext bits the key register has been rotated once, that means the key
bits will be reused when generating more equations. This leads to rounds where we guess or
determine the value of At but do not get a new equation, thus do not gain extra information
about the key. This is especially true for the correct guess and means that it is necessary to
guess extra bits in order to obtain a fully determined system. For a wrong guess however this
might be to our advantage because it is very likely that when the same polynomial is generated
the RHS differs. Thus, we get contradicting equations and can abort the guess.
In general, for a wrong guess the equation system will not have a solution. The inconsistency
might be very obvious as mentioned above, but it might also be necessary to solve a non-linear
Boolean equation system. Therefore, we have to make a trade-off how often we want to check
if the system is still solvable.
An implementation of the attack is necessary in order to provide a better estimate of the attack
complexity. Simulations showed that after guessing 47 bits we obtain a set with 57 equations
on average. When testing these equation systems for solvability around 5% have a non-empty
solution set. This means 5% of our guesses survive. Guessing 6 additional bits yields equation
systems containing 70.7 equations on average and we expect that only the correct guess or
very few guesses survive and that the equation system corresponding to the right guess will
have a unique solution. The estimated complexity for this approach is 249 bit guesses. As we
in the worst case have to solve an non-linear equation system for each guess we cannot ignore
the costs for this step. The costs for solving a non-linear equation system by for example using
Gro¨bner bases are hard to estimate as the problem of solving a random non-linear equation
system is NP-hard and thus the running time is equivalent to a brute force search in the worst
case. However, we deal with fairly small equation systems and experiments indicate that these
equation systems are solvable in a fraction of seconds using Gro¨bner basis algorithms and that
the costs are comparable to about four encryptions. Furthermore, the number of Gro¨bner
basis applications can be reduced by implementing techniques for checking for inconsistencies
in the equation system such as checking if the subsystem of linear equations is solvable etc.
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7.4 Targeting the Low Number of Initialization Rounds
A2U2 has a secret number of initialization rounds. There are 32 possible choices for the
number of initialization rounds that varies from 9 to 126 where each choice is specified by
the 5 LSB of the tag’s random number, the reader’s random number and the 5-bit counter
key. In this section, we propose two attacks on A2U2 when 9 initialization rounds are used.
The first attack recovers the 5-bit counter key using 214 different state pairs with a specified
difference, while the second attack recovers 32 secret key bits and 6 subkey bits using 8
plaintext/ciphertext pairs with a time complexity 238. Both of the attacks use known plaintexts
and chosen IVs.
7.4.1 Recovering the 5-bit Counter Key
The following attack requires for each of the possible 32 initializations, a certain number of
state pairs (chosen IVs) with a good difference (sparse characteristic). Under these states we
use the ciphertext of a single bit of plaintext that is equal to the first bit of the counter, C0,
at the time when the encryption starts (known plaintext). Then we can distinguish the state
pairs corresponding to 9 rounds of initialization by observing a bias in the difference of the
first bit of the corresponding ciphertext pairs, ∆(Y0), which is equal to the difference ∆(B0).
Experiments show that Pr(∆(B0) = 0) > 0.7 for 9 initialization rounds when 29 state pairs
with differences ∆(A) = 10000000000000000 and ∆(B) = 100000100 are used. The bias is
smaller when more initialization rounds are applied. We observe the strong bias in B0 for 9
rounds because in only 9 rounds the difference cannot propagate through state and does not
spread out sufficiently. After having distinguished the 29 state pairs corresponding to 9 rounds
of initialization, we can consequently find the 5-bit counter key.
7.4.2 Recovering the Master Key Bits
The following attack targets plaintext/ciphertext generated using 9 rounds of initialization
(can be obtained using chosen IVs) and exploits the key scheduling used to generate the
subkey bits, ht. The attacker starts by guessing the 26 master key bits used in initializing
registers A and B and then at each round he guesses one subkey bit if Ct−1 = 0, or two master
key bits if Ct−1 = 1 (since At−2 will then be used to generate ht) or no bits when all the key
bits involved in the generation of the round subkey bit are from the 26 master key bits used
in initializing registers A and B.
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Table 7.1: List of the master key bits used in the subkey generation of each round,
together with the counter value and the number of required guesses. r ≡ round no, G ≡
number of subkey/key bits that are guessed.
r St0 S
t
1 S
t
2 S
t
3 S
t
4 Ct−1 G
0 26 27 28 29 30 0 1
1 31 32 33 34 35 0 1
2 36 37 38 39 40 0 1
3 41 42 43 44 45 1 2
4 46 47 48 49 50 1 2
5 51 52 53 54 55 1 2
6 0 1 2 3 4 1 0
7 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
8 10 11 12 13 14 1 0
9 15 16 17 18 19 1 0
10 20 21 22 23 24 0 0
11 25 26 27 28 29 0 1
12 30 31 32 33 34 0 1
13 35 36 37 38 39 0 1
The cipher is initialized using 9 rounds and then a 5-bit plaintext is encrypted, so in total the
cipher runs for 14 rounds. Without loss of generality we assume that the starting key position
is 0, so the key bits at positions 0 to 25 are used in initializing registers A and B. Table 7.1
shows the key bits positions used from round 0 to round 13, the value of Ct−1 and the number
of guessed subkey/key bits. The table also shows that we have to guess 6 subkey bits and 6
master key bits plus the 26 master key bits used in initializing the registers. Note that when
6 ≤ r ≤ 10, the number of guesses G is zero regardless of the value of Ct−1 as all the five
master key bits involved in generating the corresponding round subkeys belong to the master
key bits at positions 0 to 24 (as shown in Table 7.1) which are part of the 26 master key bits
which we first guess to initialize registers A and B.
To recover 32 master key bits and 6 subkey bits using plaintexts of length 5-bit, we need only
d385 e = 8 plaintext/ciphertext pairs of length 5-bit to find the right key guess. The remaining
24 master key bits can be recovered using a brute force search. Thus, the total complexity of
the attack is in the order of 238. In order for the above attack to work we need to find only 8
plaintext/ciphertext pairs whose initial state pairs are initialized with position 0 as a starting
key position and are generated using 9 initialization rounds which we can easily find using the
5-bit counter key recovered in the previous attack.
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7.5 Final Remarks
7.5.1 Necessary Changes & Possible Improvements
In this section, we summarize the weaknesses of the published version of A2U2 [46] and propose
some possible improvements that would prevent the attacks described in this paper. However,
these possible improvements may be prone to other types of attacks, and a full re-evaluation
of the cipher would need to be performed in order to assess the strenghts of these potential
changes. The following weaknesses make the above attacks possible:
 The fact that the adversary knows the counter state at every instant facilitates crypt-
analysis. In particular, it significantly simplifies all algebraic expressions in the cipher,
bringing the algebraic degree down to 2 or even 1. Note that to fix this problem, a com-
pletely new mechanism for key/IV setup has to be developed. In addition, the size of
the counter register has to be increased significantly, since with the current register size,
the adversary can just guess the counter starting state which only contributes a factor
of 27 to the attack complexity. Furthermore, the potentially low number of nine clock
cycles to initialize the cipher is not sufficient to ensure a full mixing of the IV bits inside
the registers, giving the attacker some valuable information regarding the untouched
bits. There are several possible and complementary ways to fix these weaknesses:
1. In order to increase the number of rounds during initialization, the counter can be
set to an all-ones sequence and run for 127 clock cycles (27− 1) until it reaches an
all-ones sequence again. This would ensure a proper mixing of both registers bits.
2. At the end of the initialization phase, the counter value could be replaced by the 7
LSB of the secret key, reserved for this sole purpose. The 2 LSB that are fixed in
the original cipher description for initialization would no longer be required since
this new operation would occur after the 127 initialization rounds. This would
prevent an attacker from knowing the exact sequence of bits generated by the
counter.
3. However, this second measure does not solve the problem that the attacker just can
guess the initial 7 bits of the counter. As mentioned above, increasing the length
of the register would solve this issue, but it would be at the expense of numerous
additional gates (which contradicts the design principles of this cipher). A more
reasonable solution, in terms of gates, would be to XOR one (or several) external
bit(s) to the feedback function of the register. These bits could for example be the
output of the key scheduling mechanism or a bit from one of the nonlinear registers.
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In this way, the length of the register period would be significantly increased at a
very low cost.
 The original design mixes random values both from the reader and the tag to avoid replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks [46], which are of common concern in RFID systems.
However, the fact that the adversary has an influence (up to total control) on the IV
is a serious weakness for a stream cipher. In particular, it must not be possible for
the attacker to repeat the IV (nonce-respecting adversary [100]). Thus, it is common
practice for stream ciphers that the sender chooses the IV, e.g. as a counter or random
value. This design criterion should be adhered to. The registers’ IVs may be set as an
XOR operation of the tag’s pseudo-random number and the secret key.
 The key size itself should be increased, since a total key length of 56 bit is not strong
enough for modern standards. Due to the structure of the key scheduling mechanism,
the key size needs to be relatively prime with 5 in order to obtain the longest rotation
possible before reusing the same 5 key-bits. In addition, 7 bits need to be reserved for
the counter (after initialization). A minimum of 88 bits (81 + 7) would seem to be a
more reasonable choice. Given that the primary target of the printed tag encryption
protocol is to encrypt an EPC of 96 bits [49], having a key size longer than this value
would be at the compromise of the area available for the cryptosystem.
As mentioned earlier, when these weaknesses are fixed, a full re-evaluation of the cipher is
necessary. Note that in particular, the output unit leaks information (in form of a correlation)
about the inner state. Whether or not this information can be used for an attack depends
on the inner workings of the cipher. No simple answers can be given here without a full
specification of the new design.
Even though having short-size registers and building blocks will necessarily affect the strengh
of a cipher, design decisions have to keep in mind the need of designing a cipher small enough
to be integrated in printed electronics, where every additional gate counts2. This particular
target may have some practical sides regarding the amount of data one can collect. According
to the specifications of the ISO 14443 Standard [68], with a communication session of 400ms
between tag and reader, it would take more than 5 years to collect 236 bits of ciphertext from a
single tag, and approximately 6 months to collect 239 bits of ciphertext from 100 tags using the
same key. This number could be a limiting factor to break an improved version of A2U2, where
no practical attack could be performed with less than 239 bits of known plaintext/ciphertext.
2Every additional register in the design implies an increase of (at least) 6.25 GE. Increasing the size
of a static key (which is the case for passive RFID tags) comes at a lower cost of 1GE/bit. Moreover,
it is often assumed that some space is reserevd for the key inside the device, therefore coming at
practically no additional cost
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7.5.2 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented several attacks on the lightweight stream cipher A2U2 which all
constitute practical breaks of the cipher.
A2U2 is designed for IC printing. To keep the area small, short registers for the inner state
are used. A new output generator has been developed to increase the security of the cipher.
This output function works similar to the shrinking generator but it overcomes the problem
of the irregular output of ciphertext bits by outputting ‘dummy’ ciphertext bits such that
attacker does not know at which positions of the ciphertext plaintext bits were used.
We show that using only two chosen plaintexts, the cipher can be broken in a second by first
recovering the sequence which is used to produce the ciphertext and afterwards determine the
sequence which controls when plaintext bits are used.
Furthermore, we propose a guess-and-determine attack. We guess the positions where the
plaintext bits are used and set up a non-linear equation system which can be solved, e.g., using
Gro¨bner basis techniques. With this approach we can determine the key with a complexity of
249 guesses using a known plaintext of length less than a hundred bits.
We also investigated the possibilities of a chosen-IV attack. Choosing the IV allows us to
introduce a difference in the initial state of the register and keeping the counter constant at
the same time. Using a differential-style attack, we can identify a bias in the difference of
the first ciphertext bit when only 9 initialization rounds are used. Thus, we can recover the
counter.
When only 9 rounds of initialization are used, we can recover the master key using only 238
computational steps. We find 32 master key bits by guessing depending on the counter either
master key bits or the auxiliary value ht. The remaining master key bits can be found by
exhaustive search.
We conclude our analysis by pointing out some of the most severe weaknesses of the cipher.
The biggest and most obvious weakness is that the counter value at the beginning of the
encryption is known. However, any change made to the cipher demands a re-analysis of the
security. In the current state the cipher can be considered as badly broken.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, we evaluated the security of some lightweight ciphers. Specifically, we studied the
security of PRESENT-like ciphers, namely the block cipher PRESENT, the core permutation
of the hash function SPONGENT which can be seen as a block cipher with a zero round key
and the block cipher PRINTcipher. We also analyzed the security of the stream cipher
A2U2. In the following we summarize the results of this thesis and suggest some possible
future work.
An approach for estimating the probability of low-weight differential and linear approximations
in PRESENT-like ciphers has been provided in Chapter 4. This approach could also be used
for any cipher allowing low-weight differential and linear characteristics. The approach used
sparse submatrix of the correlation matrix with input and output masks having Hamming
weight at most 4 to find better linear approximations in SPONGENT and PRESENT.
One possible future work could be to combine this approach with the branch and bound
algorithm in order to add the good probabilities that might come from differential or linear
characteristics containing intermediate characteristics with Hamming weight more than 4.
Another possible future work could be to use parallel computing to construct matrices with
input and output entries with Hamming weight more than 4 to see whether this would improve
the linear attacks on PRESENT. Other possible improvements to speed up the submatrix
construction when considering input and output entries with Hamming weight more than 4
could be considering only calculating the correlations of those inputs which activate at most
2 Sboxes in the submatrix while setting the correlations of the other inputs to zero.
An interesting design topic could be to fix the PRESENT-like involution cipher PUFFIN
– which is not secure against both differential and linear cryptanalysis [20, 82] – by finding
the right combination of Sbox and bitwise permutation where both of them are involution
that is resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis for a number of rounds that is
equivalent to the number of rounds used by PRESENT. It would be interesting to see if such
a combination exists as it was shown in [53] that there is no Sbox with involution satisfying
the PRESENT Sbox criteria and it was also shown in [82] that there is no permutation with
involution satisfying the PRESENT permutation criteria – that is being optimal in the sense
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that full dependency is achieved in a minimum number of rounds. Note that this topic was
previously proposed in [20]. We believe that the submatrix approach would speed up the
search for the right combination of Sbox and permutation.
In Chapter 4, we also studied the effect of key scheduling on PRESENT-like ciphers. The
main result of this study is in showing that the distribution of linear approximations with
input and output masks in PRESENT with identical round keys has a larger variance than
those in PRESENT with the standard key scheduling of PRESENT (or independent round
keys). This shows that a PRESENT variant with identical round keys is less secure against
linear cryptanalysis than PRESENT with the standard key scheduling of PRESENT (or
independent round keys). More precisely, the fraction of keys with a squared correlation
larger than 2−53 is 33.7% in the case of identical round-keys but only 1.1% in the case of the
standard PRESENT key-scheduling. One possible future work is to study the distribution
of linear approximations with input and output masks with Hamming weight more than one
in PRESENT with identical round keys and see whether they would have a larger variance
compared to input and output masks with weight one.
In Chapter 5, we showed how to mount a differential attack on reduced rounds of PRINT-
cipher which uses a key dependent layer that seems to complicate differential attacks. One
of the two proposed differential attacks recovers the key dependent permutation layer of an
r-round PRINTcipher by computing the r-th root of a permutation. The chapter also shows
that a secure authentication protocol based on the many r-th roots of a permutation could
be designed. As pointed previously, we believe that finding a suitable mixing function for the
challenges and the secret key used in the authentication protocol beside a hardware imple-
mentation for this protocol are two interesting topics for future work.
In Chapter 6, we presented the invariant subspace attack and shows it relation to the sta-
tistical saturation attacks. The invariant subspace attack was successful on the full round
PRINTcipher and it found two classes of weak keys. Later the whole classes of weak keys
in PRINTcipher was found.
In Chapter 7, we presented several attacks against the stream cipher A2U2. Using two chosen
plaintexts we showed that the cipher can be broken in a second. A guess-and-determine known
plaintext attack was proposed. We proposed two attacks that exploit the use of low number
of initialization rounds. We also pointed out some possible improvements that would make
the cipher resistant against the proposed attacks.
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